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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1 Overview 
Adam Smith noted in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) that human exchange consists not just of goods 
and services, but also the trading of ideas, support and favors. Adam Smith’s invisible hand was therefore 
driven not just by market transactions, but also by social exchanges. Such social exchanges were viewed by 
Smith as fundamental for the creation of solutions that benefited the community as a whole. When a new 
solution is introduced to a community, the extent of its impact rests in its diffusion through the community 
social network. With the digitalization of the modern world has come an explosion of high-resolution 
network data, allowing innovation diffusion and impacts to be quantitatively analyzed. Seizing upon these 
data-opportunities, research on social network diffusion has taken hold across the social science and 
business worlds (Pentland, 2014). However in ‘offline’ networks, data collection costs remain high and only 
recently has attention turned to exploring diffusion of innovations within developing societies. This thesis 
contributes to a growing literature that explores relationships between social networks and innovation 
diffusion within a developing country context. Given this context, the networks of interest within this thesis 
are the offline interpersonal relationships between community members. Diffusion channels for new 
innovation are therefore limited to word-of-mouth communication, observation, and personal experience. 
While approaching these questions of how innovations diffuse through social networks, this thesis stays 
firmly rooted in the belief of idea exchange being a tool for creating positive community impacts. Using 
state of the art methods including field experiments, surveys, and simulations, this thesis asks how to better 
capitalize on how social networks can be leveraged for improving the effectiveness of practitioners in 
facilitating adoption of new innovations. While the chapters of this thesis provide interlinking insights on 
2 
 
this overarching question, each chapter is presented as a self-standing contribution to this emerging social 
network literature within development economics. This thesis begins by exploring current impacts of 
diffusion-based interventions on development outcomes before zooming in on critical design components 
within such interventions.  
2 Learning and Development 
Diffusion and social-learning based development initiatives have gained widespread popularity. Social-
learning based programs offer the promise of reaching a widespread audience at lower cost to the 
implementing agent.  While the specific design varies by intervention, many take the form of having 
professionals train a select number of community members who are then responsible for spreading learned 
information onwards through their social networks. Numerous studies have analyzed such programs and 
evaluated their effectiveness in catalyzing behavioral change in the fields of global health (Haider, Ashworth, 
Kabir, & Huttly, 2000; Kim et al., 2015; Kincaid, 2000; Oster & Thornton, 2012), microfinance (Banerjee 
et al., 2013; Bursztyn et al., 2014), insurance markets (Cai, 2012), and agriculture development (Beaman, 
Benyishay, William, & Mobarak, 2015; BenYishay & Mobarak, 2014; Conley & Udry, 2010; Kondylis, 
Mueller, & Zhu, 2014). 
Agricultural development within Africa has been of particular focus as productivity-enhancing inputs are 
seen as crucial for raising farmer yields and incomes. This is largely due to the growing evidence of 
information gaps acting as a major constraint to the diffusion of improved inputs (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; 
Munshi, 2003). The last decades have seen a rapid expansion of participatory agricultural extension programs 
which draw on this social learning frameworks. Many of these programs hinge on the argument that using 
community farmers as trainers improves knowledge transmission and learning because of the pre-existing 
relationships that external extension workers do not have (Simpson et al., 2015). These justifications 
highlight that practitioners recognize that information diffuses through social links and that social 
relationships effect influence. However only recently have these programs been approached and evaluated 
using more explicit network analysis methods (Beaman et al., 2015; Emerick, Janvry, Sadoulet, & Dar, 2016; 
Kim et al., 2015; Nourani, 2016).  
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In the context of agricultural innovations, motivations to adopt are largely tied to profit-maximization. 
However households in underdeveloped regions are largely independent from formal markets, making 
valuation of crop production and consumption difficult to quantify monetarily. As a result measuring returns 
on investment is often challenging for farmers and researchers alike.  This information quality constraint 
contributes to slower adoption rates observed within sub-Saharan Africa (Feder and Rosenzweig, 2010). 
Similarly, agricultural technologies have largely heterogeneous returns to producers. Observation of 
neighbors’ experiences with new innovations may be incorporated into adoption decision processes with 
lower confidence when prior adopters are not sufficiently comparable so as to provide a reliable benchmark 
of expected returns. In these situations, learning-by-doing may provide a more effective channel of learning. 
Direct experimentation would provide more accurate information on personal returns to adoption and be 
more influential in triggering adoption, assuming profitable returns are realizable.  
3 Networks 
The central focus of this thesis is the study of social networks as they relate to human decision-making and 
behavioral change. Before diving into why social networks are such an important component of 
understanding human decisions, the basic concepts of networks  pertinent to this thesis are described. In 
analyzing social networks, the relationships that connect individuals are explored to explain variation in 
behavior and decisions (REF). In constructing network data first one must define the entity of interest 
(“node”)  and the connecting relationship(s) of interest (“links” or “edges”).  By graphing networks, entire 
structures of nodes and links can be captured providing rich information on channels through which an 
individual may be shaped by social forces of interactions, information, and social sanctioning. Within this 
thesis nodes represent community households and links represent interpersonal relationships. Figure 1 
provides a visual representation of a 3-node networks with two alternative link formations. 
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Figure 1 Simple Networks Demonstrating Connectedness 
 
 
Network A of Figure 1 displays a network that is not completely connected while Network B is fully 
connected. In Network A, node X is linked to both Y and Z, but Y and Z are not linked with one another. 
In network terminology, this means that node X has a shortest path of 1 with both Y and Z while nodes Y 
and Z have a shortest path of 2 as two links must be travelled for them to reach one another (Y to X then 
X to Z). This is key to understanding information flows as it is the links between nodes that form the 
pathways by which information flows. In order for information from Y to reach Z, it must first go through 
X. However in Network B the network is completely connected, which means that all nodes are connected 
to all other nodes. The closer a network is to being completely connected the denser the network is 
considered to be. Density is an important measure as the structural level as information diffusion within 
denser networks is faster due to the numerous pathways by which the information can travel and reach all 
nodes (D. Centola, 2010; Choi, Kim, & Lee, 2010).  
The level of connectedness at the node level is also important. Within Network A, node X lies on all 
pathways. That is, no pathways of links exist that do not include X. In terms of information flows, this 
means X will participate in all information flows. In Network B, nodes Y and Z can pass information 
without node X participating. As networks scale up, and the number of nodes and links increases, numerous 
approaches to calculating connectedness become possible. However the general rule of thumb is that the 
more connected an individual node is with other nodes, the more likely that they will be reached by network 
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information flows. Therefore by analyzing social network structures, and the position of individuals within 
those structures, much can be elucidated on an individual’s participation within information flows and how 
that participation shapes behavior. 
4 Diffusion of Innovations 
When speaking of the diffusion of innovations, it is the rate at which innovations are adopted within a 
community or population that is the often the metric of interest.  However if the intent is to increase the 
adoption rate, one must disaggregate from the group down to the individual level and understand why some 
adopt and others do not. Adoption can be decomposed into two mutually-reinforcing stages: learning about 
the innovation through new information and the decision to adopt (or not) (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010; 
Pentland, 2014). Learning about new innovations goes beyond an awareness of their existence, but 
constitutes the information set an individual has on the use of, returns to, and costs associated with the 
innovation. Individuals learn about new innovations through social learning or experiential learning. Social 
learning is when individuals source information through their interpersonal relationships. This may be 
through direct conversation, over-hearing conversations second hand, or observation of peers who have 
already adopted the innovation. Experiential learning, or learning-by-doing, is gained through personal 
experimentation with a new innovation. All sources of learning are incorporated into the information set 
on the new innovation and is used in determining whether adopting the innovation is expected to yield 
higher returns relative to the status quo. However the different information sources may be weighted and 
incorporated differently. Information received through social learning may be factored into the adoption 
decision both less accurately and more lightly as it comes with greater quality and applicability concerns, 
depending on its source, relative to first-hand experience (BenYishay & Mobarak, 2014; Hanna et al., 2014; 
Nourani, 2016). Importantly, non-adoption of an innovation does not preclude learning from having 
occurred, only that the new information did not result in adjusting expected returns so as to warrant 
adoption (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). Learning, and the spread of new information, is therefore a critical 
forum for understanding adoption of new innovations and their resulting impacts on societies.    
Evidence suggests that information flows most strongly through the interpersonal relationships that make 
up the underlying social networks of communities (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010; Hardy & Mccasland, 2015; 
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Pentland, 2014; Thomas W. Valente, 1996). Network structures therefore map out the pathways by which 
information flows. They are a major determinant of the learning and decisions processes that determine 
innovation adoption . An individual’s position within their network structure will be highly determinant in 
the intensity with which they are exposed to new information and how that new information changes 
existing beliefs that drive adoption decisions.  More frequent exposure to the new information increases the 
probability that individuals are aware of new innovations earlier and able to gain a more complete picture 
of the innovation’s expected returns to adoption (Aral, Muchnik, & Sundararajan, 2009; D. Centola, 2010; 
D. M. Centola & Macy, 2007).  
Not all exposure is equally impactful on the adoption decision, as certain network connections have a 
stronger social influence than others. Receiving new information from a socially influential network tie will 
have a greater likelihood of affecting behavioral change than information received from a non-influential 
tie. Social influence is not a static metric. It varies both within and across network connections. Individuals 
will be more susceptible to influence from those that they deem to be a domain expert, are similar in 
pertinent characteristic or behaviors, and with whom they feel a strong measure of trust (BenYishay & 
Mobarak, 2014; D. M. Centola & Macy, 2007; Pentland, 2014). The relationship between source and 
recipient in inciting adoption becomes more relevant for more complex innovations, or in instances where 
the knowledge gap between believed and real adoption returns is greater  (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010).  
Both exposure and influence are closely correlated to the underlying social network structure and as a result 
network structures can be as influential in determining behavioral change as the content of information that 
is being spread. Network structures, and the flow of information, is constructed by interpersonal 
relationships and communication. In understanding diffusion dynamics and network structures thus hinges 
on channels of interpersonal communication within a given context. 
Such channels of interpersonal communication vary widely between developed and under-developed 
regions of the world (Chuang & Schechter, 2000). In modern societies, the prevalence of mobile phones 
and online social media platforms have created communities that are at a massive-scale. This digitalization 
of network data has provided an unprecedented opportunity for network diffusion dynamics to be analyzed 
quantitatively with high-resolution data. This opportunity has been eagerly seized, with social diffusion 
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research growing rapidly and the emergence of social physics as an independent field (Pentland, 2015). A 
second result of digitalization is a fundamental restructuring of networks from local to global combined 
with an acceleration in the speed at which information is transmitted. Evidence suggests that diffusion 
dynamics in modern networks operate differently than in traditional network structures where information 
is less abundant and slower moving  as ICT infrastructure remains largely absent (Choi et al., 2010; Dutta, 
Lanvin, & Paua, 2004). Social networks in these regions are formed and maintained through face-to-face 
interactions and word-of-mouth communication.  Mapping social networks in the absence of digitalized 
communities is costly and time-intensive. Only recently have studies turned their attention to quantitatively 
analyzing the diffusion dynamics of these traditional ‘offline’ communities (Banerjee et al., 2013; Beaman et 
al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015). 
Understanding adoption of new technologies within rural communities is best conducted at the community 
level. These community social networks can then be used to identify influential members who can better 
promote adoption of the technologies (Barahona and Pentland, 2007). By selecting these influential 
individuals as the injection points of new information into community social networks, faster-paced 
diffusion is better achieved. Once critical thresholds of adoption are achieved, mass adoption occurs and 
the new innovation transitions into common practice (Aral, Muchnik, & Sundararajan, 2013; D. M. Centola 
& Macy, 2007; Thomas W. Valente, 1996; Thomas W. Valente & Davis, 1999). Influential individuals have 
been found to cluster in the network, indicating that influential individuals are typically well connected to 
other influential network members. This clustering would make influential individuals prime targets as 
network entry points for increasing network adoption rates of new innovations and reaching thresholds of 
mass adoption (Valente and Davis, 1999; Aral and Walker, 2012). An individual’s centrality within a network 
has been shown as a key characteristics for rapid diffusion and serves as a metric of identifying influential 
individuals. However numerous measures of centrality are available and identifying the appropriate measure 
by which entry points are selected must be tailored to the specificities of the technology in question.  
Diffusion of simple technologies relies primarily on awareness and imitation. Use of simple technologies is 
easily achieved through observation and requires little additional training or focused knowledge for reaping 
returns. More complex technologies consist of greater knowledge intensity in order to capture returns to 
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adoption. Their use may require continued access to information and support on proper use in order for 
sufficient returns on investment to be successfully realized (Barahona and Pentland, 2007). Therefore, the 
more complex the technology, the more important the underlying network structure. Complex technologies 
require more frequent and repeated exposures as well as higher levels of confidence in the information being 
received in order to trigger adoption.  
In determining the selection of individuals as network entry-points, the knowledge-intensity of a technology 
must be factored in along with the desired network positioning of the targeted entry-points. Centrality is a 
key metric in understanding the power and influence that a given individual has within their community 
social network. Numerous measures of centrality exist and  determining the proper one is dependent on the 
type of information being spread and the objectives of the program (Borgatti, 2005; T. W. Valente, 2012). 
Recursive measures, such as eigenvector centrality, capture how well connected individuals are to other 
highly connected individuals, positioning it as a measure of influence. Chapter 3 of this dissertation explores 
whether diffusion of new technologies varies substantially when network injection points are selected based 
on eigenvector centrality. 
5 Network Diffusion and Development 
Development practitioners relying on social learning mechanisms, as seen within agricultural extension 
programs, highlights an implicit recognition of information diffusion through interpersonal relationships. 
Harnessing diffusion dynamics to strengthen social learning processes could generate positive impacts on 
development program effectiveness. Unfortunately, the data demands for network-based intervention 
implementation may be prohibitively high for development practitioners. Evidence suggests that network 
members have implicit, but incomplete, information on the network structures within which they are 
embedded (Banerjee et al., 2014). Chapter 4 explores whether a cost-effective means of harnessing network-
dynamics can be found by aggregating network members incomplete information sets through a 
community-wide nomination process of contact-points.  Finally, social learning programs require network 
contact-points be sufficiently pro-social so as to incur some individual costs in sharing information onwards, 
for the benefit of the wider community. Chapter 5  explores relationships between pro-social preferences 
with network centrality.  
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6 Objectives 
Social networks provide a major channel through which information diffuse through populations. While 
information on new innovations is a critical component of the decision to adopt, the diffusion process of 
innovations is more complicated than just the spread of information. Technology adoption requires that an 
individual believes the returns of the new technology outweigh returns of existing technologies. This 
dissertation explores dynamics of interpersonal diffusion through social networks within the context of 
agricultural development of small holder crop producers in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While 
the independent chapters of the dissertation are academic in their methodologies and the specificity of their 
research questions, the aim of the thesis as a whole is to apply the insights from these chapters to 
development initiative design. The overarching objective of this dissertation is to identify opportunities 
within the design and implementation of development initiatives for improved harnessing of social network 
diffusion dynamics.  
Chapter 2 Can social learning and subsidized personal experimentation increase farmer crop 
output levels? 
Chapter 3 Does selection of network entry points using eigenvector central individuals improve 
technology diffusion? 
Chapter 4 Can community nomination of entry points provide a cost-effective alternative to 
network-based entry point selection? 
Chapter 5 Is an individual’s position with their network related to demonstrated pro-social 
preferences? 
 
Chapter 2 provides a snapshot on an existing diffusion-based intervention design to explore its effectiveness 
in accomplishing objectives of improving farmer welfare via higher crop output. This intervention uses 
traditional extension program selection methods of imposing socioeconomic criteria and selecting network 
entry points from eligible candidates. Chapters 3 and 4 dive into this question of network entry selection 
and effective diffusion by exploring alternative selection methods. Chapter 3 focuses on selection based 
solely on network parameters of eigenvector centrality while Chapter 4 assesses less data-costly alternatives 
of harnessing community knowledge on network structures though an open nomination process. Chapter 
5 explores the relationship of social preferences and network centrality. In better understanding the 
10 
 
relationship between these traits, a clearer picture emerges on the links between exposure and social 
influence for better selection of network contact points. Taken in combination, the chapters provide an 
overview of available network dynamics that can be manipulated within intervention designs for generating 
stronger diffusion program impacts.  
7 Methodology 
7.1 Experimental Methods 
Development economics has a lengthy history of collecting original data and testing specific economic 
theories through quantitative analysis.  The size and quality of datasets within developing country continue 
to grow as technologies enable lower-cost data collection, allowing for richer datasets to be used within such 
empirical tests. However observational data makes identification of causal relationships empirically 
challenging. In efforts to better identify causal relationship, development economists have pulled on 
methodological approaches applied in other fields of research, most notably the fields of medicine, 
psychology, labor, and industrial organization (Duflo, 2006). This thesis draws primarily on three of these 
experimental methodologies, randomized controlled trials, field experiments and lab-in-field experiments. 
Impact evaluations based on randomized controlled trials offers an opportunity for measuring causal, rather 
than just correlational, relationships between development interventions and behavioral change. Impact 
evaluations are conducted in natural environments with participants that may be unaware of their decisions 
being studied (Barrett & Carter, 2010; Gneezy & Imas, 2017). Impact evaluations are most effective in 
testing the effectiveness of solutions to specific practical problems within a given setting. The evaluation 
therefore tests prior theories on the most effective means of eliciting particular behavioral changes for 
overcoming the problem in question (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Barrett & Carter, 2010; Duflo, 2006). Chapter 
2 of this thesis employs a quasi-experimental design in testing the impact of social learning and reduced-
cost access to experimentation on increasing technology adoption. These interventions are specifically 
designed to the context and obstacles that farmers in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are facing. 
While impact evaluations offer causal identifications of intervention impacts on development outcomes, 
they speak less to the underlying mechanisms that explain behavioral change. 
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Lab-in-field experiments are a marriage of the two approaches, offering more controlled measurement of 
behavioral responses, moving standardized, and validated, laboratory designs to more naturalistic 
environments (Gneezy & Imas, 2017). Lab-in-field experiments are specifically used to measure individual 
preferences and behavioral responses under highly controlled conditions. As a result lab-in-field 
experiments allow direct comparison of results across geographies and populations (Harrison & List, 2004). 
However the extent to which lab-measured behaviors correspond to ‘real world’ behavior remains contested 
(Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2010; Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Levitt & List, 2007; Roe & 
Just, 2009). Chapter 5 of this thesis utilizes lab-in-field experimental methodologies in eliciting the social 
preferences of community members. Specifically, we use variations of the standard investment game  and 
public goods game. 
Framed field experiments provide a marriage of the two above experimental methodologies. They offer a 
more controlled environment to test behavioral responses to solutions addressing specific development 
problems while providing insights on underlying mechanisms. Chapter 3 of this thesis uses a framed-field 
experiment in order to measure the difference in diffusion patterns resulting from two different types of 
network entry-points: most eigenvector central versus lease eigenvector central.  
7.2 Network Analysis 
Social institutions lies at the heart of each chapter within this thesis. A the most important institution 
measured within this thesis is that of the underlying network structures of the sample communities. Unlike 
network analysis that is conducted on digital networks, existing data on community networks in remote 
regions of the world is extremely sparse. All network data included within this thesis is original and collected 
through intensive surveying. In mapping networks through surveys, critical concerns that were factored into 
survey designs were the structure of relationship questions, which relationships to map, and measurement 
error resulting from memory bias. 
The network mapping strategy used throughout this thesis pulls strongly from  the approach used in 
Banerjee et al. (2013).  Deviations from their approach include fewer relationship types being measured and 
the format in which responses were collected. Unlike Banerjee et al. (2013), no upper limit was imposed on 
the number of names  listed per relationship type. Unlimited self-reporting of network ties intrinsically 
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introduces data-quality concerns of memory bias. As a safe-guard against this, a full census of households 
was read off once for each relationship of interest. Respondents were asked to respond “yes” or “no” with 
each name, indicating whether the relationship was present or not between them. The trade-off with this 
approach is survey-fatigue, as repeatedly reading off long-lists of names is time-intensive and fails to hold 
the interest of the respondent. To minimize risks of survey-fatigue, network mapping was limited to three 
dimensions found to be most important for the agricultural context. While incomparable to the rich network 
datasets generated by digitalized networks, these network maps provide a novel glimpse into the social lives 
of rural communities. The dataset used in this thesis is one of only a few that measures nearly complete 
community networks within such an underdeveloped region of the world. 
8 Outline 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 uses a quasi-experimental design in evaluation two agricultural 
interventions on raising farmer crop output in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The first treatment 
arm relies only on a social learning design while the second combines the social learning program with an 
additional layer of reduced-cost experimentation in the form of an offer for subsidized packages of 
improved inputs. Chapter 3 studies diffusion processes of in-organic fertilizer and associated information 
on the use and returns to in-organic fertilizer application. Specifically it explores whether diffusion can be 
improved by selecting entry points into community networks based on eigenvector centrality. Chapter 4 
tests whether community-selection of injection points offers a comparably alternative for improving 
diffusion without necessitating the same prohibitive data-demands of network-based selection. Chapter 5 
studies whether pro-social values of trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation are associated with network 
position. Incentivized lab-in-field experiments are used to elicit these social preferences of a sub-sample of 
community members. These community members are drawn based on eigenvector centrality scores within 
their respective networks. Chapter 6 concludes by discussing the main findings of this thesis and the cross-
cutting lessons gleaned from the individual chapters. In addition, the limitations of the thesis are reviewed 
and recommendations for future research are suggested.    
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CHAPTER 2 
Raising Farmer Yields in Eastern D.R. Congo 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Yields in Africa remain persistently and substantially below potential levels of output. More intensive use of improved 
agricultural inputs has been put forward as a strategy for raising farm productivity and improving livelihoods of smallholder 
farmers. However adoption of improved inputs are within the region has been slow. Considerable evidence points to the role of 
information gaps in the low adoption of productivity-enhancing inputs in perpetuating these low yields. This study analyses two 
policy tools in targeting these information gaps. The first is through social learning as part of a farmer extension program. The 
second combines social learning with experiential learning, reducing the cost to personal experimentation with subsidized 
improved input packages. Our results indicate that farmers who are exposed to both social learning and learning-by-doing more 
significantly impacts farmer productivity relative to those receiving no intervention and those exposed only to social learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publication Status: Ross, M. 2017. “Raising Farmer Yields in Eastern D.R. Congo: social learning and 
reduced-cost experiential learning on farmer productivity.” Working Paper.   
16 
 
1 Introduction 
Amidst increasing concerns of food security, high rural-to-urban migration, and persistent poverty within 
sub-Saharan Africa, policy makers have become increasingly focused on improving currently low output 
levels of smallholder farmers (World Bank, 2007; FAO, 2009; Godfray et al., 2010; Irz, Lin, Thirtle, & 
Wiggins, 2001; Rosegrant & Cline, 2003). While farmers in developed regions of the world achieve an 
average of 80% of potential crop yields, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa experience rates closer to 20% 
(Tittonell & Giller, 2013). This large gap between realized and potential yield levels is thought to best be 
closed through more intensive use of productivity-enhancing inputs such as improved seeds, in-organic 
fertilizer, and improved pest and disease management systems, however adoption rates of these technologies 
remain very low. Considerable evidence points to the role of information gaps in the low adoption of 
productivity-enhancing inputs within the region (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Conley & Udry, 2010; Kondylis 
et al., 2014). Additional constraints on output and agricultural technology adoption include missing credit, 
input, and output markets and poor soil fertility management (USDA, 2013; Fafchamps et al., 2005;World 
Bank, 2008; Denning et al., 2009; Ehui & Pender, 2005). These constraints both independently and in 
combination obstruct agricultural development within the area and perpetuate low crop yields. 
Current barriers to agricultural development stem directly from constraints, both resource and knowledge, 
faced by farmers and indirectly from larger institutional and infrastructural contexts within which farmers 
make their production decisions. Direct constraints would consist of farmer knowledge gaps on improved 
production processes and management systems and insufficient financial resources, both in terms of cash 
endowments and access to credit, for adopting productivity-enhancing inputs. These direct constraints are 
both more targetable and more easily manipulated in the short term, but face limitations in their scope of 
impact as persistent shifts in production require that higher productivity yields economic returns. When 
institutional indirect effects prevent farmers from reaping profits from productivity-enhancing technologies, 
farmers have little incentive to adopt the technologies and shift their production processes. Institutional 
constraints can take the form of high market transaction costs, an absence of credit or insurance markets, 
missing value chain linkages between local and export markets, insecure property rights, and unreliable 
governing institutions. These indirect constraints are larger and slower-moving barriers that require shifts 
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in the institutional framework of a region, making them difficult to target with external development 
programs and initiatives. 
Ultimately, the combination and type of constraints a farmer faces will determine what level of production 
is efficient as well as how effective interventions that address different constraints  will be in shifting the 
farmer to a new, higher, efficient output level. This study explores two policy instruments of choice for 
development practitioners that target constraints of information to improved inputs in inducing technology 
adoption and raising farmer output levels. The first is an information-transfer approach while the second 
seeks to lower the costs associated with learning-by-doing through experimentation. This study uses a quasi-
experimental design in evaluating a purely information-transfer approach against a combined information-
transfer with lowered transaction costs to experimentation on raising farmer crop yields. Section 2 presents 
the implicit theory that underlies information-transfer and transaction-cost targeting agricultural 
development programs as well as existing empirical studies that evaluate the effectiveness of farmer 
extension and subsidization projects on outcomes of technology adoption and farmer productivity.  
The intervention consists of two treatment arms. The first treatment arm provides farmers with agricultural 
extension services covering soil fertility management, legume production (in particular common beans and 
soybeans), in-organic fertilizer use, and improved farm management methods. The second treatment 
combines this same agricultural extension service with an additional offer for subsidized input packages. 
The first treatment thus targets knowledge gaps independently while the second targets both knowledge 
gaps and transaction cost to experimentation simultaneously. Both treatment arms are compared to a control 
group that receives neither intervention.  
Our study proposes to contribute to existing literature in three ways. First, those farm and household 
characteristics that contribute to greater farmer crop output in a remote and under-developed region of sub-
Saharan Africa are explored. These characteristics can provide insights on channels through which 
agriculture development programs can be effectively targeted. Second,  a quasi-experimental methodology 
is used to analyze synergistic benefits of addressing both information and financial constraints 
simultaneously through a dual-treatment structure. Farmers are randomly selected to receive either farmer-
led agricultural extension alone or agricultural extension combined with a subsidized input-package offer. 
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Using a difference-in-difference model I am able to isolate the effect of the extension program 
independently and compare results to the impact of  the combined extension and subsidy program on farmer 
technical efficiency and total output value. This design effectively evaluates a purely social learning design 
versus a combined social learning with reduced cost experimentation in identifying a more effective means 
of addressing information constraints to agricultural technology adoption. Third, I explore which 
production decisions may have been most influenced by the two  interventions, and are therefore more 
malleable facets of smallholder production which agricultural policy can target within intensification 
programs.  
Results indicate that addressing a combination of social learning with reduced-cost experimentation 
simultaneously generates larger benefits in terms of raising overall farm output compared to providing only 
the social learning-based extension program. Model estimates show a significant impact for only the 
combined extension-plus-subsidy treatment arm on total value of farm output. In exploring channels 
through which the intervention may have effected crop yields, households in this treatment arm are found 
to be more likely to change their intercropping patterns, to reduce their overall input use between time 
periods, and to be more likely to adopt in-organic fertilizer on their farm. The reduction in total input use 
suggests farmers are realizing synergistic benefits of adopting improved inputs and management processes 
that allow greater output for small input bundles. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 positions this study within the existing 
literature on agricultural extension, social learning, and technology adoption. Section 3 provides a detailed 
overview of the study design, specifically the two interventions evaluated within this study. Section 4 outlines 
the empirical model used in evaluating intention to treat effects of the two interventions. Additionally, 
Section 4 presents empirical models used to explore potential mechanisms driving estimated treatment 
effects. Specifically, I analyze the impact of the interventions on production decisions of intercropping 
behavior, total inputs used on farm, yield levels for common beans, and uptake in in-organic fertilizer. 
Section 5 provides a summary of the data collected while Section 6 catalogues estimated results. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Information within Technology Adoption Decisions 
Despite productivity-enhancing technology adoption being identified as being a critical channel for 
agricultural development within sub-Saharan Africa, adoption rates in the region remain low (Kondylis et 
al., 2014; World Bank, 2008). Knowledge gaps have been identified as a major contributor to the low 
adoption rates, prompting initiatives to better diffuse information around the returns on investment for and 
proper use of improved inputs (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Conley & Udry, 2010; Kondylis et al., 2014). 
Agricultural technology adoption is largely prompted by expected returns on investment for the new 
technology being greater than returns on investment of existing technologies. A seemingly simple 
relationship, identifying and quantifying returns in practice is complex and knowledge factors into the 
adoption decisions in several forms (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). 
Knowledge acts as a major determinant of the shape of a household’s production function as it drives the 
perception a farmer has of the expected output levels for a given allocation of inputs across produced 
outputs. Knowledge may shape the production function through multiple forms. It may be in the skill with 
which a factor is applied within the production process, in the perception of output variability given a set 
of inputs, or in information on the prices and transaction costs for markets which a farmer uses in 
determining their market participation levels and the proportion of output to consume versus sell. Limited 
information can thus create a divergence between the distributions of actual versus perceived net benefits 
in several key areas of production decision making, causing uptake levels to be held artificially low as farmers 
misestimate expected overall returns to adoption (Feder & Slade, 1984).  
Sources of knowledge can come through direct knowledge transfer (e.g. formal trainings), observation of 
prior adopters, or personal experimentation. The appropriate combination of sources for most effectively 
aligning farmer perceptions of returns is highly variable depending on the technology in question. Direct 
knowledge transfers are more effective for technologies that are more knowledge-intensive and whose 
returns on investment are more sensitive to quality of application. While formal trainings can provide general 
information on application techniques and average returns to adoption, they are not necessarily able to 
provide farmer-specific information on how to best achieve these productivity gains given the farmer’s input 
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bundles, crops of production, and farm characteristics (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010).  Learning through 
observation of prior adopters provides a sample of more heterogeneous examples of returns to adoption 
without necessitating costs of investment to the observer. However learning is still incomplete as perfect 
information on complementary aspects of production and the integration of the new technology (e.g. 
interactions between the technology and soil quality) is impossible through observation alone (Maertens & 
Barrett, 2012). Therefore for technologies that have highly heterogeneous returns, learning-by-doing 
provides more complete information both on expected returns and optimal allocation and application of 
inputs with the new technology for achieving highest returns given the farmer’s production conditions. 
However for technologies that must be purchased through markets, experiential learning requires some 
investment and introduces potential financial barriers. 
As knowledge endowments evolve through experience, observation, or formal training, expectations around 
output variability is reduced and, under conditions where real positive returns to investment exist for the 
farmer, the production function under the new technologies shifts from low to high perceived net returns. 
This shift in expected returns increases the likelihood of both whether and how intensely a new innovation 
is adopted (Hiebert, 1974).  
2.2 Determinants of Technology Adoption 
While more accurate information on the returns and proper use of improved inputs is a critical component 
of decisions to adopt new technologies, it purely shapes the beliefs of farmers on the profitability of 
adoption. Action depends on farmers beliefs changing sufficiently that a switching threshold, at which the 
net returns to the new innovation are believed to be greater than the new returns of the existing technology. 
For smallholder farmers who both consume and market their output and produce primarily with household 
labor and self-produced inputs, identifying the net returns of new technologies is not straight forward. This 
section outlines the general framework within which agricultural households make their crop production 
decisions.  
Agricultural households are characterized by the non-separability of their consumption and production 
decisions in the allocation of their fixed set of input resources (Benjamin, 1992; Ellis, 1993; Taylor & 
Adelman, 2003). This interdependency between production and consumption makes it necessary that 
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farmers optimize not solely based on production functions but instead optimize both consumption and 
production simultaneously under a single utility function (Benjamin, 1992). Households then maximize 
utility with simultaneous production and consumption decisions subject to constraints of available cash, 
productive asset endowments, family time and preferences between labor and leisure, production 
technologies, and prices of inputs, outputs, and non-produced consumption goods (Feder & Umali, 1993; 
Taylor & Adelman, 2003). In constructing agricultural household production functions the relationships of 
factor-output, factor-factor, and output-output are critical in shaping farmer production expectations over 
which they maximize utility (Ellis, 1993). In the simplest models, farmers decide to adopt a new technology 
by estimating the profitability of adoption based on three key production relationships: factor-output, 
factor-factor, and output-output. Optimal use, and maximal profits, rely on each of these relationships being 
efficiently balanced; a process typically achieved with information gained through experimentation, 
observation of prior adopters, and formal knowledge transfer channels. 
The factor-output relationship captures the transformation of a given input into generated output. 
Innovations that increase the farmer’s yield for a given level of inputs are said to be productivity enhancing. 
Factor-factor relationships captures the combinations of inputs that generate a given level of output. Factors 
are often interrelated and can be conceptualized as packages of complements. New technologies cannot 
therefore be evaluated purely in their independent relationship to outputs, but their relationships with other 
existing factors of land, labor, and farm size must also be considered (Ellis, 1993). The linkages between a 
technology and other factors of production will determine the extent to which farmers are able to realize 
synergistic benefits and the how the shape of the production function changes with the introduction of a 
new technology. Things become more complicated as multiple new technologies become available that have 
positive synergistic relationships with one another. With multiple technologies the probability of both 
technologies being adopted simultaneously increases with stronger synergistic benefits, higher divisibility of 
the two technologies, and lower transaction costs in acquiring the technologies and selling extra generated 
output (Feder & Umali, 1993).   
Finally, output-output relationships are relevant  as they determine how to allocate a fixed bundle of input 
resources across output activities. This relationship becomes most pertinent when innovative technologies 
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are output specific or when the technology is a new output activity.  Each of these provides economic 
incentives for a re-allocation of the household’s fixed set of inputs while simultaneously accounting for the 
factor-output and factor-factor relationships that are relevant for the optimal allocation of resources to 
generate expected outputs that will maximize household utility. 
Developing countries face infrastructure and exacerbated production uncertainty that restricts agricultural 
households investments in new technologies as adjustments in product (food) output and factor (labor and 
land) utilization is constrained (Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991). As a result, practicalities of missing 
markets and household risk must be incorporated into models of agricultural decision making as obstacles 
in capturing potential returns to new technologies are present. Numerous models were developed to more 
precisely reflect real world realities that  prevent farmers from realizing potential returns on investments in 
improved inputs and therefore contribute to observed low adoption rates of these inputs (Feder & Umali, 
1993).  
A market is defined as “missing” if the cost of market-participation is sufficiently high that the optimal 
household strategy is one of self-sufficiency. Transaction costs that decrease profitability of produced goods 
and raise purchase prices of consumed goods create price bands in which a household is best off 
withdrawing from formal markets and becoming self-sufficient (Key, Sadoulet, & Janvry, 2000). As 
transaction costs are not uniform, households have varying levels of integration into product, factor, and 
labor markets. The more integrated into the market, the more responsive a household is to productivity-
enhancing technologies as the differences in market prices and a household’s shadow price is more easily 
reduced to the point households can capture returns on their excess output (Key et al., 2000).  As a result, 
any price-targeting policies within these markets will have ambiguous effects on technology adoption 
decisions depending on whether transaction costs outweigh expected returns to adoption (Taylor & 
Adelman, 2003). High transaction costs of acquiring new innovations limit self-experimentation, a more 
direct information source on the suitability of new technologies for specific farm conditions and potential 
productivity returns. 
In addition to facing imperfect market integration, agricultural households in developing countries also face 
high uncertainty. Crop production as mitigating strategies are limited and market prices are highly responsive 
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to variations in supply, an interlinkage that can create multiplicative effects which households have to 
account for within their production decisions. In the face of sunk costs to production and high uncertainty, 
farmers prioritize flexibility over scale and lower risk over higher potential maximum output levels in making 
their adoption decisions (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Hiebert, 1974). Risk aversion has been found to be 
negatively correlated to a farmer’s wealth. As wealthier farmers have a larger buffer against failure, they’re 
more willing to engage in more productive, but higher risk, technologies (Just & Zilberman, 1983). This 
relationship between risk-aversion and wealth can result in risk-induced poverty traps as marginal producers 
are restricted to less profitable technologies, effectively trapping them in poverty (Dercon & Christiaensen, 
2008; Fermont, van Asten, Tittonell, van Wijk, & Giller, 2009; Tittonell & Giller, 2013).  Tendencies of 
farmers to prioritize low risk investments highlights the need for farmers to have access to accurate 
information on the potential returns to investment. Farmer uncertainty is exacerbated by farmers having 
highly variable expectations around technology performance and effects on productivity.  
2.3 Agricultural Extension Interventions 
While increasing farmer productivity is the decisive goal of policy makers, division remains over the best 
channel through which to develop agriculture and increase farmer output levels (Christiaensen, Pan, & 
Wang, 2010)). Many agricultural development policies push for adoption of yield-increasing inputs such as 
improved seeds, in-organic fertilizer, and greater soil, pest, and disease management processes. Adoption of 
high-yielding genotypes has been widespread through sub-Saharan Africa but adoption of in-organic 
fertilizer and new farm management processes have failed to take off (Foltz, Aldana, & Laris, 2012; Morris, 
Kelly, Kopicki, & Byerlee, 2007; Nisrane et al., 2011; Zingore, 2011). These low adoption rates are frequently 
attributed to two primary sources: knowledge gaps and market constraints. Agricultural extension has 
become a popular tool for targeting knowledge gaps in efforts to increase adoption rates of improved inputs.     
Our study is designed to assess the impact of an agricultural development project that uses farmer extension 
and subsidized input packages in addressing knowledge transfer and cost-to-experimentation constraints. 
Extension programs often involve a participatory approach that provide farmers with information on-, 
practical training with-, and opportunities to observe experimental plots with improved inputs and 
management practices. Isolating impact effects of extension programs on farmer productivity is complicated 
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by a complex chain of causation that includes knowledge, adoption of better practices, and investment in 
improved inputs. Despite these causal-chain challenges, rigorous evaluation of extension programs is 
necessary to determine whether returns to beneficiaries sufficiently justify the high program implementation 
costs.  
To date, agriculture extension evaluations yield mix results (for a review, see Anderson & Feder, 2007). 
Many evaluations are riddled with issues of  data quality, measurement error, and methodological weaknesses 
that undermine causality. However, several studies have emphasized the importance of program design in 
targeting local production constraints and farmer needs . One area of particular focus is the extent to which 
agricultural extension services are currently pro-poor. Several studies suggest that program benefits are being 
disproportionately accrued by wealthier farmers (Agyei-Holmes, Ayerakwa, Osei, & Osei-Akoto, 2011; 
Cerdán-Infantes, 2008; Cunguara & Moder, 2011). 
The second constraint to agricultural development this study specifically targets is cost to self-
experimentation with new technologies. Weak or missing financial markets result in poor access to credit 
and insufficient funds to purchase improved inputs while access to input markets are often associated with 
distortionary transportation costs, driving up input prices and undermining the economic viability of 
improved-input use for remote farmers. Growing new or failing markets into functional institutions is 
beyond the scope of development practitioners so market constraints are typically targeted through 
subsidization. Subsidy schemes vary in their precise structure and scope, but all are intended to lower existing 
price barriers sufficiently to open markets up to farmers with limited resources.  
Subsidization of agricultural inputs is still widely debated in its effectiveness as a policy tool. Proponents of 
subsidization argue that subsidies encourage adoption and/or optimal use of improved inputs by addressing 
constraints arising from risk aversion and market imperfections (Crawford & Kelly, 2006; Druilhe & 
Barreiro-hurlé, 2012). Critiques argue that subsidies increase demand for inputs, driving up market prices 
and making sustainability of the programs costly for governments. Critiques also highlight that subsidies are 
susceptible to political corruption and could crowd out commercial distribution channels (Crawford & 
Kelly, 2006; Druilhe & Barreiro-hurlé, 2012).  
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Studies evaluating the returns to subsidization schemes contain mixed results on the success of input 
subsidization in kick-starting agriculture development. Similar to the extension program evaluation studies, 
several subsidy-impact studies emphasize the necessity for smart designs. The importance of training on 
proper input use, timing of subsidy offers, and targeting of beneficiaries to avoid disproportionate capture 
by wealthy farmers have all been highlighted as key considerations for maximizing effectiveness  (Carter, 
Laajaj, & Yang, 2014; Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011; Marenya & Barrett, 2009). However no clear 
consensus has emerged on whether subsidization positively impacts agricultural intensification efforts. 
This study focuses on a one-off subsidization offer for the purpose of allowing farmers to experiment with 
a selection of improved inputs on their own fields for a single growing season. It is likely that interaction 
effects between knowledge transfer through social learning and personal experimentation exist. This study 
aims to better understand such interaction effects and whether the additional costs of providing subsidized 
inputs for experimentation is justified by greater gains to farmer output and productivity.  
3 Research design 
3.1 South Kivu Province 
This study is set in South Kivu province of eastern DRC, a region that faces  entrenched poverty and 
persistent armed conflict insecurity. Central government institutions are only weakly present with localized 
governance institutions providing the main structure of political daily life. Infrastructure in the region is 
under-developed, resulting in poor access to markets and high transportation costs in moving goods. The 
local population relies primarily on subsistence agriculture with limited off-farm wage Labor opportunities. 
Agricultural production takes place over two growing season, a short season from February through June 
and a longer season from July through December . Despite two growing periods and supplementation of 
some off-farm wage Labor, current estimates are that greater than 60% of regional households are food 
insecure. Food insecurity challenges are compounded by high regional population growth rates and limited 
supply of still un-cultivated arable land. The combination of these two forces creates persistent excess 
demand for land and rapid soil degradation (CIALCA, 2007).  
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Topographically and agri-ecologically, the region is quite varied across the large province. Much of the land 
is characterized as tropical highlands with average altitude in the area of 1,500 meters above sea level 
(CGIAR, 2014; Maass, Musale, Chiuri, Gassner, & Peters, 2012).  Reliability of rainfall duration and intensity 
varies by agro-climatic zone as does soil fertility, market access, temperatures, and suitability of growing 
conditions for specific crops. Generally, cassava is the primary and staple food crop with beans providing 
an inexpensive alternative source of protein to meat, dairy, and fish products. Due to these regional 
variations, this study’s agricultural interventions had to be flexible to allow localized tailoring to the diverse 
set of farmer needs and growing conditions within the sample.1  
3.2 Intervention 
The intervention was run under the umbrella of the N2Africa program. N2Africa program was established 
in 2009 and operates in 10 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. The over-arching mission of the program 
is increasing yields, food security, and incomes through agricultural extension work through the production 
of nitrogen-fixing legumes. The motivation of this mission is that legume production provides a sustainable 
source of nitrogen to farmer fields, helping combat and even reverse soil fertility degradation, while 
simultaneously diversifying smallholder farmer production and consumption and offering income 
diversification through crop sales (Pypers, Sanginga, Kasereka, Walangululu, & Vanlauwe, 2011; Woomer, 
Huising, Giller, & Et, 2014). This study uses data collected from a community-focused extension and 
subsidy project undertaken by N2Africa in the eastern DRC arm of the project over the 2013 and 2014 
growing seasons.2 See Figure 1 for a timeline of project activities. 
                                                     
1 See Appendix A1 for details on regional variation within the province. 
2 The DRC arm of the N2Africa Project consists of a multi-party collaboration between several international and local partners. 
See appendix A2 for a full list. 
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Figure 1 Timeline of Research Activities and Regional Agricultural Seasons
 
Communities were selected to participate in the N2Africa project based on three criteria. First, that the 
community was located in an area that one of the 6 local implementing partner organizations had previously 
undertaken projects.3 Second, that each community was accessible by motorized vehicle to ensure successful 
delivery of all project-distributed resources. Third, a community could not have participated previously in 
any prior N2Africa projects. Based on funding availability and in cooperation with the local implementing 
partners, 70 communities were selected to receive the N2Africa agricultural extension program. Of these 70 
extension-receiving communities, half were randomly selected to additionally receive an offer of purchasing 
a package of agricultural inputs at a subsidized price. After this assignment of the initial 70 communities 
into the two treatment arms, an additional 32 control communities were selected to serve as a control group. 
Assignment of communities to the control group was therefore not randomized but done by selecting 
communities comparable to the treated communities. A census in all 102 communities was conducted and 
the resulting information used to randomly select ten households for surveying within each community.  
The 70 treatment communities received the extension training program once all census work had been 
completed. The extension program began with a period of sensitization on new techniques and inputs with 
a specific focus on soybean production and its associated inputs. This focus on soybeans is due to the crop’s 
novelty within the region, nutritionally beneficial composition, and its need for inoculation from commercial 
rhizobia which necessitates information-intensive training for successful production. During this period, 
local needs and constraints were identified to ensure projects were properly tailored to maximize potential 
program benefits. Each community elected a ‘lead’  (or ‘master’) farmer based on criteria of literacy, property 
                                                     
3 This was to ensure established relationships of trust and cooperation were effectively leveraged. 
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ownership, extensive farming experience, and access to external sources of advice and supplies of 
production inputs. Master farmers received training on the application of new techniques and inputs for 
growing grain legumes, with soybeans receiving special emphasis. In return, contact-farmers were expected 
to organize regular meetings within their agricultural farmer groups and act as liaisons between the wider 
community and the implementing partner. All contact-farmers and interested members of their farmer 
groups were also able to visit research stations at which experimental trials of intercropping soybean with 
maize or cassava were undertaken.4 With the assistance of extension workers, farmer groups would select 
those options (inputs and practices) most suitable for their respective local conditions. Contact-farmers 
were then expected to establish their own demonstration plots using their own land. Community farmers 
interested by the results of demonstration plots could request very small input packages to experiment with 
privately on their personal fields, however package sizes provided only a very limited level of 
experimentation.5   
In the 35 randomly assigned villages to receive an additional subsidy-offer, this subsidized package was made 
available after all extension service programs concluded in August 2013. Farmers in these randomly selected 
communities were offered the opportunity to purchase packages of inputs consisting of a combination of 
improved seeds, in-organic fertilizer, and inoculum at a subsidized rate. Implementing partners custom-
designed up to six packages each, where packages contained varying amounts and types of crop seeds, 
fertilizer, and inoculum of equivalent value in order to best target regional differences and local farmer 
needs.6 Each package was offered to farmers at the equivalent of 26 USD, roughly 75% of package market 
value. These prices did not take into account transportation costs that were avoided by project-delivery of 
resources, resulting in additional, but variable, cost-savings for communities. Community-based Local 
Development Committees (CLDs) were responsible for informing community members of the offer and 
the associated delayed payback scheme.7 CLDs were also tasked with registering applicants, ordering 
packages, coordinating distribution within the community and collecting final payments. 
                                                     
4 These trials were meant to juxtapose improved inputs and management techniques with traditional practices.  
5 Individuals across both treatment arms had access to these small packages. Throughout the growing season extension workers 
would visit the communities to provide assistance, advice, and asses on-going results. In some communities field days were 
organized so that non-participating farmers could also observe project results. 
6 See appendix A3 for details on package compositions 
7 Payment was postponed until after harvest was completed. A 500 FC (USD$0.54) down-payment was required. 
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As can be seen in Figure 1, eastern DRC is characterized by two growing seasons each year. A long season, 
A, between July and December and a short season, B, between February and May.  Baseline and end-line 
surveys were conducted immediately following Growing Season B in 2013 and 2014.8 Extension services 
were conducted during Season B of 2013and subsidized packages were delivered between season B and A 
of 2013. Every effort was taken to interview the same 10 farmers of each community, although some 
replacements did occur9. The resulting dataset thus has a two-phase panel structure and covers in-depth 
production indicators as well as socio-economic and demographic details of the household.  
4 Empirical Analysis 
The analysis phase can be decomposed into three steps. First, relationships between farmer and farm traits 
with higher farmer output levels are analyzed using an OLS regression of baseline farm-level production 
and household-specific indicators. Second, project intervention impacts on farmer productivity are 
estimated using a difference-in-difference model. Fourth, channels through which observed treatment 
effects work are teased out, focusing primarily on changes in the changes in intercropping patterns, the 
amount of inputs used in production, value of common bean yields, and use of in-organic fertilizer. I 
describe each of these empirical analysis models in detail below. 
4.1 Farm Characteristics on Farmer Output Empirical Model 
Using only baseline data, I regress several farm-level and household covariates on a producer’s average plot 
technical efficiency score using the OLS model 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐻𝐻 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖   (1) 
where Crop Valueij is the value of a farmer’s total output of all produced crops measured first in USD and 
second in caloric value for farmer i in community j. As the study region is characterized by weak 
infrastructure and high transaction costs to market, the HH Headij is a vector of household-head 
characteristics including a social capital score, use of credit in the previous 12 months, age, education level, 
                                                     
8 9 villages participated in the baseline survey and intervention but were not visited in the end-line survey due to logistical 
constraints and were dropped from the sample. 
9 No correlation with treatment arms was found. See  appendix A5 for attrition and replacement analysis. 
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gender, migrant status, an indicator for the household having a tin roof, and an indicator for the household 
head being a member of an agricultural cooperative. Farmij includes farm-level production decisions 
including the number of crops produced, number of household members that work on the farm, total farm 
size, proportion of farm owned by the household, perceived soil quality of the farm, the use of hired labor, 
and the use of organic or in-organic fertilizer. The term 𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗 is a vector of intercropping dummies included 
to control for the different combinations of plants a farmer decides to produce on each household plot. 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level. 
4.2  Intervention Impact Empirical Model 
In total, four outcome variables of interest are used. The first two are both measures of technical efficiency, 
with one being in terms of USD value of output and the other in terms of caloric content of output. The 
second two are log transformations of the level values of output, both in terms of USD and caloric content. 
The first two, technical efficiency, account for inputs used while the second two do not. Using these four 
outcomes of interest independently, the following difference-in-difference regression analysis is used to 
determine the impact of each intervention on farm-level productivity.  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 (2) 
In which Yijt is either the USD or calorie valuation of farm output for farmer i from village j in time t, Post 
is binary indicator for time period with the endline period taking a value of one. Consistent with difference-
in-difference approaches, an interaction term for time period (Post) with each of the treatment groups is 
included and the coefficients for these interaction terms is the estimated treatment effect for each of the 
two interventions respectively.  Xijt is a vector of Kx1 farm and producer characteristics for farmer i from 
village j in time t to control for differences in means that arose between each of the treatment and control 
groups. This vector includes an indicator on credit use in the last 12 months, indicator of a tin roof, 
membership of an agricultural cooperative, log transformation of total farm size, percent of farmed land 
owned, and perceived farm soil quality. Similar to equation (1), 𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗 is a vector of intercropping dummies 
ensure that variations arising due to choice of crop combinations on a given plot are controlled for. Finally, 
𝜂 is the random error term assumed to be identically and independently distributed with distribution N(0, 
𝜎𝜂
2),  . Standard errors are clustered at the community level.  
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4.3 Intervention Mechanism Analysis Empirical Model 
To explore channels through which the agricultural interventions had the strongest effects, I isolate 
treatment impacts on specific changes in production behavior. The four intervention mechanisms focused 
on are changes in intercropping behavior, input use as measured by an index score, total USD value of 
common bean yields, and uptake of in-organic fertilizer. These four mechanisms are chosen for their links 
to content covered in the extension programs. Improved soil fertility management through the production 
of legumes forms one of the primary pillars of the N2Africa program. Intercropping of legumes with staple 
crops, improving soil fertility through legume production, as well as benefits and proper used of improved 
inputs including improved seeds, in-organic fertilizer, and inoculum for soybean were all covered in the 
extension curriculum. We look at changes in intercropping behavior by looking at the proportion of plots 
on which a farmer changed the intercropping pattern from the previous year. In collecting data, plots were 
not assigned unique identifiers, so are not able to be directly linked across data collection waves. As a result 
we rely on a dependent variable of the proportion of plots that have a different intercropping pattern then 
observed the previous year. With this construction, models of analysis for panel datasets are inapplicable. 
Instead, a tobit model is applied bounded between zero using baseline values of covariates.  
𝐼𝐶 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑉𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖   (3) 
All right hand side variables are equivalent to those described in equation (2) with the addition of 𝑉𝑖, a vector 
of community fixed effects. Standard errors are also clustered at the community level, similar to equations 
(2) and (3). For the remaining three mechanisms explored, the difference-in-difference model used in 
estimating treatment effects on technical efficiency and output value levels is applied.  
5 Data 
Our study analyses socioeconomic and production data collected from 3,170 plots owned by 953 
households within 93 communities throughout the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC).10 The sample composition for each treatment is described in Table 1.   
                                                     
1010 households were randomly sampled for surveying in each village. Some households participated in the baseline but could 
not be found for the endline survey collection. Households that were not agricultural producers in the baseline were replaced 
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Table 1 Sample Size by Treatment 
Treatment Communities Households Plots 
Control 29 287 997 
Extension 33 349 1141 
Ext + Subsidy 31 317 1032 
Total 93 953 3170 
 
Farmers within the region are primarily subsistence producers but market sales do occur on a regular basis. 
As the incentives behind production may therefore be a combination of consumption and sale, farmer total 
crop yields are translated into both US dollar value and caloric value. As crop bundles in the region vary 
significantly across households, converting all crop yields into single unit valuations allows household total 
output levels to be compared.11  The reported mean of crop yield values is artificially high due to high noise 
within the dataset coming from self-reported memory-based crop yields.12 The noise generated by self-
reported crop yields is evident in the high standard deviations associated with both measures of household 
output. For all analyses, log transformations of yield values are used to minimized the influence of outliers 
on estimators of treatment effect without subjecting data to subjective cut-off thresholds. For production 
inputs, farmers produce less than two different crop varieties across their primary four fields. Plots are small, 
around .38 of a hectare, although this size varies strongly within the sample. Roughly 42% of the sample 
hired outside labor to work on their farm, and most households have on average of 2 internal members that 
labor on each plot. On average farmers report their soils as being slightly above moderate fertility levels and 
while nearly 40% of the sample reports using organic fertilizer on their fields, less than 5% report using in-
organic fertilizer to improve soil fertility levels.  
  
                                                     
with agriculture producing households in the endline. As a result, the total number of households interviewed is greater than 
930.  See appendix A5 for attrition and replacement correlation with treatment analysis. 
11 As households face unique market transaction costs, all valuations were calculated using average reported market prices 
within the sample for each crop.  
12 Excluding observations above the 95th percentile drops the mean household yields to USD 6,859.53.  
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Table 2 Summary Statistics of Household Production Outputs and Inputs 
   
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm Yield (USD) 29,339.97 37,6511.5 
Farm Yield (kJ) 4.23e+07 5.50e+08 
Plot Size (Ha) 0.383 1.515 
Hired Labor  (=1) 0.42 0.494 
HH Labor  (No. Members) 2.11 1.166 
Soil Fertility (1 = Very Infertile; 5 = Very Fertile) 3.355 0.984 
Organic fertilizer (=1) 0.398 0.49 
In-organic fertilizer (=1) 0.044 0.206 
Hired Labor, Organic Fertilizer, and In-organic Fertilizer are measured as indicator variables in 
which use of the input takes value one. Reported means are the proportion of sample which uses 
the input.  
 
 
Control communities were selected by implementing partners as comparable communities that met the 
outlined criteria for project participation, but were not chosen for participation. Due to this non-random 
assignment, I check control group orthogonality against all households in the pooled treatment groups. 
Table 3 displays the pre-intervention mean values and standard deviations for the overall sample, the 
control group, and the pooled treatment group for all indicators used in the technical efficiency analysis. P-
values for differences in means between treated communities and control communities are listed in column 
(5). Between control households and all treated households, no significant differences in means is found for 
any of the tested covariates.  
Participation in the extension-only treatment and extension plus subsidy treatment was assigned through 
randomization over the originally selected 70 communities. I confirm that random assignment to the two 
treatment arms successfully achieved orthogonality. Table 4 reports a difference in means test between the 
two treatment arms. For all covariates tested, no statistically significant difference in means is detected 
between the two randomly-assigned treatment groups.  
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Table 3 Balance Table for Control vs. Treated Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Means  
 N Control Treated Overall 
(2) vs. (3) 
p-value 
Household Characteristics      
Social Capital Score 748 41.204 41.815 41.627 0.803 
   (2.085) (1.307) (1.103)  
Used Credit (past 12 mos.) (=1) 894 0.405 0.394 0.397 0.766 
   (0.034) (0.020) (0.017)  
HH Head Age (yrs) 887 47.033 45.571 46.015 0.200 
   (0.886) (0.719) (0.572)  
HH Head Edu  892 1.029 0.958 0.980 0.345 
   (0.058) (0.049) (0.038)  
HH Head female (=1) 895 0.179 0.145 0.155 0.276 
   (0.026) (0.018) (0.015)  
HH Head migrant (=1) 895 0.350 0.386 0.375 0.538 
   (0.048) (0.034) (0.028)  
HH Tin Roof (=1) 895 0.526 0.530 0.528 0.938 
   (0.045) (0.032) (0.026)  
HH Head Ag. Coop Member (=1) 895 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.988 
   (0.024) (0.014) (0.012)  
Production Characteristics       
Total number of crop varieties produced 895 2.026 1.902 1.940 0.206 
   (0.086) (0.047) (0.042)  
Total farm size - Log transformed 895 -1.556 -1.377 -1.431 0.229 
   (0.126) (0.079) (0.067)  
HH Labor (No. Members) 895 2.569 2.591 2.584 0.830 
   (0.070) (0.073) (0.055)  
Hired Labor (=1) 895 0.365 0.380 0.375 0.700 
  (0.033) (0.022) (0.018)  
Percentage Farm Owned 888 0.839 0.812 0.820 0.455 
   (0.029) (0.021) (0.017)  
Soil Fertility (1 = Very Infertile ; 5 = Very Fertile) 895 3.279 3.216 3.235 0.642 
   (0.115) (0.072) (0.061)  
Used Organic Fertilizer (=1) 895 0.449 0.388 0.407 0.482 
   (0.071) (0.049) (0.041)  
Used In-organic Fertilizer (=1) 895 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.834 
   (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)  
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Table 4 Balance Table for Extension vs Extension + Subsidy Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Means  
 N Control Treated 
(2) vs. (3) 
p-value 
Household Characteristics      
Social Capital Score 518 41.410 42.226  0.757 
   (1.548) (2.137)   
Used Credit (past 12 mos.) (=1) 620 0.381 0.407  0.498 
   (0.028) (0.028)   
HH Head Age (Yrs.) 618 44.802 46.414  0.263 
   (1.032) (1.000)   
HH Head Edu  618 1.009 0.902  0.276 
   (0.061) (0.077)   
HH Head female (=1) 621 0.130 0.161  0.386 
   (0.021) (0.029)   
HH Head migrant (=1) 621 0.356 0.419  0.343 
   (0.049) (0.046)   
HH Tin Roof (=1) 621 0.523 0.537  0.830 
   (0.044) (0.047)   
HH Head Ag. Coop Member (=1) 621 0.115 0.111  0.895 
   (0.021) (0.020)   
Production Characteristics       
Total number of crop varieties produced 621 1.897 1.908 0.908 
   (0.068) (0.066)  
Total farm size - Log transformed 621 -1.305 -1.454 0.346 
   (0.110) (0.113)  
HH Labor (No. Members) 621 2.632 2.547 0.560 
   (0.113) (0.092)  
Hired Labor (=1) 621 0.415 0.342 0.089 
  (0.032) (0.028)  
Percentage Farm Owned 616 0.825 0.797 0.513 
   (0.022) (0.036)  
Soil Fertility (1 = Very Infertile; 5 = Very Fertile) 621 3.198 3.236 0.794 
   (0.096) (0.109)  
Used Organic Fertilizer (=1) 621 0.427 0.346 0.408 
   (0.072) (0.067)  
Used In-organic Fertilizer (=1) 621 0.028 0.040 0.392 
   (0.009) (0.011)  
 
Despite no statistical evidence of systematic differences in households between groups, due to the non-
random assignment of households to the control group, I include a selection of relevant dynamic covariates 
in all regression analyses. Thus for all analyses, time-varying variables that may drive different trends 
between periods are controlled for. 
  
36 
 
Table 5 Outcome Variable Means and Standard Deviations by Treatment and for Full 
Sample 
  Means  
 N Control Extension 
Ext + 
Subsidy Overall 
Primary Outcomes      
Log of Output Value (USD) 895 8.402 8.412 7.986 8.267 
   (0.201) (0.197) (0.255) (0.127) 
Log of Output value (kJ) 895 14.965 15.130 14.518 14.876 
   (0.326) (0.291) (0.401) (0.197) 
Mechanisms      
Intercropping* 895 0.671 0.625 0.682 0.658 
   (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.014) 
Cultivated Plots 895 1.923 1.839 1.822 1.859 
   (0.060) (0.050) (0.060) (0.032) 
Input Score 895 -0.133 -0.056 -0.001 -0.061 
   (0.160) (0.153) (0.160) (0.090) 
Bean Output (USD) 474 4.050 3.639 3.413 3.683 
   (0.273) (0.334) (0.362) (0.192) 
In-organic Fertilizer 895 0.036 0.028 0.040 0.035 
   (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) 
* Measure of change in intercropping behaviour between time periods not a baseline value  
Bold results indicates a significant difference in means between Extension-only and Extension 
+ Subsidy treatment groups at the 10% significance level  
 
Summary statistics and balance between treatments of baseline values for outcome variables are displayed 
in Table 5. The exception of baseline values being used is made with the outcome variable “Intercropping”, 
which is itself a variable measuring change between time periods. This is the only variable with significant 
difference in means between the two treated groups but does not suggest a systemic difference in treatment 
groups pre-intervention. All other variables are balanced across treatments in the baseline period suggesting 
that households across groups were not systemically different prior to receiving the study interventions for 
all outcomes measured.  
6 Results 
6.1 Farmers and Output Levels  
I analyze the relationships between household head socio-economic indicators and input resources with 
observed total output values. While the control group experiences a marginal decrease in output value, for 
both USD and caloric content measures, both intervention groups experience slight growth in output 
between pre- and post-intervention time periods (Figure 2). Since prices used in calculating USD value 
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were constant between time periods, this growth is attributed entirely to higher output levels rather than 
price effects.  
Figure 2 Farmer Production in Dollar and Caloric Value by Treatment and Time Period 
 
Additionally, I evaluate potential change in input use due to the complementary nature of production 
factors. Using principal component analysis on the major production function inputs of land, labor, soil 
fertility, and fertilizer in the form of either organic or in-organic, a single input score is calculated for each 
farmer. Figure 3 plots this score by treatment and time period to evaluate trends in input use. Input use 
increases dramatically in the endline time period for all treatments, suggesting that increased input intensity 
is driven by changes in factor market prices rather than from extension or subsidy interventions. 
Next I explore what observed farm and farmer characteristics correlate with higher farm output levels. I 
regress several baseline characteristics on both the dollar and caloric value of farmer crop output. Results 
of these OLS regressions are presented in Table 5. Household characteristics appear to have low correlation 
with overall farm yields.  Agricultural cooperative membership is positively and weakly significant in its 
relationship with the USD value of farm output but this significance is not evident with caloric values of 
yield.  
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This result may be explained by the role of cooperatives in marketing products, resulting in farmers that 
place higher emphasis on profit-maximization over subsistence production being more likely to both 
participate and benefit from cooperative membership.  
Figure 3 Farm-level Input Use by Time Period and Treatment 
 
 
 
Table 5 Outcome Variable Means and Standard Deviations by Treatment and for Full 
Sample 
  Means  
 N Control Extension 
Ext + 
Subsidy Overall 
Primary Outcomes      
Log of Output Value (USD) 895 8.402 8.412 7.986 8.267 
   (0.201) (0.197) (0.255) (0.127) 
Log of Output value (kJ) 895 14.965 15.130 14.518 14.876 
   (0.326) (0.291) (0.401) (0.197) 
Mechanisms      
Intercropping* 895 0.671 0.625 0.682 0.658 
   (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.014) 
Cultivated Plots 895 1.923 1.839 1.822 1.859 
   (0.060) (0.050) (0.060) (0.032) 
Input Score 895 -0.133 -0.056 -0.001 -0.061 
   (0.160) (0.153) (0.160) (0.090) 
Bean Output (USD) 474 4.050 3.639 3.413 3.683 
   (0.273) (0.334) (0.362) (0.192) 
In-organic Fertilizer 895 0.036 0.028 0.040 0.035 
   (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) 
* Measure of change in intercropping behaviour between time periods not a baseline value  
Bold results indicates a significant difference in means between Extension-only and Extension 
+ Subsidy treatment groups at the 10% significance level  
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Far more relationships between production characteristics with productivity are found. More diverse crop 
bundles are estimated to be more likely associated with higher economic returns and while a positive 
relationship is estimated with consumption measures of output, no statistical significance is found. Given 
that household members provide the primary source of farm labor within the region, it is unsurprising that 
larger households are correlated with higher output levels. Finally we observe similar phenomenon observed 
in many developing countries of larger farms being associated with lower output levels, ceteris paribus. No 
relationship is found between inputs of stronger farm property rights, perceived soil fertility, use of hired 
labor, or use of any fertilizer with household production levels. As in-organic fertilizer use within the sample 
is extremely low (less than 5% of the sample) the  sample may suffer from insufficient power for accurately 
reflecting relationships between in-organic fertilizer and crop yields. 
Overall, crop diversification, more intensive farming, and household labor are all positively associated with 
higher crop output valuation. While crop diversification and intensive farming are more manipulable short 
term variables, adjustments in labor inputs is reliant on the presence and strength of local labor markets. 
Neither crop diversification nor intensive farming are primary foci of the extension services studied here, 
however both are touched on indirectly through the introduction of soybean production and improved farm 
management strategies (including planting in rows and soil fertility management) discussed in the agricultural 
trainings.  
  
40 
 
Table 6  Farmer and Farm Characteristics with Household Production Levels 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Log Yield 
(USD) 
Log Yield 
(kJ) 
   
Household Characteristics   
Social Capital Score 0.007 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
Used Credit (past 12 mos.) 0.152 0.426 
 (0.267) (0.443) 
HH Head Age (Yrs.) -0.007 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.015) 
Highest Education Attained   
Primary 0.181 0.376 
 (0.388) (0.646) 
Secondary 0.128 0.213 
 (0.358) (0.569) 
Tertiary 0.640 0.898 
 (0.478) (0.866) 
Female  (=1) 0.315 0.770 
 (0.368) (0.588) 
Migrant (=1) 0.268 0.329 
 (0.319) (0.545) 
Tin Roof (=1) 0.330 0.460 
 (0.309) (0.522) 
Ag. Coop Member (=1) 0.571* 0.739 
 (0.304) (0.501) 
Production Characteristics   
Crop diversity (No. Crops) 0.582* 0.779 
 (0.302) (0.497) 
HH Labour  (No. Members) 0.217** 0.347** 
 (0.104) (0.173) 
Farm Size (Log of Ha) -0.773*** -0.810*** 
 (0.087) (0.136) 
Percentage Farm Owned 0.400 0.642 
 (0.410) (0.657) 
Soil Fertility (1 = Very Infertile; 5 = Very Fertile) 0.168 0.224 
 (0.143) (0.238) 
Hired Labor (=1) 0.440 0.511 
 (0.272) (0.446) 
Organic Fertilizer (=1) 0.077 0.053 
  (0.453) (0.746) 
In-organic fertilizer (=1) -0.125 -0.466 
 (0.827) (1.347) 
Constant 2.993** 8.520*** 
 (1.249) (2.129) 
   
Observations 582 582 
R-squared 0.401 0.335 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6.2 Intervention Impacts 
Measuring the treatment effect of extension only and extension combined with a subsidy input-package 
offer a difference-in-difference fixed effects model is run on the two measures of farmer output. Results for 
both regressions are presented in Table 7. Each regression includes time-varying control variables but only 
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coefficients of estimated treatment effects, time trends, and means (constant) are displayed. Additionally, p-
values for F-tests testing significant differences between the treatment effects of the two interventions are 
included in rows at the bottom of Table 7. 
Table 7  Treatment Effect Estimates on Technical Efficiency and Total Farm 
Output Value 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log USD Log kJ 
   
Extension * Post 0.245 0.375 
 (0.377) (0.604) 
Extension+ Subsidy * Post 0.956** 1.450** 
 (0.376) (0.578) 
Post-Intervention -0.233 -0.369 
 (0.255) (0.385) 
Constant 5.073*** 10.823*** 
 (0.610) (1.003) 
   
Observations 1,650 1,650 
R-squared 0.165 0.099 
Number of households 951 951 
P-Value of F-Test   
Extension * Post v. Ext + Sub * Post 0.0681 0.0868 
All models include control variables of household credit use in the last 12 months, roof 
material of house, membership in an agricultural cooperative, log transformation of total farm 
size (Ha), proportion of farm owned by household, and perceived farm soil quality (scale of 
1 = very infertile to 5 = very fertile).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A positive but insignificant impact of the extension only intervention is observed, ranging between 24% 
and 37.5% increase in USD and caloric measures of output, respectively. For the combined treatment of 
extension offered with input subsidization, large and significant gains in farm output are estimated for both 
economic and consumption measures of total farm output value. Additionally, for both regressions the 
difference in estimated intention to treat effects between treated groups is statistically distinguishable at the 
10% significance level. These results would indicate that targeting both farmer knowledge and associated 
transaction costs simultaneously generates larger returns compared to targeting knowledge independently.  
6.3 Mechanisms Analysis 
To better explore potential changes in farmer decision-making I explore four mechanisms through which 
observed increases in output value in the subsidy treatment group could be operating. Results for each 
mechanism is displayed in Table 8. No significant results are observed for the extension only treatment 
42 
 
arm on any of the outcomes analyzed and no effects from either treatment arm are found on common bean 
yields. 
Table 8 Results for Impacts on Secondary Outcomes: Intercropping, Input Use Score, Bean 
Yields (Kg/Ha), and Use of Fertilizer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Intercrop Bean Yield Inputs Score Fertilizer 
     
Extension Only * Post  0.054 -0.014 0.003 
  (0.044) (0.097) (0.022) 
Ext + Subsidy * Post  0.023 -0.156** 0.058** 
  (0.047) (0.071) (0.029) 
t  -0.026 0.136*** 0.003 
  (0.035) (0.051) (0.016) 
Extension Only -0.085    
 (0.069)    
Ext + Subsidy 0.031    
 (0.066)    
Constant 0.694*** 0.273*** -1.747*** 0.031 
 (0.125) (0.053) (0.142) (0.038) 
     
Observations 887 843 1,650 1,650 
R-squared  0.078 0.505 0.023 
Number of Households  613 951 951 
Sigma 0.623***    
 (0.031)    
P-value of F-test:     
Ext * Post vs. Ext + Sub * Post 0.0519 0.450 0.136 0.0458 
All models include control variables of household credit use in the last 12 months, roof material of house, 
membership in an agricultural cooperative, log transformation of total farm size (Ha), proportion of farm 
owned by household, and perceived farm soil quality (Likert scale of 1 to 5). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The first two columns of Table 8 focus on production relationships of output-output, exploring the crop 
activity choices of households within the sample. The change in the proportion of plots on which a farmer 
changed their intercropping behavior is analyzed using a tobit model (Column 1). Neither treatment arm is 
statistically distinguishable from the control group, however they are statistically difference from one 
another. Farmers in the extension only group appear less willing to adjust intercropping behavior while 
farmers in the combined extension and subsidy group demonstrate a higher likelihood of changing their 
intercropping behavior between time periods. This result may indicate that farmer experimentation with 
improved seeds from the subsidized package in the prior season were more likely to adjust their 
intercropping behavior in reallocating resources to new outputs. However absent more detailed information 
on adoption of improved seeds at the individual level, this outcome cannot be confirmed concretely.  
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Column (2) repots estimates of the impact of the treatment arms on bean yields., for which observable 
relationship is found. This result indicates that increases in  total farm output observed for the combined 
extension with subsidized inputs treatment arm were not driven by beans but potentially across crop 
portfolios. Common beans are an existing crop within the region and are unlikely to qualify as a new 
innovation, making additional experimentation unlikely to influence farmer adoption decisions.  
In terms of changes in input use, two specific mechanisms are analyzed in Column (3) and  (4) of Table 8. 
Column (3) reports results of changes in overall input use as measured by an index of all production function 
variables. Column (4) analyzes change in in-organic fertilizer use. Both indicators are found to have a 
significant relationship with the combined extension and subsidy treatment. While an overall increase in 
input use is estimated to have occurred in the post-intervention time period, households in the combined 
extension with subsidy treatment group had lower average input bundle scores compared to control and 
extension-only households. However producers in the extension + subsidy treatment arm are nearly 6% 
more likely to adopt in-organic fertilizer on their fields. This rise in in-organic fertilizer suggests that 
reductions in overall input are sufficiently large as to offset this increased use of in-organic fertilizer. 
Furthermore, the decrease in inputs is contributing to the overall increase in farmer output levels observed 
for the subsidy treatment arm in Table 7. These two results combined would indicate that households are 
benefiting from synergistic relationships between inputs that may not be being realized by households in 
the control and extension-only groups.  
7 Conclusion 
Incomplete information, limited financial endowments of farmers, and highly variable market transaction 
costs constrains proper use of and access to productivity enhancing inputs, contributing to the persistence 
of low yields for African agriculture household producers. In particular, information gaps on the returns 
and use of improved inputs has been found to be a major obstacle to widespread adoption within sub-
Saharan Africa. Programs providing agricultural extension have been proposed as tools to target knowledge 
gaps. These programs rely heavily on social learning and diffusion of information through community 
networks. However information biases that result from observed rather than personally experienced 
engagement with new innovations pose a threat to the effectiveness of social learning-based extension 
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designs. Providing reduced-cost opportunities to experiment directly with improved inputs offers a second 
policy tool that targets information gaps with a learning-by-doing approach. I test the effectiveness of both 
an independent agricultural extension program and a combined agricultural extension and input subsidy 
program on improving farmer production levels within eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Due 
to the non-separability of production and consumption decisions made by agricultural households, I 
estimated total yields both in economic (USD) and consumption (caloric content) values.   
I address three important areas within existing literature. First, I analyze what farmer traits are correlated 
with higher farmer crop output within the region using an OLS regression of pre-intervention farm and 
household characteristics. Second, I estimate intervention impacts using a difference-in-difference 
approach. Third, I test channels through which the interventions may be generating their estimated 
treatment effects on household crop yields. These channels include changes in intercropping patterns on 
farm plots, changes in input use between time periods, common bean yields (Kg/Ha) and farmer use of in-
organic fertilizer. 
I find that farmer output levels are more closely associated with production decisions rather than household 
characteristics. The positive relationship between crop diversification and farmer output suggests that 
farmers face high uncertainty stemming from fluctuating market prices making diverse crop portfolios an 
economic risk-mitigation strategy. Decisions on the intensity with which land is farmed and considerations 
of land tenure are additional areas agricultural development programs can explore in efforts to increase 
farmer production levels.  
Difference-in-difference analysis on the effect of each treatment arm on total household output estimated 
positive effects for both treatment groups, although only the extension-plus-subsidy intervention had 
statistical significance. These results indicate that knowledge gaps do present a constraint to agricultural 
development within the region, and targeting these information gaps with social learning and reduced-cost 
experimentation yields larger effects on household output than social learning programs alone. As no 
subsidy-only treatment arm was undertaken, it cannot be determined whether the observed impact is the 
result purely of the greater access to experimentation, whether synergistic benefits arose from reinforcement 
between information gleaned via social learning  and independent experimentation.  
45 
 
The subsidized input packages were a one-off shift in transaction costs so the only long-run change 
generated by the intervention is in addressing uncertainty around output variability within the technology 
adoption decision. This result therefore indicates that experimentation offers a stronger mechanism for 
adjusting household production functions, and perceived returns to technology adoption, compared to 
solely information provision. As our empirical model estimates the intention to treat effect, it is not possible 
to decompose experimentation into direct learning-by-doing (i.e. treatment uptake) compared to 
observation (i.e. observers of adopters). It is likely that our observed intention to treat effect is a combination 
of both the direct and indirect benefits of farmer experimentation.  
The coefficient estimate on the extension-only impact on productivity is large and positive but was not 
found to be statistically significant. The coefficient on the combined extension and subsidy group is only 
weakly significant, and it cannot be ruled out that the two projects generate relatively comparable results. 
However the cost of implementation for the provision of subsidized inputs is substantial and very well may 
eclipse the relative gains in production outputs that farmers are able to realize given the existing market 
institutions and infrastructure within the region. A full cost-effectiveness analysis is beyond the scope of 
this study, but warrants future research before committing to the conclusion that combined extension and 
subsidy programs is a stronger policy tool for agricultural development within the region. 
Our study was conducted in an impoverished region of one of the least developed countries in Africa. The 
area is subject to persistent instability and characterized by high variation in topography and climate. Farmer 
output levels within the region are low, even by comparison to neighboring countries, suggesting large gains 
are available for even limited agricultural interventions. A similar project model may not be successful in 
countries with more developed agricultural sectors and higher market integration. Further research is 
required on how information constraints to agriculture evolve with better road and ICT infrastructure, 
higher market integration, and more complete markets.  
In addition, our intervention was implemented by six independent partners. While standardized protocols 
for project implementation were established, inevitable variation in partner structures, beneficiary 
relationships, and processes existed. While this multi-partner framework more accurately reflects real world 
development practices, these variations in regional traits and partner implementation variations make 
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generalizability of results limited to comparable project structures implemented under similar local 
conditions.  
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Appendix 
A1  Regional variation  
The agro-climatic, geographical terrain, and institutional variation of the South Kivu province is most easily 
grouped into three distinct axes. The first axis stretches north of the regional capital, Bukavu, along the 
shoreline of Lake Kivu. The second stretches west from Bukavu into an area characterized by highlands. 
The third is directly south of Bukavu and consists primarily of the Ruzizi Plain which is the floor of the 
Western Rift Valley. Table A3 outlines the breakdown of our sample into each of the axes.  
Table A1a Sample by Axe 
Axe Territory vill_id hh_id 
North Kalehe 16 112 
Central Mwenga 23 203 
South Uvira 52 436 
Total  91 751 
 
When looking at the primary production inputs and crop production frequencies by region, the variation is 
apparent between axes in Table A4. Overall the regional differences are quite strong, making it imperative 
that geographical fixed effects are controlled for in the analysis approach. 
 
Table A1b Farm Characteristics and Crop Frequencies by Axe 
Axe Cassava Soybean 
Common 
Bean 
Farm Size 
(Ha) 
Farm 
Owner 
Soil 
Quality 
Hired 
Labor 
(USD) 
Mean HH 
Mem. Labor 
North 58% 18% 83% 0.46 0.82 3.23 26.65 3.30 
 (0.50) (0.39) (0.38) (0.59) (0.36) (1.02) (343.84) (2.33) 
West  75% 2% 64% 0.45 0.87 2.74 0.48 2.96 
 (0.43) (0.14) (0.48) (0.80) (0.31) (0.98) (1.59) (2.00) 
South 76% 1% 39% 0.41 0.75 3.65 16.16 2.66 
 (0.43) (0.11) (0.49) (0.63) (0.42) (0.84) (267.73) (1.70) 
Stan. Dev. in parentheses  
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A2  Collaborating Partners 
Table A2 Collaborating Partners in the N2Africa Project of Eastern DRC 
International  Local 
Wageningen UR  
Catholic University of 
Bukavu (UCB) 
IPLCI 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) 
 
 
DIOBASS CDC 
the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) 
 
 
PAD Women for Women 
the Consortium for Improving Agriculture-based Livelihoods 
in Central Africa (CIALCA) 
 
 
 
SARCAF  
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A3  Package Composition 
Table A3 Package Composition by Partner for Extension + Subsidy Treatment Arm 
Partner Package 1 Package 2 Package 3 Package 4 Package 5 Package 6 
Soybean  
Options 
Comm. 
Bean 
Options 
PAD 
 
4 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
3 kg Maize 
SW303 
5 kg NPK 
4 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
160 lm Cassava 
5 kg NPK 
4 kg Comm. 
Bean 
3 kg Maize 
SW303 
5 kg NPK 
4 kg Comm. 
Bean 
160 lm Cassava 
5 kg NPK 
4 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
5 kg NPK 
4 kg Comm. 
Bean 
5 kg NPK 
SB24 
 
PK6 
CODML 
(black) 
 
RWR10 
(red) 
IPLC /  
WfW 
 
4 kg Soy SB24 
10 gr Inoculum 
3 kg Maize  
12,5 kg NPK 
4 kg Soy SB24 
10 gr Inoculum 
160 lm Cassava 
12,5 kg NPK 
4 kg com. bean 
3 kg Maize  
12,5 kg NPK 
4 kg Comm. 
Bean 
160 lm Cassava 
12,5 kg NPK 
4 kg Soy SB24 
10 gr Inoculum 
12,5 kg NPK 
4 kg Comm. 
Bean 
12,5 kg NPK 
 
HM21 
 
Marungi 
 
CODML 
(black) 
Sarcaf / 
Diobass 
 
2 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
1,5 kg Maize 
SW303 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
75 lm Cassava 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Comm. 
Bean 
1,5 kg Maize 
SW303 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Comm. 
Bean 
75 lm Cassava 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Comm. 
Bean 
6 kg NPK 
SB24 
 
PK6 
CODML 
(black) 
 
RWR10 
(red) 
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Partner Package 1 Package 2 Package 3 Package 4 Package 5 Package 6 
Soybean  
Options 
Comm. 
Bean 
Options 
Kasheke / 
Sarcaf 
 
2 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
1,5 kg Maize 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
75 lm Cassava 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Comm. 
Bean 
1,5 kg Maize 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Comm. 
Bean 
75 lm Cassava 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Soy 
10 gr Inoculum 
6 kg NPK 
2 kg Comm. 
Bean 
6 kg NPK 
SB24 
 
PK6 
CODML 
(black) 
 
HM 21 
Units: lm = Linear Meters ; gr = gram ; kg = kilogram 
Crops: Comm. Bean = Common Bean ; Soy = Soybean; Cassava Variety = Sawa Sawa ; Maize Variety = Ekayel de Kenya 
NPK = In-organic fertilizer containing macro-nutrients of Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus (P), and Potassium (K) 
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Table A4 Variable names, definitions and details on variable construction or estimation 
Variable Definition Construction Details 
T Time t = 0 as baseline and t = 1 as endline 
Primary Outcomes 
Tech Eff (USD) Technical Efficiency in US dollar (USD) (%) 
Estimated using SFA with USD value of plot as dependent variable. Plot level estimates 
averaged to farm level for all empirical analysis. 
Tech Eff (kJ) Technical efficiency in caloric content (kJ) (%) See above except with caloric content as value measure 
Yield (USD) Total USD value of all farm crop output 
Calculated using crop price means across both time periods. Output values normalized to 
plot size (i.e. yield value of kilograms per hectare) 
Yield (kJ) Total kJ value of all farm crop output Calculated using crop specific caloric content as given in Leung (1968). 
Secondary Outcomes 
Intercropping Proportion of plots for which intercropping changed 
Change variable calculated as the number of times an intercropping combination in the 
baseline is not observed repeated in the endline, normalized by total number of plots 
cultivated. 
Input Use Input Use Index Score 
Calculated using Principal Component Analysis on the production function variables used to 
estimate technical efficiency in the Stochastic Frontier model 
Bean Yield (Kg/Ha) Total farm yield for common bean (Kg/Ha) Calculated only for farmers who sowed common bean seeds. Normalized to yield estimates.  
Fertilizer (=1) Indicator variable for use of in-organic fertilizer on the farm  
Household   
Social Capital Social Capital Index Score 
Calculated based on responses of available connections to provide assistance in hypothetical 
situations of agricultural negative shocks. Calculations include number of connections 
available for assistance listed, traveling distance to them, closeness of relationship. 
Used Credit (=1) Indicator of use of credit in the past 12 months  
HH Head Age Age in years of household head 
Some observations listed large differences in ages between baseline and endline despite no 
change in responder, these outliers are corrected for by adding “2” to the baseline response. 
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Variable Definition Construction Details 
HH Head Edu Categorical variable of highest level of education attained 
Responses of “None”, “Primary”, “Secondary”, and “Tertiary”. Some completion included 
as having attained a level. Tertiary includes undergraduate, graduate, and professional 
certificates. 
Female (=1) Household head is female  
Migrant (=1) Household head is a migrant Migrant defined as not being born or married into the village. 
HH Tin Roof (=1) Indicator for the house having a tin roof  
Agr. Coop. (=1) 
Indicator for the household head being a member of an 
agricultural cooperative 
 
Production   
Crop Bundle Total number of different crops produced on farm  
Farm Size Total farm size (Ha) Calculated as the sum of all cultivated plots 
HH Labor Number of household members who work on the farm  
Hired Labor (=1) Indicator for hired labor use  
% Farm Owned Proportion of total cultivated land owned by the household Mean of all plots weighted by plot size 
Soil Fertility Soil fertility level on a Likert scale (1 to 5) 
1 = Very infertile; 2 = Infertile ; 3 = Average ; 4 = Fertile ; 5 = Very Fertile 
Each plot rated and weighted mean calculated by plot size 
Organic Fertilizer 
(=1) 
Indicator for use of organic fertilizer (manure) on the farm  
In-organic Fertilizer 
(=1) 
Indicator for use of in-organic fertilizer (NPK) on the farm  
IC Intercropping indicators 
Set of indicators for each intercropping combination observed in sample. Equals 1 if that 
combination was observed on any of the farm plots in a given time period. 
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A5  Attrition and Replacement of Households in Sample 
Logit model conducted on both households departing from sample in baseline and households added to 
sample in endline. Standard errors clustered at the village level. No observable correlation between 
households dropping or adding to sample and treatment assignment.  
Table A5 Correlation of Attrition and Replacement Households in Sample 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Attrition HH Replacement HH 
   
Extension Only 0.143 0.558 
 (0.275) (0.414) 
Ext + Subsidy 0.050 0.305 
 (0.252) (0.409) 
Constant -1.428*** -2.833*** 
 (0.206) (0.314) 
   
Observations 895 770 
(1) run on baseline data only ; (2) run on endline data only 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
58 
 
  
59 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Social Networks and Technology Diffusion 
Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Congo 
 
 
Abstract 
The adoption of new technologies plays an important role in political and economic development. Social networks likely play a 
role in this process, though little is known about the precise role the networks play or the consequences of selecting initial recipients 
from different positions within the networks. We collect information about full social networks from 2563 community members 
in forty communities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and implement an intervention in which ambassadors are asked to 
spread fertilizer. We randomize whether these ambassadors are central or isolate, allowing us to estimate the effect of network 
position of initial recipients. In total, 225 transfers of fertilizer packs took place. We find no evidence for an effect on fertilizer 
use, fertilizer knowledge, willingness to pay for fertilizer among populations, nor the spread of distribution. We do find evidence 
that centrality affects the speed of distribution, and the identity of the ultimate recipients of new technology or knowledge: isolated 
farmers tend to give to the central, but central farmers do not give to the isolated. We also document large effect-attenuation, 
which suggests the importance of selecting a sufficiently large set of lead community members for the spread of new technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publication Status:  Ross, M., P. Hofman, J. Larson, P Van der Windt, and M. Voors. (2017) “Social 
Networks and Technology Diffusion: evidence from a field experiment in the Congo.” Working Paper.  
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1 Introduction 
Economic development hinges on the spread of new information and technologies. Access to information 
communication technologies have been found to improve political accountability (Grossman, Humphreys, 
& Sacramone-Lutz, 2014) and reduce corruption (Bailard, 2010); cellphones and monitoring applications 
have positive effects on improving health and education outcomes by reducing absenteeism (Cilliers et al., 
2014); and new agricultural technologies can boost crop output and efficiency (Pypers et al. , 2011). Social 
network are likely important for the adoption of this new information and technologies (Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 2010). Furthermore, the network position of the initial recipients have been found to be 
important (S. Aral & Walker, 2012; D. M. Centola & Macy, 2007). This study aims to contribute to the 
growing literature of empirical studies testing network entry points on information and technology diffusion.  
Our study focuses on the diffusion of information and technologies within the context of agricultural 
development. The use of interventions that rely on social learning mechanisms, typically termed farmer-led 
extension, has received substantial investment in the last decades (Feder, Anderson, Birner, & Deininger, 
2010; Kondylis et al., 2014). Considerable attention has been paid to the effectiveness of such programs on 
increasing agricultural productivity and strengthening farmer livelihoods (Cunguara & Moder, 2011; 
Kondylis et al., 2014; Lambrecht, Vanlauwe, & Maertens, 2016; Taye, 2013). Extension programs implicitly 
assume that information and innovations diffuse through community networks and interpersonal 
relationships. This study aims to test these underlying assumptions on the diffusion of agricultural 
innovations. 
We explore the diffusion of in-organic fertilizer and related information on its use, proper application, costs, 
and benefits through community social networks in the Democratic Republic of Congo using a framed field 
experiment. Specifically it explores how resulting selection of network contact points based on eigenvector 
centrality scores varies resulting diffusion outcomes. We explore the impact of network entry through most 
central versus least central individuals on three different outcomes. Specifically, we analyze outcomes of 
community rates of fertilizer use, mean scores of fertilizer knowledge, and change in willingness to pay for 
fertilizer. We also explore speed and spread of distribution. Second, we explore whether attenuation of 
fertilizer and information occurs during the diffusion process, and whether this is different by type of 
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ambassador. Third, we investigate which characteristics are important to receive fertilizer and information 
about fertilizer.  
Our findings reveal a number of new insights about the role of networks in technology diffusion.  First, we 
show that network centrality measures are highly correlated with observable characteristics of community 
residents. Central farmers are more likely to hold a formal position of status in the community, are more 
likely to interact with community leaders, are less likely to be a migrant, are in general richer, more literate, 
more likely to be male, and have larger households. This corresponds closely with anecdotal work from the 
region. These strong correlations with observable characteristics are important in guiding implementers in 
selection of central individuals when network surveys are not feasible.  
We also find that initial recipients with low centrality spread the chemical fertilizer faster compared to initial 
recipients with high centrality scores. However, we find no difference in the resulting community-level 
fertilizer adoption rate, diffusion width,  fertilizer knowledge, willingness to pay between network-central 
versus network-isolate entry points. We find strong evidence of attenuation regardless of network entry 
point. Meaning, that the intensity of adoption, fertilizer knowledge, and willingness-to-pay outcomes weaken 
significantly with each step away from the initial network entry point. This suggests that the strongest social 
influence is stemming from the legitimization of contact with external extension professionals, which fades 
as information and innovation spread through the network. 
Finally, we find compositional effects of diffusion. Specifically, that network centrality affects which 
community members receive the new technology and its associated information.  Both centrals and isolates 
as entry-points prefer to share with individuals that live in close geographical proximity,  are family, are field 
neighbors or are agricultural discussion partners. This result highlights that diffusion follows existing  
interpersonal relationships. However, a key outcome is that both centrals and isolates prefer to pass their 
information and fertilizer resources on to highly central individuals. This means that regardless of entry-
point, innovations are going to cluster in the center of networks. This pooling of information and resources 
results in network central individuals being significantly more likely to benefit from any generated returns 
while periphery households are more likely to be excluded.  
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These results contribute to a number of literatures. First and foremost our study adds to the growing 
literature that explore the role of social networks on the spread of innovations within developing countries 
(Beaman, Benyishay, William, & Mobarak, 2015; Emerick, Janvry, Sadoulet, & Dar, 2016; Kimbrough, 
Smith, & Wilson, 2008; Nourani, 2016). Ancillary results explore questions of how social networks relate to 
individual characteristics and can be used by development practitioners in targeting and identifying key 
beneficiaries (Chami et al., 2014). Each of these research areas offers valuable insights in how development 
programs can more effectively harness social network dynamics for strengthening program impacts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces related literature and our 
contribution. Section 3 anchors our study in the Congolese context. Section 4 presents our research design. 
Descriptive statistics and results are presented in Sections Error! Reference source not found. and 6. We 
onclude in Section 8. 
2 The role of social networks 
There is a growing experimental literature exploring the way that social networks, and an individual's 
position within a network, matter for development outcomes. 
2.1 The role of the initial receivers in distribution 
Selection of network entry-points is believed to be a key design component for the speed at which 
innovations diffuse through a network. Innovation diffusion depends on a critical mass-adoption threshold 
being reached in order for adoption to become self-sustaining(Rogers, 1995). With smart targeting of entry-
points the lag time between introduction and mass-adoption is reduced, thereby accelerating innovation 
diffusion (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). The selection of adoption-influential individuals has its origins 
within the opinion leadership literature (T. W. Valente & Pumpuang, 2007; Thomas W. Valente & Davis, 
1999; Walsh, Gwinner, & Swanson, 2004) which has evolved from socioeconomic foundations to network 
theory foundations. Centola (2010) found that the probability of adoption was higher with greater exposure, 
leading to an argument that clustered selection of network-entry points was more effective for complex 
technologies. Banerjee et al. (2013) devised a new measure of centrality for determining “diffusion central” 
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individuals as a means of identifying network entry-points that were likely to maximize the spread of new 
innovations. Beaman et al. (2015) used complex-contagion simulations in identifying network entry-points 
and found resulting diffusion to be greater than status quo selection processes that do not utilize network 
data. However not all studies find network-based selection to better as Aral, Muchnik, & Sundararajan 
(2013) find little variation in diffusion rates based on different entry-point selection criteria.  
The most common design in evaluating entry-point selection methods consists of an intervention (often 
information) being offered to a random subset of individuals with pre- and post-intervention surveys used 
to measure individual exposure to the intervention, changes in knowledge or beliefs as a result of the 
intervention, and social ties within the sample community.  Exposure is often inferred only from social 
closeness to the initial recipients of the intervention, and outcomes assume that the information traveled 
along existing links within the underlying social network, though this assumption is typically neither directly 
measured nor tested. 
Several studies have documented the existence of peer effects using adaptations of the above design across 
a variety of contexts. In Cai et al., 2015, the intervention is a briefing on an agricultural insurance scheme in 
rural China. Their results indicated that respondents with a large number of friends who were exposed to 
the intensive training session are more likely to take up the offered insurance.  In Oster & Thornton, 2012, 
the intervention is a distribution of menstrual cups to randomly selected girls across four schools in Nepal 
in which they found that girls with many friends who have already adopted the menstrual cup have a higher 
probability of also successfully adopting the menstrual cup.  In Bandiera & Rasul, 2006, the probability of 
adopting sunflower cultivation in Mozambique is found to be a relationship shaped as an inverted-U. 
Initially, the probability of adopting sunflower cultivation is increasing with the number of family or friends 
who have already adopted, however at a certain threshold the relationship changes direction and additional 
connections having adopted cultivation lowers the probability of a given individual also adopting.  
Banerjee et al. (2013) study the diffusion of participation in a microfinance program in 43 communities in 
India by inviting several key respondents to an informational meeting on the microfinance program. These 
few individuals were then asked to pass on the program information to the remainder of the community.  
Based on the observed diffusion, a predictive capturing an individual’s likelihood for generating optimal 
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diffusion patterns was developed. They dub this measure diffusion centrality. Their model was very effective 
in predicting the diffusion pattern but computationally demanding, motivating their development of a 
simpler analogue termed Diffusion Centrality. This measure of Diffusion Centrality has a close relationship 
with eigenvector centrality, and under model assumptions of infinite diffusion time periods is equivalent to 
eigenvector centrality. This study’s design holds five main advantages over existing network studies.   
First, our intervention traces both the distribution of information and a physical technology, fertilizer 
packages. This is in contrast to Beaman et al. (2015), Kim et al., (2015) and Emerick (2016) whose outcomes 
are based solely on adoption rates. This is an important contribution as adoption of a technology relies on 
a potential-adopter shifting their belief set such that that the returns of the innovation are expected to be 
greater relative to the status quo. Diffusion of innovation-related information is therefore an early condition 
of innovation adoption. We are able to track the distribution of both the information and the physical 
resource, comparing accordingly.  
Second, we look at the importance of centrality. This focus is based on eigenvector centrality being equated 
to measures of social influence (Borgatti, 2005), making it particularly relevant as more influential individuals 
are thought to have a positive effect on the adoption decisions of peers. Furthermore, our design is especially 
favorable to detecting the importance of network-based selection of initial recipients on resulting diffusion 
patterns.  By selecting household heads as entry points based on their having very high or very low 
eigenvector centrality scores, we overcome the identification challenges faced by Banerjee et al. (2013) and 
Cai et al. (2015). In addition, by focusing on the two extremes of the centrality spectrum we maximize the 
discernible differences in diffusion attributable to eigenvector centrality-based selection of entry points.  
Third, we collect full household network data. There are potential biases that can result from extrapolating 
results based on small samples capturing only portions of larger networks (see (Sinan Aral et al., 2009; 
Borgatti, Carley, & Krackhardt, 2006; Chandrasekhar & Lewis, 2010). In contrast, our data set provides a 
high-resolution snapshot of pre-existing community networks allowing for a detailed measure of network 
positions and overarching structures through which diffusion can be tracked.   
Fourth, we measure social networks in the pre-intervention survey and use this information to select our 
farmer entry points which allows for a more causal relationship to be established. To our knowledge, a 
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similar network-based selection approach has only been undertaken by two prior studies, both of which 
analyzed alternative network measures for their selection processes. Kim et al. (2015) collected network data 
in 20 communities in Honduras and assign communities to one of three treatments: 1. Random Assignment 
2. Community members with the highest number of social network connections (indegree) 3. Friends of 
randomly selected community members. They find that using indegree does not improve diffusion 
outcomes over random assignment, and friends of friends only increase adoption for one of their two 
interventions provided.  Beaman et al. (2015) collected full network data in 200 communities in Malawi 
based on three relationships of interest: consultation on agricultural decisions, food sharing, and friendship 
to study an intervention aiming to increase adoption of pit planting methods.  Using threshold models of 
contagion they simulated both simple and complex contagion models in selecting theoretically-optimal pairs 
of initial seeds.  They find that all initial recipients selected from either of the threshold model simulations 
(simple or complex) outperformed the status quo method of selection by consultation with community 
leaders.   
Finally, our design allows us to collect a wide set of outcome measures. We measure outcomes in terms of 
not only the magnitude of community-level diffusion and uptake, but also the composition of recipients by 
exploring who within the network ultimately receives either the fertilizer or the information. It is important 
to learn more about the types of people that are benefiting from diffusion-based interventions given 
concerns that resources are captured by community elites or diverted along personal channels (Olken, 2006; 
Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). Reaching marginalized populations or particular subsets of community 
members may be of particular importance to development agencies. Our design allows us to consider which 
community members gain access to and knowledge about new technologies when different network-based 
entry points are selected for resource distribution. Studies that aggregate community-level effects overlook 
this potentially crucial consequence of technology diffusion schemes. 
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3 Research context: Eastern Congo 
We implement our study in forty rural communities in the Congolese province of South Kivu. The location 
of the communities and the major regional city (Bukavu) are shown in Error! Reference source not found..13 
ongo ranks at the very bottom in the human development index (UNDP, 2013). GDP per capita is as low 
as $442 and over 85 percent of the population currently lives below the poverty line (WORLD BANK, 
2015). The region has been embroiled in violent conflict, spiking during the First and Second Congolese 
Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003). The latter has been the deadliest war in modern African history (Coghlan 
et al., 2007). Hostilities remain up to this day. For the majority of the rural population agriculture is the main 
source of income and nutrition. Farms are often small and fragmented. Farms typically intercrop common 
beans, banana, cassava, sweet potatoes, maize and sorghum (Bulte et al. 2015).  Due to the conflict, 
development in farming has been stagnant. Yields are low, causing widespread malnutrition. Incomes from 
cash crops are minimal and most farmers struggle to improve their livelihoods. Most farmers have no access 
to important input markets such as fertilizer and (improved) seeds (Pypers et al., 2011).  As a result, the use 
of fertilizer is very low, with only 3% of farmers reporting having used fertilizer previously (Bulte et al., 
2015). In addition to infrequent use, average quantities applied are low. On average, only 0.3 kilograms per 
hectare is applied, compared to 14kg per hectare for SSA as a whole and 166kg per hectare in Asia (FAO, 
2015).  
Communities in the South Kivu province – like in the rest of Congo – are small, typically comprised of less 
than 200 households (Bulte et al., 2015). Within these communities, economic and social interactions are 
typically local due to underdeveloped transport and ICT infrastructure. The reach of formal government is 
limited, and local institutions – such as chiefs - have considerable autonomy in organizing the economic and 
social activities of raising taxes, settling disputes and allocating communal resources (Vlassenroot & 
Huggins, 2005). Additionally, most agricultural activities and organizations are formed internally to a 
community. This combination of agricultural innovations being largely missing within the region and the 
                                                     
13 Communities were not randomly selected. Communities were selected based on the following criteria: fewer than 100 
inhabitants, road access, and proximity to larger centers where research assistants could spend the night.  
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localized nature in which economic and social life is organized makes Congo a well-suited location to learn 
about how social networks shape innovation adoption.  See Figure 1 for a map of the research region. 
Figure 1 Map of Research Region in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
4 Experimental design 
As part of our field experiment, each community was visited three times. The first visit entailed a household 
survey with all household heads to collect social network information as well as socioeconomic and 
agricultural production data. The second visit occurred approximately one month later, during this visit we 
implemented our field experiment. The intervention consisted of training and the distribution of packets of 
fertilizer and information to selected farmers, which we will call our “ambassadors”. A third visit took place 
two weeks later. 14 During this visit, all household heads were revisited and outcome data was collected. 
                                                     
14 For logistical reasons there is variation in how much time there was between these visits. This variation is unrelated to 
assignment to treatment. 
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Error! Reference source not found. provides an overview of the activities undertaken. We will discuss each 
isit in more detail now.  
Table 1 Description experimental design 
Visit Day Activity Date 
1 1 
 Household survey 
 Mapping of household-level social networks 
 Chief survey to obtain community level information 
17 Feb – 13 Mar 2015 
2 31 
 Training ambassadors  
 Distribution of technology and information 
 Communities randomly assigned to central or isolate ambassadors  
 Elicit willingness to pay for fertilizer 
20 Mar – 29 Mar 2015 
3 45 
 Household survey with the same individuals as visit 1 
 Track fertilizer and knowledge spillovers 
8 Apr – 29 Apr 2015 
 
4.1 Visit 1: Measuring the social network 
Our research assistants first conducted a full community census of all heads of household in the community, 
during which the head of household’s full name, age, and gender were recorded along with the names of 
any other adults in the household. Upon completion of the census, each household head was individually 
interviewed. The baseline survey consisted of two parts. The first part collected information about basic 
socio-economic characteristics, such as demography as well as income and agriculture related questions. 
These questions included information about fertilizer use, fertilizer knowledge and an individual’s 
willingness to pay for fertilizer. We will come back to these measures. 
In the second part we collected social network data. Specifically, we aimed to obtain data on three types of 
network. The first is family network. Whether the head of the household is biological family with any member 
within the other household.15 Second, we ask about field-neighbor network. Whether the head of the 
household’s fields borders a field owned by any member of the other household. Third, we measure the 
agriculture network. Whether the head of the household discusses agricultural related topics with anybody else 
in the other household. We focus on these three networks because they are most closely associated to our 
                                                     
15 Specifically, we use whether the other person is biologically related to a maximum of the third degree (this is a well-
understood term in Congo). This does not include the wife’s family; it has to be through descent. 
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agriculture-related intervention, which is discussed in the next section. Kendzior, Zibika, & Voors (2015) 
found that these three networks are the three predominant channels via which agricultural resources were 
shared. We conducted a number of pilots that included more networks.16 Pilot results showed that these 
three dimensions were the most distinct from one another and thus captured maximum variation while 
minimizing the number of network survey questions. 
Specifically, to elicit network ties the research assistant first explained the network under study, and then 
moved down the complete community roster asking for each household on the list if the network applies.17 
Our network data is thus at the household level for each of the three relationships covered.  
4.2 Visit 2: Training and distribution of fertilizer and knowledge 
The aim of this study is to understand the role of social networks in technology distribution. As a result, we 
undertook an intervention with a technology that is relevant to community members in Eastern Congo. We 
choose for the distribution of fertilizer and knowledge about fertilization to a select set of “ambassadors” 
per community, whom we asked to distribute this technology and information further. This intervention 
respond to the low yield faced by Congolese community members. In addition, the intervention mirrors 
closely agricultural extension programs designed to promote technology adoption that have been 
undertaken in the region by NGOs in order to raise yields and subsequently improving nutrition and income 
levels (Pypers et al., 2011). Acknowledging the promise of new technologies, development initiatives often 
strive to distribute them in developing countries. A typical approach first selects a subset of community 
members to be the initial recipients who are then tasked with spreading the technology and information 
about it more widely throughout the community (see Feder, Murgai, & Quizon, 2003). These programs train 
and provide resources to a subset of intended recipients, frequently referred to as “lead” farmers or 
“contact” farmers, and rely on these trained farmers to further disseminate information and resources within 
their community. The aim is to maximize distribution at minimal costs (Woomer et al., 2014).  
                                                     
16 In total we conducted three pilots. The other networks were friends (the problem was that everyone was everyone’s friend), 
and work on another person’s farm (that overlapped with the other networks). 
17 Given the time intensive method in which we elicit network ties, we opted to measure community social networks across 
fewer dimensions than earlier studies (e.g. Banerjee, 2013) in efforts to minimize potential survey fatigue. 
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The field experiment consisted of a number of activities. In each community, enumerators gathered the 
three pre-selected ambassadors. These ambassadors then took part in a one hour training session, which 
was led by an agronomist.18 The training followed a set script (see Appendix) and the topics included 
information on types of fertilizer, benefits, application methods, expected market prices and access points 
in Bukavu. Our training sessions focused exclusively on in-organic fertilizer containing NPK for its 
flexibility in being applied throughout the growing season and it positive effect on yields for a range of crops 
grown within the region (FAO, 2000).19  
At the end of the training session, each ambassador received a single 1 kilogram bag of fertilizer that they 
were told was theirs to keep. Each ambassador also received three fertilizer “kits”. Each kit consisted of 
three 1 kilogram bags of fertilizer. All bags of fertilizer came with a sticker and a pen. We asked the 
ambassadors to distribute each kit to separate household in the community. Upon transfer of the kits, we 
asked the ambassador to record the date and time on a sticker and paste it on the kit. We also asked the 
ambassadors to spread the information on use of in-organic fertilize that was provided during the training. 
The recipients of the kits were asked to take one bag from the kit, and distribute the two remaining bags 
further. These “second-stage” ambassadors were also asked to record the date and time of this transfer on 
a new sticker, and to distribute the knowledge of fertilizer as well. Given this structure the maximum spread 
is thus thirty recipients per community, or 27 transfers (nine from first-stage to second-stage ambassadors, 
and eighteen from second-stage to final recipients). Note that there were no sanctions or incentives imposed 
to ensure this structure was followed in practice.  
In our analysis below, we refer to the three trained individuals as first-stage ambassadors. Those community 
members that received fertilizer and training from these first-stage ambassadors are called second-stage 
ambassadors so long as they also further distributed fertilizer. If any individual received fertilizer (from either 
first-stage or second-stage ambassadors) but did not further distribute fertilizer, they are referred to as 
receivers. Community members that did not receive any fertilizer are termed non-receivers. This structure is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
                                                     
18 The agronomist was one of the enumerators who had finished a degree in agronomy. 
19 NPK fertilizers are three-component fertilizers providing nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K). 
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Figure 2 Design Structure of Fertilizer Distribution 
 
 
4.3 Exogenous variation in the type of ambassador 
In this study we aim to understand the importance of the position of the initial receiver in the network for 
the distribution of technology. A major problem research face answering this question is that the initial 
receiver is not likely to be random. NGOs that undertake agricultural extension programs often target 
specific individuals, whether they are the more literature, those chosen by the community chief, etc (Feder 
et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 2015). In order to be able to make causal claims, we randomly assign the initial 
entry point.  
As a first step we collapse the three networks into a single combined network. We do so because by 
examining multiple networks, we look at more possible channels of interaction. Therefore, we can capture 
more of what is happening in the social networks in the community. By combining the three networks we 
examine all possible ways of interacting that we think are likely to explain agricultural distribution behavior. 
Specifically, for an relationship to be present in the combined network graph it must be present in at least 
one of the three networks. Since a relatiosnhip need not be reciprocated for a node (head of household) to 
transfer information or resources, we convert our network data from directed edges to undirected edges, 
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meaning if either node claims a connection to another node, we will treat it as two-way link between the 
two.  
Subsequently, we assign to each individual their position within the network. In this study we are particularly 
interested in the centrality of an individual. We expect that the centrals are more influential (Bonacich, 2007). 
This should lead to higher uptake and knowledge in communities where central farmers were trained, 
compared to communities where isolate farmers were trained. Specifically, in this study we focus on a single 
measure of an individual’s position within a network structure: eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972).  This 
centrality measure is based not only on the number of edges that a given node has (as in degree centrality), 
it also weights each edge between nodes by the degree of the node that the edge leads to. For this reason, 
eigenvector centrality is often used to proxy for an individual’s level of influence within their social network 
as nodes can be said to be more influential with each other well-connected node it is linked with. In the case 
of technology diffusion, a highly eigenvector central node may, by nature of its access and connectedness, 
be a more compelling source of novel information for adoption of the relevant technology. Alternatively, 
nodes with low eigenvector centrality may, by nature of homophily, be better positioned to reach nodes in 
the network that lay on the periphery of the network structure (Aral et al., 2009).    
As a last step we assign our communities to one of two treatments.20 In twenty randomly selected 
communities we choose the three most central individuals as ambassadors – and call them “central 
ambassadors”. In the other twenty communities, we choose the three least central individuals as ambassador 
– we call them “isolate ambassadors”.21 Error! Reference source not found.3 illustrates a network map for 
wo communities, one from each treatment group. The map is structured so that individuals with fewer 
connections are located on the periphery while those with numerous connects are located in the center of 
the network map. 
  
                                                     
20 We also randomly assigned our five research teams to these community to deal with any worries related to enumerator 
effects. 
21 In some cases, one (or more) of individuals with the highest (lowest) centrality score were not present in the community. In 
such case, they were replaced by the next highest (lowest) from a backup list. 
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Figure 3 Example Community Social Network Structures by Treatment Type (Isolate v Central) 
  
Error! Reference source not found. presents information for a number of key respondent characteristics, 
utcome variables, and social network based on pre-treatment information across the two treatments. We 
find that the randomization was successful in creating two groups that are similar. Across nineteen measures 
we find differences for only one variable. In-degree, or the number of edges that lead towards a node, is 
higher amongst households in communities where isolates were selected as entry points. The presence of 
an imbalance between treatment groups, even when assignment to treatment is randomized as in our study, 
is to be expected when comparing data over many characteristics. However, as this is likely to be correlated 
with treatment we add indegree in all our analyses to improve power. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and balance 
 Treatment Centrals Treatment Isolates   
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD  P-value 
Individual and community level characteristics 
Age 1,191 46.75 17.87 1,336 45.16 17.18  0.149 
Gender (1=female) 1,191 0.32 0.47 1,336 0.32 0.47  0.858 
Literate (yes=1) 1,167 0.49 0.50 1,298 0.43 0.50  0.311 
Ethnicity (1=minority 
group) 
1,195 0.08 0.28 1,338 0.18 0.39  0.307 
War Exposure (max 4.5) 1,171 2.41 1.07 1,304 2.22 1.01  0.249 
Household Size 1,171 6.29 3.14 1,304 6.37 3.18  0.748 
Income Index 1,135 0.00 1.00 1,255 -0.03 0.91  0.648 
Likely lead farmer (1=yes) 1,195 0.23 0.42 1,338 0.21 0.41  0.480 
Chief (1=yes) 1,171 0.02 0.13 1,304 0.02 0.13  0.899 
Migrant (1=yes) 1,191 0.35 0.48 1,335 0.31 0.46  0.181 
Community Size 20 62 19 20 68 13  0.246 
Outcome variables 
Ever used fertilizer (yes=1) 1,158 0.06 0.24 1,285 0.07 0.26  0.424 
Fertilizer Knowledge Score 
(max 7.5) 
1,166 1.27 1.47 1,299 1.26 1.44  0.954 
Willingness to Pay (RCS, in 
US$) 
335 1.49 1.34 339 1.59 1.46  0.664 
Social network characteristics 
Centrality 1,195 0.34 0.27 1338 0.32 0.26  0.591 
In-degree 1,195 7.79 5.08 1338 10.02 7.10  0.029*** 
Density 20 0.14 0.07 20 0.15 0.07  0.620 
Clustering coefficient 20 0.60 0.18 20 0.62 0.20  0.783 
Note: P-values are from regressions with standard errors clustered at the community level (where appropriate). There 
are some small deviations from the PAP here, where we specified simple t-tests without clustering. Land size is 
restricted to maximum 100 km2. Income index is a normalised index (for the control group) calculated using the user-
written Stata program WMEANEFFECTS and comprises: # chickens owned, # goats or sheep owned, # cows owned, 
land size, land access. 
 
4.4 Visit 3: collecting outcome measures 
About two weeks after the field experiment, we revisited all communities to collect outcome measures. 
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Specifically, we are interested in individuals’ use of fertilizer, knowledge about fertilizer, and willingness to 
pay for fertilizer. Furthermore, we are interested in the speed and spread of the technology throughout the 
community. To obtain this information our enumerators undertook two activities in each community: a 
tracking exercise and a second household census.  
The packets of fertilizer distributed during the intervention were tracked down by research assistants.22 The 
starting points were the three ambassadors to whom fertilizer was initially distributed. We then asked to 
whom they gave fertilizer and followed up with the named recipient. We asked each fertilizer recipient 
whether, when and from whom they received a packet of chemical fertilizer, and to whom they in-turn 
distributed any fertilizer. These additional recipients were then also visited and interviewed until all recipients 
had been identified and receipt of fertilizer confirmed. Based on this data we created two outcome variables 
of interest: speed of diffusion and spread of diffusion.  
Speed of diffusion was measured as those giving fertilizer had been asked to note on a provided sticker, the 
date and time a package transfer was made. We copied this information and calculated for each packet of 
fertilizer the number of days that had occurred between the recorded date of receipt and the date the 
intervention was conducted within the community during which all fertilizer packets were initially 
provided.23  
To calculate the spread of distribution we take all nodes that received in-organic fertilizer at any point during 
the intervention and calculate the geodesic distance between receivers. The geodesic is the minimum number 
of edges that need to be followed in connecting one node with another. The geodesic is then divided by the 
total number of nodes in that community (to make the results comparable across communities). If there is 
no shortest path possible (because the receivers are in unconnected parts of the network) this variable takes 
the maximum value of 1. 
Once all fertilizer packets had been traced, our research assistants re-surveyed all households in the 
community. As part of the survey, we collected data was collected on three outcome variables. The first is 
                                                     
22 We only tracked fertilizer packages. Not the knowledge (i.e. with whom did you talk?), that was collected using a survey. 
23 If the recorded time of transfer was after 5pm, we recorded an additional half day as having passed. 
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fertilizer use. We ask respondents whether they had applied chemical fertilizer on any of their fields during 
this agricultural season.  
Next, we asked about fertilizer knowledge. We asked each respondent a set of questions to capture each 
household head’s knowledge on chemical fertilizer use, benefits, and market sourcing. Specifically, the 
questions covered the expected effects of chemical fertilizer, timing of application, methods of application 
and market availability and pricing.24 Points were awarded for correct responses to generate a fertilizer 
knowledge score ranging from 0 to 7.5. 
Finally, we ask about individuals’ willingness to pay for fertilizer. To do so we used the Randomized Card 
Sorting (RCS) method, as described in Smith (2006) 25, with eighteen respondents from each community. 
These eighteen respondents were chosen by sorting all household heads by eigenvector centrality scores and 
selecting the top six, bottom six and middle six household heads. Using ten choice cards which displayed 
potential fertilizer prices that increased stepwise from 100 Congolese Fc (about 0.90US$) to 5000 Fc (about 
4.50US$), each of the eighteen selected participants were asked which of the fertilizer prices displayed they 
would be willing to pay for a one kilogram bag of NPK fertilizer. Cards could be sorted into one of three 
piles: would pay, would maybe pay and would not pay26. 
It is important to note that we asked the exact same household survey questions before the onset of the 
field experiment. As a result, we have panel data that allows us to identify changes in indicators of interest 
that arise due to the chemical fertilizer distribution intervention.27  
                                                     
24 We tally and weigh the correct answers to create a knowledge score. Specifically, it is based on the following questions. 
What is the effect of fertilizer on yields? (A: increases yields, 1 point)  What are other effects of fertilizer? (A: earlier harvest, 
0.5 point. A: Kills seeds, 0.5 points. Multiple possible).  When is it effective to apply fertilizer? (A: before planting, 1 point. 
A: during planting, 1 point. A: after planting, 1 point. Multiple possible).  What is the best method to apply fertilizer? (A: mix 
in soil before planting, 0.5 point. A: Put next to the seed/plant, 0.5 point. A: Throw on the field, 0.5 point. Multiple Possible)  
What is the price of fertilizer in Bukavu? (A: between 1.5 and 1.7 dollars, one point. A: between 1.2 and 1.5 dollars, 0.5 
point. A: between 1.7 and 1.9 dollars, 0.5 point). 
25 A challenge with measuring Willingness to Pay measurements is starting point bias (or anchoring). Respondents rarely 
deviate far from the initial valuation posed by the researchers. By giving all the amounts to the respondent in a random order 
this is prevented. Smith (2006) compares three approaches that use payment cards, and finds evidence that randomizing the 
order of the cards yields the most valid results. 
26 Included in the baseline survey was a simple open-response questions asking the amount the respondent would be willing 
to pay for a one kilogram bag of NPK fertilizer. The average response for this question was $1.00, significantly lower than 
the price elicited using the Random Card Sorting method conducted with the 18 community members. 
27 The survey also asked whether the household had received fertilizer in the previous weeks. As a result, we have two 
sources on whether the household received fertilizer: 1) from the tracking exercise, and 2) from the endline survey. In the 
current analyses, we use the first. There seem to have been some data entry errors providing a large mismatch between both 
data sets, ie when comparing the tracking data (whom did you give fertilizer to) to the endline data (who did you receive 
fertiliser from) do not overlap to a large degree. We have to go back to the data entry forms to check. 
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4.5 Attrition 
We undertook great efforts to interview all heads of households. Our rule was that if the household head 
was not available, we would return later (often during the weekend as respondents were more likely to be 
present). If the head of the household remained unreachable, we looked for an adult replacement within the 
household. In to the first household census, in about 20% of the cases the head of household had to be 
replaced with a family member, generally the spouse.28 Upon replacement, we asked the replacement about 
the characteristics (including the network characteristics) of the head of the household. In total, we were 
able to data from 97% heads of households, which is very high compared to similar studies.29 In total, we 
recorded information on 2,563 individuals and 20,596 social ties. 
Related to our second household survey conducted during the third visit, we record modest attrition. In 
total, 9% of our baseline respondents were not present. We do not find that there was selection in attrition.30 
We also do not find that the level of attrition is correlated with treatment status. 
4.6 Manipulation check 
Before moving to the results, we first explore whether the ambassadors in fact distributed the fertilizer. We 
find that they did. In total, our dataset records 225 transfers of fertilizer. In total, 86% first-stage 
ambassadors distributed fertilizer.31 Interviews reveal that those who did not distribute their fertilizer kept 
it for their own use, or said that they were waiting until the next planting period to distribute the fertilizer. 
We find that central ambassadors donate to an average of 3.1 other communities, and the average kilograms 
per recipient is 1.6 kilograms. Isolate ambassadors distribute to an average of 2.8 individuals, with an average 
of 2 kilograms per recipient. This last difference is significant at the 95% confidence level using a simple t-
test. We find that distribution beyond the first-stage ambassador is much lower. Second-stage ambassadors 
                                                     
28 We asked the replacement the reason for the absence of the head of the household. The most common reasons mentioned 
are: visit to the household’s fields, visit to Bukavu, and temporary outmigration for work. 
29 Beaman et al (2015), for example, were only able to reach 80% of targeted respondents. 
30 In Table 7 in the appendix we regress attrition on a set of baseline characteristics and find only one correlation: dropouts 
have had slightly lower war exposure. The difference is however small. Further, we also collected some data on participants 
we could not reach in any of the field visits. This data was collected from a neighbour, family, or the community chief. We 
then compare this group against all who participated in the endline survey. Absence is very low (3%) migrants and farmers 
are also less likely to be absent. 
31 These are 97 of 116 first stage ambassadors (we lack data for 4 ambassadors) 
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distributed onward in only 20% of cases. When they did, they distributed on average to 1.8 people and in 
total 1.1 kg. 
5 The Sample: Community members and ambassadors 
We present information about the community members and ambassadors in our study communities. 
5.1 The Community Members 
Error! Reference source not found. presents descriptive statistics for our respondents. Respondents are on 
verage 46 years old, predominantly illiterate with only 32% of the household heads being female and roughly 
33% of the household heads being migrants into the community. Households typically comprise of six 
members (including all wives and children). Most respondents have been exposed to conflict in a number 
of ways including being forced to flee, losing a family member or sustaining an injury. We reduced exposure 
to conflict to a single metric by constructing a composite index of the weighted sum of all experienced 
incidents of conflict.32 On average, sample members reported having experienced at least one such conflict-
related event. As the average community size within our sample is 65 households, by construction roughly 
two percent of the sample hold the position of community chief. The average respondent’s farm size is five 
square km.33 Following Banerjee et al. (2013), in order to assess whether someone was viewed as influential 
among farmers, we asked If we wanted to spread information about a new agricultural technique, to whom should we 
speak? We did not restrict nomination to household heads but recorded any name provided by each 
respondent. In total 23% of the household heads were mentioned at least once as being the best candidate 
for spreading agriculturally-relevant information.  
Turning to baseline values of our main diffusion outcome variables. Error! Reference source not found. 
hows that only about 6% of households had previously applied fertilizer to their fields. Overall, fertilizer 
knowledge in the baseline period was low with an average sample score of 1.27. Finally, based on the 
                                                     
32 Saw Fighting, 0.5 point. Property Damage/Loss, 0.5 points. Injured in the war, 1 point. Family member injured in the war, 
0.5 point. Family member killed in the war, 1 point. Migrated because of the war, 1 point. 
33 We remove several outliers of farms over 100 km2. In our analyses that require land size as a predictor we will use the 
measure without outliers. We did not account for this in the pre-analysis plan. 
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randomized card sorting method, the average willingness to pay reported was approximately $1.50 for 1 kg, 
roughly the equivalent of the market price of fertilizer.34   
Finally, these community members live in closely knit communities. Density is the percentage of possible 
edges that are realized and averages 15% for our sample communities. The clustering coefficient is a measure 
of the proportion of possible triads being present within each community network. Our sample average for 
the clustering coefficient is high at 61%, indicating that there is a 61% probability that if household A is 
connected to both household B and household C, that household B and C are also connected. The average 
community member has a centrality of 0.33, and an indegree of 8.9. 
5.2 The ambassadors 
We briefly discuss our (first-stage) ambassadors. Table 3 presents information about central and isolate 
ambassadors based on information collected before the intervention. As expected, we find that central and 
isolate ambassadors differ significantly on a considerable number of personal characteristics. Central 
ambassadors are more likely to be named as leaders among farmers, male, literate, richer and head larger 
households. Also, compared to isolate ambassadors, centrals are more likely to hold formal positions of 
authority, including being community chief, have more frequent interactions with the community chief, and 
are more knowledgeable about chemical fertilizer.  
Isolate ambassadors are more likely to be migrants. Only 11% of central ambassadors are migrant, while 
this increases to a full 49% for isolate ambassadors, a difference that is statistically significant at the 99% 
significance level. This finding corresponds closely to previous work on Congo that highlight that migration 
status are important determinants of social and economic life, and suggests that these cleavages permeate 
even into the position an individual holds within their larger community social network.  
Finally, we verify that our ambassador selection process was successfully by comparing network position of 
our ambassadors. Table 3 shows that both the in-degree and the centrality of the central ambassadors are 
significantly higher (0.88) than isolate ambassadors (0.10).35
                                                     
34 The market price in Bukavu for a kilogram of fertilizer was $1.70 or 1 kg at the time. 
35 We have one outlier, with one supposed isolate ambassador having almost the maximum centrality score. It is possible that 
the research assistants trained the wrong person to be an ambassador. Incorporating this outlier in the analysis gives 
conservative estimates about treatment effect. 
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Table 3 Ambassador characteristics 
 Centrals Isolates   
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD  P-value 
Individual characteristics 
Age 56 50.2 13.8 57 46.1 18.4  0.292 
Gender (female=1) 56 0.13 0.33 57 0.51 0.50  0.000*** 
Literate (yes=1) 56 0.54 0.50 57 0.32 0.47  0.060* 
Ethnicity (1= minority group) 56 0.05 0.23 57 0.14 0.35  0.342 
War Exposure (max 4.5) 56 2.63 0.97 57 2.26 0.89  0.098* 
Household Size 56 7.39 3.97 57 5.58 3.01  0.019** 
Income Index 53 0.28 0.86 56 -0.27 0.80  0.002** 
Likely lead farmer (yes=1) 56 0.52 0.50 57 0.14 0.35  0.000*** 
Community Chief (yes=1) 56 0.18 0.39 57 0.00 0.00  0.000*** 
# times talked to chief in last month 46 11.3 10.5 57 6.0 8.7  0.020** 
Migrant (yes=1) 56 0.11 0.31 57 0.49 0.50  0.000*** 
Indegree 56 14.3 7.0 57 4.5 4.0  0.000*** 
Centrality 56 0.88 0.11 57 0.10 0.14  0.000*** 
Outcome variables 
Used fertilizer (yes=1) 56 0.09 0.29 57 0.04 0.19  0.420 
Fertilizer Knowledge (max 7.5) 56 1.71 1.42 57 0.80 1.19  0.001*** 
Willingness to Pay for fertilizer (US$) 49 1.80 1.69 55 1.46 1.59  0.447 
Note: P-values are from regressions with standard errors clustered at the community level. War exposure is based on 
one question where respondents could give multiple answers. Each answer has a score attached, and this variable sums 
those scores together. Saw Fighting, 0.5 point. Property Damage/Loss, 0.5 points. Injured in the war, 1 point. Family 
member injured in the war, 0.5 point. Family member killed in the war, 1 point. Migrated because of the war, 1 point. 
Income index is a normalised index (for the control group) calculated using the user-written Stata program 
WMEANEFFECTS and comprises: # chickens owned, # goats or sheep owned, # cows owned, land size, land access.  
 
6 Empirical Models 
We first examine the effect of network position on technology diffusion. In exploring this relationship we 
begin by analysing equation (1) where Yijt is a vector of the three outcomes of fertilizer adoption, fertilizer 
knowledge, and willingness-to-pay for fertilizer for individual i (with i={1,…,n}) in community j (where j = 
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{1,…, 40) at time t (where t = 0 for baseline and 1 for endline). As our assignment to treatment is 
randomized, a causal relationship can be measured using a difference-in-difference model for estimating the 
treatment effect.  
Yijt = β0 +  β1 Tj +  β2 Postt +  β3 Postt ∗  Tj +  ∂k + εij    (1) 
Tj is our treatment variable at the community level, which takes the value Tj=1 if the first-stage ambassador 
is an isolate, and Tj=0 if the first-stage ambassador is a central. Postt is a dummy that signifies the post 
intervention (endline) period. The variable of interest is the interaction between treatment and a post-
intervention dummy (Postt*Tj). We expect the coefficient on this term, β3, which represents the treatment 
effect, to be negative. This is due to our hypothesis that central ambassadors are more effective at increasing 
adoption and communicating knowledge (Borgatti, 2005). ∂k are dummies capturing research team fixed 
effects, as it is the variable on which our random assignment to treatment was blocked. εij are Newey-West 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, clustered at the community level. We 
estimate with individual fixed effects to correct for idiosyncratic differences36. 
In exploring relationships of network entry point on outcomes of diffusion speed and wideness of 
distribution, we estimate Equation (2). 
Yl = β0 +  β1 Tj + 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + ∂k + εlj     (2) 
, in which Y𝑙  is a vector of outcomes capturing speed of diffusion and wideness of distribution. As we do 
not have this data over time, our data does not lend itself to a difference-in-difference approach. However 
as our data is randomized, we can identify causal relationships with an OLS regression on endline 
observations.  Within Equation (2),  Tj is our treatment indicators assigned for community j, while 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is 
respondent i’s indegree within community j.  Indegree is included as a regression covariate as it was found 
as not being orthogonal to treatment within our balance analysis (Table 2). 
To examine the effect on intervention attenuation we examine models 3 and 4.  
                                                     
36 Random effects gives qualitatively similar results. 
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Yij = β0 + β1𝐗i +  εij     (3) 
where, Yij captures the same three outcomes as seen in Equation (1).  Xi is a vector capturing our four types 
of recipient groups: (i) those that were trained by our agronomists (first-stage ambassadors), (ii) those that 
received from first-stage ambassadors (second stage ambassadors), (iii) those that received from second 
stage ambassadors, and (iv) non-receivers (See Figure 3). We expect the coefficient on each coefficient in 
the vector of estimates, β1, to be increasingly negative. This is based on a hypothesis that the strength of 
the intervention will be strongest for those directly receiving it with decreasing impact the further it moves 
from the network contact point. εij are standard errors clustered at the community level. 
While Equation (3) analyses overall attenuation, we turn our attention to whether attenuation levels vary by 
centrality level of network contact points. Specifically we estimate 
 Yij = β0 +  β1Xi + β2Xi ∗ Tj + β3 Tj +  ∂k + εij    (4) 
where, Yij is the same vector of outcomes as Equation (1) and (3). Added to Equation (4) are interaction 
terms between treatment assignment and each of the three receiver-type dummies. We expect coefficient 
estimates within vector β2 to be negative. ∂k captures research team fixed effects and εij captures standard 
errors clustered at the community level 
Finally, we conduct an exploratory analysis on what factors are relevant for who ambassadors decided to 
transmit information and resources to. We initially estimate Equation (5) which does not distinguish 
between ambassador centrality type. We conduct this analysis by exploring each potential pairing of each 
ambassador with every other household head within the community on outcomes of whether fertilizer was 
transmitted or information transmitted between the pairing. 
 Yaij = β0 + β1Xaij + 𝑉𝑗 +  εaij    (5) 
where, Yaij is an indicator taking value “1” if fertilizer (information) was transmitted between ambassador a 
(where a = {1, 2, 3}) to household i (with i = {1, ..., n| i ≠ n}) in community j (with j = {1, ... , 40}). Xaij is 
a row vector of a set of variables we expect to predict ambassador giving behavior. These include whether 
a and i  are linked as family, field neighbors, agricultural discussion partners within their social network, or 
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members of the same agricultural group as well as the centrality score of individual i and individual i’s age, 
gender, wealth index score, leadership status, migrant status, and ethnic minority status. Vj  is a vector of 
community dummies to correct for village-specific gifting norms. We cluster errors at both ambassador and 
receiver level37. 
To examine whether central and isolate ambassadors had different deliberations regarding who to give to, 
we also include interactions with treatment in equation 6. Significant positive (negative) coefficients in β2 
will show that isolates are more (less) likely to give to villagers with this characteristic than central 
ambassadors. 
7 Results 
We present our results in three parts. The first part explores the causal impact of an ambassador’s network 
position on the use of fertilizer, the knowledge about fertilizer, and individuals’ willingness to pay for 
fertilizer. We also explore whether the speed and spread of distribution is different depending on the type 
of ambassador. Second, we look at attenuation of fertilizer use and knowledge. The final part of this section 
explores who receives fertilizer, and whether this differs by ambassador type. 
7.1 The impact of network position on technology diffusion 
We first explore the causal effect of an ambassador’s network position. Information about fertilizer use, 
fertilizer knowledge, and willingness to pay for fertilizer comes from individuals. Furthermore, we asked 
about this both before and after the intervention and we thus estimate a difference-in-difference model. 
The first three columns in Error! Reference source not found. present the results. Column 1 shows that the 
ntervention generated a significant increase in fertilizer use, raising fertilizer adoption by 8% compared to 
baseline levels. This more than doubles prior fertilizer use rates (6%). Although comparison with the the 
theoretical maximum of every kilogram of fertilizer being used by a different household in an average 
                                                     
37 This is different from the PAP in several ways: we said we would check for differences across treatment using a Chow test. 
See model 6 for the updated approach. We also said we would weight for the probability to be selected based on community 
size. This is not possible when clustering at two levels. In addition, we dropped variables in changes due to high 
multicollinearity. We added whether a receiver belonged to ethnic minority in community. 
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community is 46% (30/65). So adoption levels are considerably lower than intervention resources would 
suggest. This result is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. However, we do not find any 
evidence that fertilizer use was different between those communities where we trained central ambassadors 
compared to those communities where we trained isolate ambassadors.  
Table 4 Ambassador’s network position and distribution 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fertilizer Use Fertilizer 
Knowledge 
Willingness to 
Pay 
Distribution 
Speed 
Distribution 
Spread 
Treatment*Post 0.000 0.021 0.142   
 (0.036) (0.144) (0.246)   
Post 0.084*** 0.696*** -0.199   
 (0.022) (0.110) (0.175)   
Treatment (1= isolate 
ambassadors) 
   -4.196*** 0.081 
    (1.049) (0.075) 
In-degree    -0.036 -0.005 
    (0.058) (0.004) 
Constant 0.066*** 
(0.009) 
1.274*** 
(0.034) 
1.563*** 
(0.054) 
9.476*** 
(1.212) 
0.252 
(0.172) 
Difference-in-
difference 
Y Y Y N N 
# Clusters 40 40 40 33 NA 
Observations 4677 1198 4708 220 39 
Level Indiv. Indiv. Indiv. Transfer Community 
Mean of dependent 
variable (centrals) 
0.06 1.27 1.49 7.77 0.05 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: OLS regressions of ATEs of treatment, fixed effects. Research team fixed effects included. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses clustered at the community level. We deviate from the PAP here. In-degree was added to control 
for imbalance at baseline.  
 
Column 2 shows the impact of ambassador position on fertilizer knowledge. We find that the intervention 
increased fertilizer knowledge by 0.7 points to a new average of 1.9 points (out of 7.5). This means that at 
the community level, respondents were able to name about one additional advantage of in-organic fertilizer, 
or knew the price more precisely. This is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Again, we do 
not find that the network position of the ambassador was associated with a significant difference for the 
knowledge outcome.38  
In column 3 we find that individuals’ willingness to pay was unresponsive both to the intervention and to 
treatment.  This could be due to opposing forces occurring simultaneous. Improved knowledge on the 
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advantages of fertilizer is likely to increase an individual’s willingness to pay for fertilizer while increases in 
local supply of fertilize will have a potentially negative effect. We are unable to decompose these effects. 
Next, we look at the speed and spread of fertilizer diffusion. Information for both variables was obtained 
only after the intervention, and we thus estimate a simple cross-sectional model. Speed of distribution is 
measured at the transfers level, while spread of distribution is measured at the community level. The last 
two columns of Error! Reference source not found. present the results.  
Column 4 shows the effect on the speed of diffusion.39  We find that that isolate ambassadors completed 
their chemical fertilizer distribution four days faster than central ambassadors. This result is statistically 
significant at the 99% significance level. This is opposite to what we expected. We expected that central 
ambassadors would distribute faster, as they had more connections and thus more potential people to whom 
they could distribute fertilizer.  
Finally, column 5 looks at the difference in the spread of distribution. We find that isolate ambassadors 
appear to distribute wider than central ambassadors. In central communities the path between all receivers 
is 25% of the maximum length possible, while in isolate communities it is 8 percentage points higher. This 
implies that the treatment has diffused further in the community. It makes sense that isolates lead to further 
diffusion: centrals are often clustered together in the center of the network map, while isolate ambassadors 
can be anywhere on the fringes of the network. This result is however not statistically significant. As this 
variable is at the community level, our statistical power is low, and we find high standard errors for all of 
our estimated coefficients.40  
In summary, we find significant effects of the intervention on adoption and knowledge of chemical fertilizer. 
However we do not find that this differs when the initial entry point are central head of households or 
isolates. We do see that isolates are much faster at distributing their chemical fertilizer, and they appear to 
spread wider, though this last result is not significant because of low power.  
                                                     
39 The number of observations is lower here because it was not registered in all cases. This might be because ambassadors 
forgot to write the time down or because they did not know what the time was. 
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7.2 Treatment attenuation 
The next result that we explore is attenuation of distribution. We expect fertilizer use, fertilizer knowledge 
and willingness to pay for fertilizer to diminish as it spreads through the community. In other words, an 
individual that receives information about fertilizer use directly from the agronomist is more informed than 
an individual that received the intervention information indirectly through network diffusion. As centrality 
is closely correlated with socioeconomic indicators of education, the quality of information processing and 
transmission behind attenuation may vary by the centrality of network contact points. We explore both now.  
We divide each community into four groups: 1) first-stage ambassadors, 2) those who received from first-
stage ambassadors, 3) those who received from second stage ambassadors, and 4) non-receivers41.  Error! 
eference source not found. plots our main outcome variables – fertilizer use, fertilizer knowledge, and 
willingness to pay for fertilizer – across these four groups. We find that the intervention weakens when 
moving away from the entry point. The first-stage ambassadors have the highest level of fertilizer use, 
knowledge and willingness to pay. This is lower for those that received fertilizer from the second stage 
ambassadors, those that received from the first-stage ambassador score lower, and those that received from 
the second-stage ambassador score even lower. Those that are not-receivers score the lowest across all three 
outcome measures. 
  
                                                     
41 By design, we do not have third stage ambassadors in our data, though in practice we have one case where this happened. 
We lump these in with the group that received from second stage ambassadors. 
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Figure 6 Fertilizer Use, Fertilizer Knowledge, and Willingness-to-pay by Ambassadors, Receivers, 
and Non-Receivers 
 
In columns 1 to 3 of Error! Reference source not found. we test whether these differences are statistically 
ignificant. We see outcomes taper off strongly. The coefficients are negative and increasing in size. 
Recipients from second stage ambassadors and non-recipients have a much smaller probability of applying 
in-organic fertilizer or of being equally informed on its use. Willingness to Pay follows a similar pattern, but 
standard errors are large. First stage ambassadors used chemical fertilizer in about 40% of the cases, while 
those who receive from first-stage ambassadors the adoption rate drops 8% points (32%). For those 
receiving from the 2nd stage ambassadors the percentage is 20%. For non-receivers it is 10%. There is no 
significant difference between 1st stage those receiving from them. Fertilizer knowledge follows a similar 
pattern. 1st stage ambassadors get 3 points (out of 7.5), while non-receivers get about 1.3 points less. 
Willingness to pay has no clear pattern, which is unsurprising as we found no effect of our intervention on 
willingness to pay. In sum, we find clear and strong attenuation for adoption and knowledge. The 
implication of this is that an intervention will not cascade infinitely throughout a community. Having 
second-stage ambassadors also provide trainings will not be effective, and perhaps educating more trainers 
in the first stage is required to ease the teaching burden on 1st stage ambassadors. 
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Table 5 Centrality and intervention attenuation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Fertilizer 
Use 
Fertilizer 
Knowledge 
WTP Fertilizer 
Use 
Fertilizer 
Knowledge 
WTP 
Received from 1st stage 
ambassadors 
-0.079 
(0.061) 
-0.368** 
(0.147) 
-0.111 
(0.176) 
-0.101 
(0.078) 
-0.465** 
(0.190) 
-0.290 
(0.259) 
Received from 2nd stage 
ambassadors 
-0.201*** 
(0.059) 
-0.599*** 
(0.201) 
-0.484*** 
(0.151) 
-0.198** 
(0.083) 
-0.843*** 
(0.277) 
-0.377 
(0.245) 
Non-Receiver -0.298*** 
(0.052) 
-1.284*** 
(0.151) 
-0.485** 
(0.210) 
-0.310*** 
(0.077) 
-1.299*** 
(0.193) 
-0.391 
(0.318) 
Treatment (1= isolate ambassadors)   -0.003 
(0.116) 
-0.074 
(0.289) 
0.072 
(0.287) 
x Received from 1st stage ambassadors 
 
 
 
 
 
0.027 
(0.125) 
0.175 
(0.315) 
0.295 
(0.359) 
x Received from 2nd stage ambssadors 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.118) 
0.340 
(0.385) 
-0.201 
(0.304) 
x Non-Receivers 
 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.109) 
0.032 
(0.306) 
-0.198 
(0.379) 
Indegree    0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
Constant 0.396*** 
(0.056) 
3.033*** 
(0.140) 
1.751*** 
(0.147) 
0.282*** 
(0.085) 
2.721*** 
(0.172) 
1.583*** 
(0.252) 
Observations 2295 2305 525 2236 2245 525 
Number of Clusters 40 40 40 40 40 40 
P 
fromfirst=fromsecond 
0.003 0.099 0.004    
P 
fromsecond=nonreceiv
er 
0.031 0.000 0.997    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
OLS Regressions with the three receiving groups as explanatory variables. The omitted category are the first-stage 
ambassadors. N for column 3 and 6 is lower because it is only for the 18 game participants. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the community level. Research team fixed effects included for 
columns 4-6.  
 
Finally, we investigate whether attenuation varies by the network position of the first-stage ambassadors. 
Results are presented in columns 4 to 6 of Error! Reference source not found.. We find no evidence that 
entral ambassadors are better than isolate ambassadors at sustaining the effect of the intervention.   
7.3 Predicting Diffusion  
We now investigate what characteristics determine obtaining fertilizer or knowledge about using fertilizer. 
We base whether an individual received fertilizer on our tracking exercise. Whether an individual received 
information about fertilizer we base on our second household survey. We explore a wide set of 
characteristics. First are a set off characteristics related to the relationship between the ambassador and the 
receiver: family, field neighbors, discuss agriculture, physical distance between dwellings, and a receiver 
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centrality rank.42 We also look at characteristics of the receiver, specifically: age, gender, migrant status, and 
income. We separate out our investigation. That is, we explore for those that received from first-stage 
ambassadors then separately explore the characteristics of those that received from second-stage 
ambassadors. Finally, we look whether the network position of the first-stage ambassador had an impact on 
these results. 
Column 1 in Error! Reference source not found. presents the results for first-stage ambassadors for 
eceiving fertilizer while Column 2 reports results for receiving information about fertilizer. We find largely 
similar patterns for both resource and information. First-stage ambassadors are more likely to give fertilizer 
and information to people with whom they discuss agriculture. Someone being in their agricultural 
discussion network increases the chance of receiving fertilizer by 7%. For this group of ambassadors we do 
not find significant effects for blood ties and field neighbors. Additionally, geographic proximity plays a key 
role as ambassadors tend to share fertilizer with their geographical housing neighbors. Neighbors that live 
1 kilometer closer are 12% more likely to receive fertilizer.43 First-stage ambassadors are more likely to give 
fertilizer to community leaders (an increase of 3%). Initial recipients of goods may feel an obligation to 
include the chief in any perceived rewards. This might also explain they do not share with blood family, as 
opposed to 2nd stage ambassadors (see below). It also seems that first stage ambassadors share less to ethnic 
minorities.  
Columns 3 to 4 in Error! Reference source not found. show the same results but for the second-stage 
mbassadors. Although there are similarities between the results related to those ambassadors to whom we 
seeded information and fertilizer directly (first-stage ambassadors) and those selected by them (second-stage 
ambassadors), there are differences. First, second-stage ambassadors are significantly more likely to give to 
individuals with whom they one of our social networks. For each that increases the probability by about 
3%. Furthermore, second-stage ambassadors are not more likely to give to community leaders. In contrast, 
migrants are more likely to receive information from second stage ambassadors.  
                                                     
42 Within each community, we rank all possible receivers by centrality, excluding the ambassadors. This allows each 
ambassador to give to people of the maximum and minimum rank. This rank is normalized by dividing by the maximum 
rank. 
43 These results echo results by Sperling & Loevinsohn (1993) for neighboring Rwanda, who find that sharing of bean seeds 
was restricted to friends, family and neighbors. 
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Table 6 Predicting Diffusion Behavior 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 Fertilizer 
Use  
Fertilizer 
Info 
Fertilizer 
Use  
Fertilizer 
Info 
Fertilizer 
Use  
Fertilizer 
Info 
Ambassador 1st stage 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 1st stage 1st stage 
Blood family 0.002 
(0.016) 
0.095 
(0.203) 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
Field Neighbors 0.032 
(0.026) 
0.204 
(0.268) 
0.033** 
(0.015) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
0.020 
(0.028) 
Discuss Agriculture 0.071*** 
(0.026) 
0.440 
(0.267) 
0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.068** 
(0.030) 
0.054* 
(0.029) 
Physical Distance -0.121*** 
(0.020) 
-2.429*** 
(0.684) 
-0.066*** 
(0.011) 
-0.033*** 
(0.010) 
-0.157*** 
(0.030) 
-0.106** 
(0.045) 
Receiver Centrality Rank -0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.141 
(0.308) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.028) 
0.027 
(0.027) 
Receiver age 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Receiver is female -0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.045 
(0.167) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
Receiver Income index 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.044 
(0.068) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Same agricultural group 0.023 
(0.020) 
0.149 
(0.266) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
Receiver is leader 0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.240 
(0.180) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.039** 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
Receiver is ethnic minority -0.051* 
(0.031) 
-0.148 
(0.634) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.022 
(0.036) 
0.004 
(0.050) 
Receiver is migrant -0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.067 
(0.142) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
Treatment (1 = isolate 
ambassadors) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.043 
(0.045) 
-0.024 
(0.053) 
x Receiver Blood family  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.046 
(0.038) 
0.044 
(0.038) 
x Receiver Field Neighbor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.016 
(0.050) 
0.064 
(0.052) 
x Receiver Discuss 
Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.023 
(0.053) 
-0.034 
(0.054) 
x Receiver Physical 
Distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.056 
(0.041) 
-0.002 
(0.053) 
x Receiver Centrality Rank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.074** 
(0.036) 
-0.064* 
(0.034) 
x  Receiver age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
x Receiver is female  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.012 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.018) 
x Receiver is migrant  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
x Receiver Income index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.042 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
x Same agricultural group  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.022 
(0.024) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
x Receiver is leader  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(0.056) 
-0.008 
(0.059) 
x Receiver is ethnic 
minority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
Constant 0.150*** 
(0.021) 
-2.104*** 
(0.375) 
0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.152*** 
(0.027) 
0.104*** 
(0.028) 
Observations 4644 4523 5155 5155 4644 4308 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Note: Analysis looks at all possible receivers for fertilizer and information givers. Dependent variable is 1 if respondents said they 
received fertilizer or information from first (second) stage ambassador. OLS Regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
clustered at the ambassador and receiver level. Community fixed effects included 
Income index is a normalized index (for the control group) calculated using the user-written Stata program WMEANEFFECTS 
and comprises: # chickens owned, # goats or sheep owned, # cows owned, land size, land access. 
 
Finally, in columns 5 to 6 of Error! Reference source not found. we explore whether these results are 
ifferent by the type of first-stage ambassador. The only difference we find is that isolates are more likely to 
give to individuals with a lower centrality ranking. The person with the highest centrality ranking is 7% more 
likely to receive fertilizer than the person with the lowest centrality ranking. This implies that isolate 
ambassadors are giving to centrals, but central ambassadors do not give to isolates. This only holds with 
90% significance for information. This is important if the goal is to have an equitable spread: giving to 
centrals is likely to concentrate the technology among the most central individuals. Furthermore, we see that 
isolates are more likely to share with individuals with whom no captured network connection exists. This 
final result is surprising, as it indicates that either isolates are sharing through unexpected interpersonal 
relationships that are not captured within our network questions or they are using the resource diffusion 
intervention as an opportunity to establish new connections. Our data is unable to untangle these two 
hypothesis. 
In sum, we find several variables that can explain the distribution behavior of technology and information. 
Most importantly is geographic proximity, though the agricultural discussion network is also important. We 
find important distributional effects in that goods might cluster at the top centralities and not trickle down. 
There are clearly many other factors that explain distribution behavior, as the results are of moderate 
magnitude.  
8 Conclusion 
The diffusion of technologies and knowledge is a key component of political and economic development.  
While it is acknowledged that the identity of the initial recipients may impact resulting distribution patterns 
and development outcomes, few studies explicitly measure the consequences of their network position. We 
investigate whether the network position of initial recipients affects the use, knowledge willingness to pay 
for a technology, and the speed and spread of diffusion. We also explore whether attenuation of the 
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technology and associated information takes place. Since social networks may constrain who passes new 
information along to whom, we also consider whether the network position of the farmers affects which 
other community members receive the technology. 
We implement a field experiment in forty communities in Eastern Congo. In an initial visit, we collect 
information about full social networks. In the subsequent visit we implemented an intervention in which 
selected ambassadors are trained on the importance and use of fertilizer. Subsequently, these ambassadors 
received packages of fertilizer and were asked to spread this fertilizer and their knowledge about fertilizer. 
We randomize whether these ambassadors are central or isolate, allowing us to estimate the effect of 
network position of initial recipients. In total, 225 transfers of fertilizer packs took place. During a third 
visit we conducted a tracking exercise and a second household survey to collect outcome measures.  
We find that centrality measures based on family, farming, and agricultural discussion relationships are 
strongly correlated with observable characteristics.  central farmers are more likely to hold a high status 
position in the community and interact with community leaders, are less likely to be a migrant, are in general 
richer, more literate, more likely to be male, and have larger families.  We find no evidence of a treatment 
effect of centrality on the quantity of fertilizer use, knowledge or valuation. We also find no evidence that 
the spread is further. We do find the speed. We also find distributional effects. Network centrality affects 
which community members gain access to new technologies and learn about them.  Both central and isolate 
farmers prefer sharing along existing social ties but the sharing behavior of central first-stage ambassadors 
versus isolate first-stage ambassadors differs in that isolate ambassadors tend to pass the technology on to 
more central individuals but the most central do not pass the technology to the most isolated.  Our results 
have a number of implications. 
First, our results indicate that resources and information pool to the center of networks regardless of entry-
point when selection is based on centrality. Furthermore our results suggest that centrality is predictive of 
socioeconomic indicators of social prominence, with marginal households being more likely to sit on the 
periphery of their social networks. These two results taken in combination have important implications for 
intervention designs. In instances where practitioners have strong priorities on who is benefiting from their 
intervention and their focus is on marginal households, than designs relying on diffusion via central 
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individuals is inappropriate. Practitioners are better to directly distribute resources to these households as 
opposed to relying on social learning and diffusion dynamics.  
Second, the strong attenuation of resources within the diffusion process highlights two important design 
considerations. The first is that if practitioners aim to leverage diffusion dynamics (as opposed to direct 
targeting), than considerations of periodic reinforcement of knowledge and resources may strengthen 
ultimate diffusion by re-legitimizing and re-invigorating the diffusion process. Our study shows that quality 
of information and rate of adoption decreases with each step away from the initial injection point. Designing 
programs that incorporate multiple practitioner-community interactions may help alleviate some of these 
inherent attenuation effects.  
Finally, our results speak to the cost-benefit trade-off of network entry-point selection and resulting 
diffusion outcomes of reach, speed, and benefit distribution. Development project designs must take into 
account network sizes, desired spread and speed of diffusion, and intended recipients when selecting entry 
points. With the goal of reducing implementation costs of introducing new technologies and information 
while maximizing overall reach, the use of social network analysis is called into question. However, measures 
of network centrality could be useful for attaining goals of reaching household on the periphery of social 
networks, although greater research into whether more observable correlates of ethnicity or migrant status 
could be used as inexpensive alternatives of identifying marginalized households.  In either case, as the 
collection of network data is costly, the ability to predict diffusion by social network analysis is beneficial 
contingent on leveraging network-gains through less-expensive alternative measures. Our study contributes 
to existing literature exploring this trade-off by quantifying potential gains of network-targeting and 
exploring relationships between network metrics and more observable socioeconomic indicators in 
identifying cost-feasible designs of network-targeting for development practitioners. Research on more cost-
effective designs based on these network-socioeconomic relationships or other selection methods (e.g. geo-
spatial networks; community nomination processes) is gaining momentum within a developing country 
context (Banerjee et al., 2013b; Beaman et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015; Nourani, 2016). However significant 
gaps remain and further theoretical modeling and empirical testing is required before concrete policy 
recommendations are definitive. 
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Appendix 
Table 7. Attrition 
 (1) (2) 
 Panel Attrition Absence 
Age -0.005 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
Female 0.303 
(0.236) 
0.272 
(0.218) 
Centrality 0.075 
(0.283) 
 
 
War Participation 0.302 
(0.424) 
 
 
War Exposure -0.183** 
(0.083) 
 
 
Household Size 0.005 
(0.022) 
 
 
Migrant -0.015 
(0.200) 
-1.233*** 
(0.409) 
Fertilizer Knowledge 
(baseline) 
-0.060 
(0.046) 
 
 
Land Size -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
Student  
 
0.026 
(0.998) 
Farmer  
 
-1.244*** 
(0.238) 
Wage Labourer  
 
-0.530 
(0.420) 
Petty Trader  
 
0.794** 
(0.334) 
Miner  
 
-0.030 
(0.310) 
Unemployed  
 
-1.299* 
(0.787) 
Other Work  
 
-0.356 
(0.470) 
Constant -1.763*** 
(0.478) 
-2.519*** 
(0.547) 
Observations 2461 2330 
Attrition 0.091  
Absence  0.031 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the community level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Community Selection of Targets in Network Diffusion Interventions 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Interventions aiming to increase adoption rates through information campaigns often rely on network diffusion strategies. A 
critical design component within these initiatives is selection of the network entry points in order to facilitate faster and/or wider 
information spread. This study combines a community-wide polling of network entry-points combined with detailed community 
network and socio-economic data. First we explore what attributes are prioritized by community members in nominating a 
resident farmer as an extension contact-point. Second, we use simulations to compare the diffusion spread of top-nominated 
individuals as network entry-points compared to entry-points that achieve maximal spread within diffusion simulations. We 
find that community members prioritize network connectedness, pro-social preferences,  and socioeconomic indicators of gender, 
age, formal leadership, and education levels within their nomination decisions. Furthermore, receiving the top three most amount 
of nominations is found to be significantly correlated with selection as an optimal entry-point within the diffusion simulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publication Status: Ross, M., P. Hofman, P. van der Windt, M. Voors. 2017. “Selection of Targets in 
Network Diffusion Interventions.” Working Paper. 
  
100 
 
1 Introduction 
Adoption of growth enhancing technologies and behaviors is essential for development (Alvarez et al., 
2013). Technology adoption has been studied in a wide range of applications including agricultural 
production (Beaman et al, 2015; Emerick et al., 2016), health (Oster and Thornton, 2012), finance (Banerjee 
et al., 2013; Breza and Chandrasekhar, 2015; Chuang and Schechter, 2015), labor (Beaman, Keleher and 
Magruder, 2013) and institutions (Breza et al., 2014). Information on the returns to investment for new 
innovations is a key component of adoption decisions. Interventions aiming to increase adoption rates 
through information campaigns often rely on network diffusion strategies. A critical design component 
within these initiatives is selection of the network entry points in order to facilitate faster and/or wider 
information spread. Social network diffusion dynamics have gained attention in the previous decades as 
offering an effective means for identifying optimal network contact-points based on  diffusion objectives 
(Aral & Walker, 2012; D. Centola, 2010).  However network-based approaches are data-intensive and require 
detailed information on underlying network structures. For development initiatives, the data demands of 
such approaches can be prohibitively high. 
For technology adoption, network-based studies focus largely on the underlying network structure and the 
position of contact-points within the structure. However the role of an individual’s social preferences, 
incentives, motivations, and prior beliefs on the innovation has also been highlighted as important for an 
individual’s social influence within technology spread (Pentland, 2014; T. W. Valente & Pumpuang, 2007; 
Van Eck, Jager, & Leeflang, 2011). Therefore optimal selection of network injection-points must account 
for both network factors and personal traits when selecting contact-points, although the two factors are 
highly interdependent. 
In the context of agricultural innovation adoption, farmer-led extension programs have become a popular 
tool for raising the adoption rates of productivity-enhancing inputs. Evidence suggests that technology 
adoption rates could be increased through network based targeting within agriculture (Beaman et al., 2015). 
With the high costs of network-data,  network-based targeting is  often unrealistic as a  widespread policy 
tool in many contexts. Community members have incomplete snapshots of both their social network 
structures (Banerjee et al., 2014) and their peer’s relevant personal traits. Aggregating each community 
member’s information set provides a detailed, but incomplete, overview of the key selection considerations. 
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Full community-nomination of contact farmers may therefore offer a less data-intensive alternative selection 
method.  
 This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First we explore what attributes are prioritized by 
community members in nominating a resident farmer as an extension contact-point. This analysis explores 
whether community members are incorporating network and personal characteristics relevant to improved 
diffusion processes into their nomination decisions. We find that community members prioritize network 
connectedness, pro-social preferences,  and socioeconomic indicators of gender, age, formal leadership, and 
education levels within their nomination decisions. Second, we use simulations to compare the diffusion 
spread of top-nominated individuals as network entry-points compared to entry-points that achieve maximal 
spread within diffusion simulations. Receiving the top three most amount of nominations is found to be 
significantly correlated with selection as an optimal entry-point within the diffusion simulation. Given the 
cost-constraints of development practitioners, our results suggest that the trade-off between data-demands 
and gains in diffusion makes community-wide nomination a practical and effective alternative to network-
based selection of contact points. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the existing literature on network 
diffusion, technology adoption, and agricultural extension. Section 3 introduces the project design and local 
context of rural communities in Eastern DRC.  Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy and provides 
summary statistics of the data used in analysis. Section 6 catalogues our empirical results and section 7 
concludes.  
2 Literature 
2.1 Targeting for Diffusion 
An individual is said to be socially influential if their behaviors or beliefs affect the beliefs, and ultimately 
adoption decisions, of peers. Thus the more influential an individual is, the more weight people give to 
information received from him or her (Leonard-Barton, 1985; T. W. Valente & Pumpuang, 2007). Social 
influencers are thought to catalyze the diffusion of innovations and reduce lag time between introduction 
of innovations and critical mass thresholds for cascades being achieved (Davis, 1999; Thomas W. Valente, 
1996). For interventions attempting to achieve high adoption rates, network injection points should be 
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individuals that are both socially influential and well positioned within the network structure for efficient 
information spread.  
In identifying socially influential individuals, no clear pattern of socioeconomic traits has been found that 
distinguishes network influencers from non-influencers (Aral & Walker, 2012; Chan & Misra, 2013). 
However social influence within technology adoption has been found to increase with topic expertise, 
comparability in conditions relevant to the innovation, and pro-social values (Chan & Misra, 2013; Walsh, 
Gwinner, & Swanson, 2004). Additionally, socially influential individuals are found to have more central 
positions within their social network structures (Van Eck et al., 2011). An individual’s social influence will 
therefore vary both by domain and network links. Social influence captures the credibility given to 
information received by an individual, but network positioning dictates the extent to which information will 
diffuse onward through the network structure. Considerable attention has been focused on determining 
how diffusion patterns vary by selecting network contact points using different measures of connectedness 
(Cho, Hwang, & Lee, 2012).  
Different measures of connectedness capture different types of information flows (Borgatti, 2005).  
Eigenvector centrality is on measure of social connectedness that is considered a strong approximation of 
an individual’s probability of participating in network information flows. This is due to it imposing no 
restrictions on neither the frequency with which information passes nor the number of pathways by which 
it travels (Borgatti, 2005; Bonacich 1987, 1991). For this reason, we prioritize eigenvector centrality as the 
network positioning parameter that captures an individual’s level of expected influence within their given 
network. In an online social network experiment, Centola (2010) found that behavior spreads faster across 
networks with a clustered-lattice structure compared to random networks. We disaggregate this finding to 
the individual level with a node-specific measure of clustering, which measures the proportion of mutual 
connections between each pair of nodes within a network, as a second proxy for an individual’s potential 
level of influence and information diffusion capabilities within their network.  
In simulating technology adoption processes at the network level, we focus on threshold models. This 
choice is based on these models of diffusion offering a parsimonious method for theoretically estimating 
entry points that maximize spread. Maximal spread is defined as the highest proportion of network members 
adopting the new innovation. These models are built on the assumption that any given individual will adopt 
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if exposed to a threshold number of prior adopters (Acemoglu & Ozdaglar, 2011; D. M. Centola & Macy, 
2007; Granovetter, 1978). Adjusting the minimum threshold requirement for adoption will result in 
diffusion patterns variations.  
If exposure to a single adopter is sufficient for an individual to also adopt, then diffusion patterns will be 
similar regardless of entry point chosen assuming a long enough time horizon. These ‘simple contagion’ 
diffusions apply only to technologies that have very low levels of associated knowledge and easily realizable 
returns to adoption. For innovations that entail greater knowledge or greater uncertainty on returns to 
adoption, multiple exposures  are required to spur adoption. This higher threshold case is termed ‘complex 
contagion’ (Centola & Macy, 2007). Technologies that more closely resemble complex contagion diffusion 
patterns, practitioners are best off selecting socially-close entry points with shared connections to ensure 
minimum exposure thresholds are reached in the early stages of diffusion (Beaman, Benyishay, William, & 
Mobarak, 2015). We use complex contagion simulation models in modeling the diffusion of agricultural 
innovations given the higher knowledge-intensity and uncertainty inherent in agricultural technologies. 
2.2 Agricultural Extension and Contact-farmer Selection 
Agricultural output within sub-Saharan Africa continues to fall short of estimated levels of potential 
production. Agricultural extension programs have gained immense popularity in recent decades as a policy 
tool for addressing persistently low smallholder productivity levels and issues of food security within the 
developing world. In recent years, more participatory farmer-led extension programs have rapidly gained 
popularity despite limited evidence on their effectiveness (Anderson & Feder, 2004; Feder et al., 2010; Feder, 
Murgai, & Quizon, 2003). In farmer-led agricultural extension programs, a few farmers from each 
participating community are selected to act as the contact point between extension agents and the 
community. These selected community members are then responsible for ferrying information between the 
extension agents and their communities (Kondylis, Mueller, & Zhu, 2014). These farmer-led designs are 
motivated by the belief that community farmers have in-depth knowledge of local agri-climatic and market 
conditions, production processes, and are known to their fellow community members. These advantages 
are thought to make contact-farmers better able to present information and technologies to their 
communities in ways that are relatable, confidence-inducing, and cost-effective compared to external 
extension professionals (Kiptot and Franzel, 2014). 
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Extension programs vary in their designs but typically include training sessions, demonstration plots, one-
on-one assistance. Almost always the programs rely on word-of-mouth communication through 
interpersonal relationships to spread information on improved agricultural methods and inputs (Lukuyu et 
al, 2012; Franzel et al., 2014). Farmer-led extension designs are intended to improve the diffusion of 
agricultural knowledge and innovation by utilizing individuals with high social influence as the contact point 
between extension professionals and respective communities. 
Contact-farmers are typically jointly selected by communities and extension practitioners with varying levels 
of involvement by each. Studies have explored both motivations of contact-farmers in carrying out their 
extension responsibilities and what traits communities found desirable in selecting contact-farmers. 
Typically contact-farmers were found to not receive any financial compensation for their extension roles. 
Instead they report being motivated by altruism, access to knowledge, opportunities to experiment with new 
resources, and potential for personal networking (Simpson, Franzel, Degrande, Kundhlande, & Tsafack, 
2015). On the other side, communities reported that pro-social behaviors and agricultural progressiveness 
were key determinants in selecting peers as contact-farmers to represent them (Lukuyu et al., 2012). Finally, 
studies have explored relational differences between contact-farmers and their community members. 
Contact-farmers who were only moderately better performing than community averages were most effective 
in diffusing information compared to those who displayed large gains in behavior performance  
 In a study on a pest management extension project, those contact-farmers who were more productive than 
their information recipients, but only moderately, were most effective in the transmission of knowledge. 
Contact-farmers with excessive differences in performance and socio-economic indicators are thus found 
to be less effective in influencing community adoption rates (BenYishay & Mobarak, 2014; Feder & 
Savastano, 2006)  
3 Study Design 
3.1 Regional Context 
Our study is set within the South Kivu province of eastern DRC. The region is characterized by 
underdeveloped infrastructure, low agricultural productivity, and armed conflict instability (Coghlan et al., 
2007; Huggins, 2010; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004; World Bank, 2015) Currently, the use of fertilizer 
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within the region is very low; only 3% of farmers use fertilizer and average quantities applied are 0.3 
kilograms per hectare, compared to 14 Kg/Ha for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and 166 Kg/Ha average 
application in Asia (Bulte et al., 2015; FAO, 2015). Poor transport infrastructure and limited access to input 
markets cause production-enhancing technologies to be under-utilized (Pypers et al., 2011). 
Within the study-region, economic and social interactions are predominantly local due to the 
underdeveloped transport infrastructure and hilly landscape. Most of the agricultural activities and farmer 
groups are formed within the community. As a result, a person’s social network position is pivotal in 
accessing and controlling information and resources. Relationships of family and geographical field and 
house neighbors were found to be of particularly importance for agricultural resource access and spread 
(Kendzior, Zibika, & Voors, 2015; Sperling & Loevinsohn, 1993).  
3.2 Data  
Our study was conducted in rural communities in South Kivu province in eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo. We selected 40 small communities with a maximum size of 100 households. In each community, 
we first conducted a full household census and then interviewed each household head44, recording details 
on demographics, agricultural production information from the most recent production season, and social 
preferences. In addition, we asked for each social network tie to other community members (see section 3.3 
for details). In interviewing the chief, we also asked about access to markets and the history of land conflicts 
in the past year.  Table 1 displays our descriptive data and appendix Table A1 includes variable definitions. 
  
                                                     
44 When household heads were not available (due to seasonal migration or prolonged travel from the community), a 
replacement within the household was surveyed. Replacements were asked to answer from the perspective of the household 
head for all survey questions. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics at Community Level and Household Level of Survey Indicators 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Community Level 
Community Indicators      
Number of Households 40 64.08 16.08 23 81 
Number of Land Conflicts 40 1.25 2.468 0 12 
Market Transport Cost (Francs) 40 1,780 1,135 0 4,000 
Years as Chief 40 26.48 15.83 1 65 
Community Networks      
Centrality 40 0.341 0.0826 0.179 0.547 
Clustering Coefficient 40 0.612 0.186 0.334 1.028 
Household Level 
Network Indicators      
Eigenvector Centrality 2,533 0.328 0.263 0 1 
Clustering Coefficient 2,537 0.384 0.242 0 1 
Social Preferences      
Other 2,475 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Selfish 2,475 0.0606 0.239 0 1 
Inequality Averse 2,475 0.592 0.492 0 1 
Generous 2,475 0.0877 0.283 0 1 
Amount Shared 2,475 1.265 0.422 0 3 
Household Indicators      
Native Language 2,563 0.854 0.353 0 1 
Female (=1) 2,553 0.322 0.467 0 1 
Age (yrs.) 2,553 45.9 17.53 12 103 
Household Size 2,475 6.334 3.161 1 30 
Migrant (=1) 2,554 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Highest Education       
Primary 2,475 0.311 0.463 0 1 
Secondary 2,475 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Tertiary 2,475 0.0182 0.134 0 1 
War Exposure 2,475 2.312 1.04 0 4.5 
Frequency Talk Chief 2,428 6.287 8.31 0 31 
Community Leader 2,475 0.316 0.465 0 1 
Wealth Index 2,390 -0.0189 0.953 -2.249 12.93 
Agricultural Indicators      
Farm Experience (yrs.) 2,473 30.87 17.54 0 90 
Primary Farmer 2,563 0.767 0.423 0 1 
Fertilizer Knowledge 2,465 1.268 1.453 0 6.5 
Labor Collective 2,563 0.149 0.357 0 1 
Agri. Cooperative 2,563 0.0222 0.147 0 1 
Agri. Committee 2,563 0.139 0.346 0 1 
 
Socio-economic characteristics. The average community size is 64 households (Table 1).45 The 
households head is predominantly male. Around half of household heads are literate and 30% completed 
some or all of primary school. Road infrastructure in the region is underdeveloped, causing transport costs 
                                                     
45 By construction this is below the regional community size of about 200 households as we restricted our sample to 
communities with fewer than 100 households (Bulte et al., 2015) 
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to heavily influence farmer decision making regarding purchasing of market inputs and sale of crops 
produced. Within our sample, the average cost of transport to reach the closest market is 1,780 Cf, roughly 
equivalent to USD$1.83. Disputes surrounding access use and management of land in the Kivu provinces 
are complex and are closely linked with the root causes of conflict within the region (Huggins, 2010). We 
find that communities within our sample experience an average of one land dispute annually, although 
variation between communities is relatively high. In the absence of a functional and effective central 
governing body present within the South Kivu province, local chiefs are largely responsible for governing 
daily life in their communities through customary law. Chief status is hereditary and held for life, with chiefs 
in our sample having been in the position for an average of 26 years. People interact with the chief during 
about 6 days of the month and roughly 30% of household heads hold some formal position of leadership 
within the community. Agricultural group membership is low, with labor groups and committees being the 
most popular and nearly zero participation in cooperatives. This near absence of cooperative membership 
highlights the absence of formal support for marketing and sales of crop produce for farmers within the 
region. 
Selecting Contact-farmers. Our main survey variable below, is a hypothetical question in which we asked 
household heads to nominate one individual in the community who they felt is best suited for spreading 
information about new agricultural technologies. We follow the approach in Banerjee et al. (2013), albeit 
adapted to the agricultural context, and ask: 
 
If we wanted to spread information about a new agricultural technique, to whom do you suggest we 
speak in this community? 
 
 Community members are intrinsically motivated by two factors in making their nomination: (i) the 
perceived reliability of the nominee in learning about and distributing resource and information, and (ii) the 
likelihood of personally benefiting indirectly through the nominee. We explicitly frame the question as an 
information distribution question and not selection of an extension contact-farmer. This is to minimize any 
ulterior motivations behind nomination of social hierarchy or social control by which resource or financial 
benefits could be personally captured. The candidacy question is therefore framed to capture innovation 
adoption through improved information, emphasizing influence and reach of nominees. 
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On average within each community, 90% of household heads provided a nomination in response to the 
candidacy question (Table 2) and 12 different household heads were put forward (21% of all community 
households). From these nominations we select from each community the three candidates with the highest 
number of nominations. The average number of nominations received by candidate household heads is 2.6 
(1% of community nominations), but this average increases to 8.37 for top nominees (16%).46  
  
Table 2 Summary Statistics (Level and Percentage) of All Candidate Nominations, Top Candidate 
Nominations, and Nominators within Communities 
 Level  Percentage of Community 
                    
VARIABLES Mean s.d. Min Max   Mean s.d. Min Max 
All Candidates               
# per Community 13.95 4.39 4 23  21% 0.060 10% 39% 
# Nominations per Candidate  2.59 1.09 1 6.75  1% 0.006 0% 3% 
Top Candidates          
# per Community 3 0 3 3  5% 0.02 4% 13% 
# Nominations per Candidate 8.47 4.28 1 17.5  16% 0.080 5% 38% 
Nominators          
#  per Community 55.25 14.55 21 73  90% 0.100 57% 100% 
          
“Level” values are not normalized by community size while “Percentage of Community” normalizes values by 
total number of households within the community. Number of top candidates in Level values is equal to 3 by 
study design and does not vary across communities but percentage values will vary due to differences in 
community sizes.  
 
Figure 1 plots the frequency of nominations occurring by shortest path length. Nominations are most 
frequently made along direct network links and drop off rapidly with each subsequent path length. Incidence 
of self-nomination is very low.   
 
Figure 2 separates out nominations by relationship type with nominations made through indirect links 
grouped in a separate column. Relationship ties are not mutually exclusive so multiple relationships along a 
single network link do occur. Based on Figure 2, no relationship tie dominates the others within nomination 
decisions.   
 
  
                                                     
46 As our candidacy question did not restrict nominations to only household heads, there are individuals who were nominated 
that are not included within our sample. Thus it is not a direct relationship that all 90% of household heads nominations are 
reflected within the FT and top FT metrics reported in Table 4. 
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Figure 1 Path Length Frequencies of Nomination 
 
Figure 2 Frequencies of Nominations by Relationship Type 
 
 
Social networks. In mapping social networks, we focus on three key relationships of interest: family, field 
neighbors and people that often discuss agricultural issues together. Each of these relationships form the 
basis not only for frequent interaction, and thus direct knowledge of a candidate’s merits, but also channels 
of information and resource distribution through which an individual may ultimately benefit within an 
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agricultural context.47 In collecting network data along each of the three social dimensions concerns of 
measurement error resulting from memory bias was a chief concern. To overcome this risk, each respondent 
was read the full roster of community members compiled through the community census repeated for each 
social dimension. Respondents would respond “yes” or “no” to each name read indicating the presence of 
a connection along the social dimension in question.48  
In total, we capture information on 2,563 individuals and 20,596 relationships. Social ties are then aggregated 
into a single combined network graph for each community. The resulting dataset is thus an unweighted 
directional network. The network structures of communities exhibit exceptionally clustered network 
structures and short diameters relative to network size, signifying quite dense network structures.  
Figure 3 Sample Community Social Network Structure 
 
 
Figure 3 graphically presents a sample network structure for a community within our sample. The most 
connected household heads, measured by in-degree, are colored green while the least connected household 
heads are colored red. There is strong variation evident in connectedness levels of the households. This 
variation in network connectedness of households is representative of the larger sample. 
                                                     
47 Early pilot tests included multiple other social dimensions within the network survey but found no added value in variance 
captured with their inclusion. To minimize potential respondent survey fatigue, we restricted network data to these three 
dimensions. 
48 Household heads and respective wives were independently named on the community census while all other adult 
household members were grouped under a label of “other household member”.  
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Social preferences. To elicit proxies of an individual’s social preferences, we use four hypothetical 
allocation decisions based on Fehr et al (2008) in which respondents are asked to choose between two sets 
of payoff scenarios for themselves and an anonymous member of the community (see Table A1 for choice 
options). We classify participants as selfish (who maximize their own pay-off), generous (those that 
maximize receiver pay-off) and inequality averse. The rest is categorized as other (the omitted category for 
our analyses). The majority of respondents (60%) are inequality averse.  
We also include a hypothetical dictator game question to elicit respondent sharing behavior of an allotment 
of 3 kg of chemical fertilizer. They are able to choose with whom they would like to share as well as the 
amount they would like to give away. On average respondents are willing to share just under half of the 
endowment.  
4 Empirical Analysis 
Our study addresses two primary research questions. First we ask, what characteristics drive community 
nominations of contact-farmers? We include within our analysis traditional socioeconomic variables as well 
as measures of an individual’s social preferences and network position. In addition, we zoom in on the direct 
relationships between nominators and the household heads they nominate to understand how relative 
differences in characteristics determine nominations. Second, we explore the extent that community 
nominations overlap with households identified as maximum diffusion entry-points in the complex 
contagion simulations. This comparison allows us to assess whether contact-farmer selection by community 
members sufficiently aggregates each individual’s incomplete information set on networks for harnessing 
network diffusion dynamics.  
4.1 Characteristics of Community Nominated Contact-farmers 
We set out by exploring what characteristics are most influential for community nominations of contact-
farmers. Specifically, we estimate: 
𝑌𝑖𝑧 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑖𝑧 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖𝑧 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑧 + 𝜀  (1) 
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where, 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is an indicator for whether household head 𝑖 (with, i = 1, ...,𝐻𝑗 where 𝐻𝑗 is the number of 
households in community z) of community z (with z = 1, ..., 40) received any nomination. 𝑆𝑖𝑧 is a vector 
containing our social preference measures, 𝑁𝑖𝑧 contains individual network position indicators (eigenvector 
centrality measures and clustering coefficient), 𝑋𝑖𝑧 is a vector of socioeconomic and agriculture covariates, 
𝐶𝑧 is a vector of community fixed effects, and 𝜀  is an error term.  
To fully capture what characteristics were most correlated with nominations we re-run equation (1) and 
substitute the dependent variable to capture whether household head 𝑖 is among the three most nominated 
candidates in a community (termed Top Candidates) as well as the proportion of nominations household 
head 𝑖 received relative to total nominations made within community z, which provides a normalized 
measure of vote-capture.   
Next we focus on nomination decisions between nominators and candidates. We do so by exploring the 
relational differences in characteristics between pairings where a nomination occurred versus pairings where 
no nomination occurred. We first construct a variable capturing the difference between each pair of 
household heads within community z. We denote this differenced variable with a bar, in which i is a 
household head potentially nominated by household j.  
∆𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 
Difference variables are not taken in absolute value form so that direction within the differences are 
maintained. All socioeconomic, social preference, and network position indicators within our dataset are 
differenced for every combination of household pairs within community z. We then estimate the dyadic 
model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑧 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑧 + 𝛼2∆𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑧 + 𝛼3∆𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑧 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑧 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2) 
where, 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is an indicator for whether household head 𝑖 nominated household head j (with j = 1, ….𝐻𝑧 and 
i≠j) within community z.  Term ∆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑧,  is a vector containing the differenced social preference measures for 
i and j, ∆𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑧 contains the difference in individual network position scores (eigenvector centrality measures 
and clustering coefficient), ∆𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑧 is a vector of differenced socioeconomic and agriculture covariates. 𝐶𝑧 is 
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a vector of community fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is an error term clustered on both household i and j within 
community z.49  
4.2 Comparing Complex Contagion-Selection with Community Nomination  
We use threshold complex contagion model simulations to identify the two individuals best suited to be 
injection points into the community network.50 We follow Beaman et al (2015) and first randomly assign 
each individual in the network a normally distributed threshold, with mean of 2 and standard deviation of 
1. Then, two household heads in the network are selected at random to be the network entry point and are 
deemed ‘infected’.51 Any individuals that are connected to at least as many of the infected nodes as their 
assigned threshold are then also considered infected.  
The simulation is continued for four iterations.52 Within each iteration, any household who exceed their 
threshold in links to infected individuals also become infected. We do not allow for households to become 
un-infected within the simulation. After the four possible infection periods, the proportion of household 
heads that are infected is calculated. This proportion measures the simulation diffusion rate.  For each 
possible pair of initial targets within the community, we repeat this same simulation 2000 times to account 
for the element of the randomness built into the model. The two individuals that achieve, on average, the 
highest diffusion rate within the complex contagion selection process are selected as the simulation 
candidates.  
Next, we compare the relationship between community polling candidates and simulation candidates.  We 
use a logit model where the dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑧 is an indicator for household i receiving in the top 3 
highest number of community nominations. Specifically we estimate: 
𝑌𝑖𝑧 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑧 + 𝜀  (3) 
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧 takes the value 1 if household i is a simulation candidate and 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝑧 is a 
vector of community fixed effects and 𝜀 is the error term. We re-run Equation (3) on the proportion of 
                                                     
49 This is the suggested method for clustering standard errors within regressions of dyadic relationships ( see Cameron, Gelbach, 
& Miller, 2011; Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011) 
50 We do this for pairs and not triplets due to the computational complexities render triplets time prohibitive: the current 
model required a running time of one day for completion while triplets require a total running time of nearly 500 days. 
51 Where ‘infection’ can be considered as having received information or having adopted the innovation based on the 
specifics of what diffusion process is being modeled.  
52In models with no reverting from adopter to non-adopter and infinite time periods the model will convergence on perfect 
adoption. Therefore we set a time period limit of 4 iterations. 
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nominations household i  received within community z as well as a comparison through two restricted 
version of the full community polling process.53  
These two alternative sampling of processes are often observed within farmer-led extension programs in 
practice (Beaman et al., 2015; Simpson et al., 2015; Bulte et al., 2015), (i) we restrict our nominees to those 
selected by community chiefs and other leaders within the community54 and (ii) select farmers based on 
eligibility criteria commonly used by NGOs (see Bulte et al, 2015) which include farmers that own land, are 
farming as a primary activity, are literate, have over 10 years farming experience, and have previously used 
in-organic fertilizer.55 In essence, both alternative selection process are restricted versions of the full 
community polling process. 
5 Results 
5.1 Community Selection of Farmer Trainers 
We set out by assessing the characteristics of  nominated candidates as selected by community members. 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects (at the mean). In Column 1, we assess characteristics of individuals who 
received at least one nomination in the candidacy questions. Column 2 restricts out dependent variable to 
three most frequently mentioned nominees and Column 3 assesses the proportion of nominations an 
individual received. 
Across the columns we observe similar patterns. Focusing first on our social network and preferences 
variables, we see that nominated community members have higher centrality scores and are more likely to 
behave more pro-socially in a dictator game setting. These results corroborate research on social influence 
(Walsh et al., 2004). Despite Centola (2010) findings of clustering measures affecting diffusion, our results  
  
                                                     
53 All alternative selection processes were conducted ex-post on our community-wide polling dataset and not conducted 
directly within communities. 
54 Leaders included are the chief, under-chiefs, and the chief’s advisors (“Mushamuka”) 
55 Use of fertilizer greatly restricts the sample size, resulting in some communities have less than 2 individuals meeting all 
criteria. In these instances, those individuals meeting all criteria are ranked first with individuals meeting all but the fertilizer 
use criteria included in order of nominations received.  
115 
 
Table 3 Regression Results on dependent variables nomination as a Farmer-Trainer (FT), top-nominated FT, and 
proportion of nominations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Candidate Top  
Candidate 
Prop. of Nominations 
Model Logit Logit Tobit 
    
Network Position    
Eigenvector Centrality 0.146*** 
(0.031) 
0.062*** 
(0.015) 
0.065*** 
(0.011) 
Clustering Coefficient 0.026 
(0.038) 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
Social Preference Indicators    
Selfish -0.010 
(0.036) 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
Generous 0.036 
(0.030) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
Inequality Averse 0.014 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
Amount shared 0.053*** 
(0.020) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
Household Characteristics    
Native Language 0.014 
(0.069) 
0.019 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
Female Head (=1) -0.102*** 
(0.022) 
-0.052*** 
(0.020) 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
Age 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Age^2 -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Household size 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Migrant (=1) 0.027 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Highest Education Attained    
Primary 0.066*** 
(0.020) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
Secondary 0.137*** 
(0.022) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
Tertiary 0.177*** 
(0.055) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
0.047** 
(0.019) 
War exposure score 0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Frequency Talks Chief 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Wealth Index 0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Community Leader 0.095*** 
(0.017) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
Agricultural Indicators    
Years Farming 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Primary Farmer -0.001 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
    
Fertilizer Knowledge -0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Agri. Labor Group 0.010 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
Agri. Cooperative -0.019 
(0.052) 
0.024 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
Agric. Committee 0.035 
(0.022) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
Observations    
N 2,335 2,201 2,335 
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find limited effect of clustering on nomination and even a weakly negative relationship for Top Candidates. 
It is possible that the centrality of an individual is more accurately approximated through observation relative 
to clustering. While the first can be approximated rather crudely based on how connected an individual is 
to other well connected community members, the second is more challenging as it requires more explicit 
knowledge of a greater number of social links within the network structure. 
Several socioeconomic characteristics correlate with community nomination. Being male, older, head of 
larger household, educated, in a community leadership position, and of greater wealth are all positively 
correlated with both the probability of nomination as well as the magnitude of nominations received by an 
individual. These correlations generally reflect characteristics of prominent individuals within a community. 
We find little evidence of topical expertise being positively correlated with probability of nomination or 
proportion of nominations received. Only membership on a community agricultural committee is found to 
be correlated within our agricultural indicators.  
 
We zoom further in on the presence of homophily within nomination decisions. Table 4 presents log odd-
ratios of the difference in indicators between households on an indicator of a nomination occurring.  
We observe similar patterns in the direct relationships between households and their nominated candidates 
that were observed at the community level in Table 3. For the network and social preference indicators, we 
observe that households are more likely to nominate candidates that are more central, less clustered, and 
more pro-social relative to themselves. In household indicators, nominated candidates are more likely to be 
male, head of a larger household, have experienced less war exposure, talk more frequently with the chief, 
wealthier, and better educated than their nominators. Where we see a deviation of individual nomination 
correlates from the group-level correlates is in agricultural indicators. Nominators tend to nominate 
individuals who have lower fertilizer knowledge and are less likely to be members of agricultural cooperatives 
relative to themselves. This reinforces the above finding that less emphasis is placed on domain expertise 
and more on perceived social influence within nomination decision processes. 
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Table 4 Regression Results on Homophily within Nominations 
 (1) 
Differenced Variables 
(j – i) 
Nomination  
Cast 
  
Network Indicators  
∆ Eigenvector Centrality 0.871*** 
 (0.165) 
∆ Clustering Coefficient -0.243 
 (0.190) 
Social Preference Indicators  
∆ Generous -0.191 
 (0.145) 
∆ Selfish -0.271* 
 (0.162) 
∆ Inequality Averse -0.121 
 (0.146) 
∆ Amount Shared  0.108 
 (0.101) 
Household Indicators  
∆ Female  -0.179** 
 (0.087) 
∆ Native Language 1.017** 
 (0.516) 
∆ Age 0.007 
 (0.008) 
∆ HH Size 0.054*** 
 (0.018) 
∆ Migrant  0.179 
 (0.109) 
∆ War Exposure -0.117*** 
 (0.034) 
∆ Community Leader 0.421*** 
 (0.115) 
∆ Frequency Talks Chief 0.023*** 
 (0.009) 
∆ Wealth Index 0.238*** 
 (0.084) 
∆ Education Level Attained 0.419*** 
  (0.116) 
Agricultural Indicators  
∆ Farming Experience (yrs.)  0.002 
 (0.008) 
∆ Primary Farmer  0.008 
 (0.085) 
∆ Fertilizer Knowledge  -0.065* 
 (0.035) 
Agricultural Group Membership  
∆ Labour Collective 0.242 
 (0.167) 
∆ Cooperative -0.556** 
 (0.275) 
∆ Community Committee  0.268 
 (0.187) 
Constant -5.555*** 
 (0.440) 
  
Observations 145,727 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Village fixed effects included. Logistic regression, coefficients report odds-ratio estimates. Differenced Variables are (j 
= Potential Candidate) - (i = Potential Nominator) for all possible pair combinations within each village. Standard 
errors clustered on two levels: potential candidate (j) and potential nominator (i) 
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5.2 Simulation-selected Comparison 
Our exploratory results indicate that community members are accounting for network position indicators 
in addition to pro-social preferences and socio-economic qualities in selecting contact-farmers. However, it 
is unclear whether those selections are optimal targets as would be predicted from contagion simulation 
models. We graphically compare this overlap  for full community polling, two restricted-polling processes, 
and random selection processes in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 Alternative selection processes and their overlap with optimal complex contagion entry 
points  
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that random selection of entry-points results in optimal entry-points being selected only 
25% of the time.  However selection by community-wide polling identifies optimal entry-points in over 
40% of instances. This result indicates that community members are incorporating factors that relate to 
diffusion and network-influence within their nomination decisions. Restricting nominations to only 
community leaders has only a small impact on selection of optimal entry-points relative to full community 
nomination. However restriction of who can be a candidate, based on eligibility criteria, substantially 
decreases the probability of optimal entry-points being selected. The imposition of eligibility-criteria reduces 
probability of selecting optimal entry-points down to the same level as random selection, erasing any gains 
that community-wide nomination may generate. This result indicates that restricting the pool of nominators 
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to only community leaders has considerable less impact on resulting selection of optimal entry-points than 
restricting the pool of candidates who can be nominated.  
Turning only to the three community nomination-based approaches, we see that full community-polling 
outperforms the two restricted community-polling alternatives.. The difference in means is not significant 
relative to leader-restricted polling but is for restricting candidacy based on eligibility criteria. Table 5 
presents formal empirical results, conditional on community fixed effects. 56 Column (1) reports the marginal 
effects (at the mean) of being identified as a candidate through simulation on being nominated as a Top 
Candidate in the community wide polling process. Column (2) looks at the same relationship on the 
proportion of nominations received. Columns (3) and (4) analyze the two restricted selection processes of 
leadership polling and eligibility-criteria for candidates. 
 
Table 5 Regression Results on Overlap Complex Contagion Optimal Entry Points with Candidates, 
Top Candidates, and Proportion of Nominations Received 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Top 
Candidate 
Prop. of 
Nominations 
Leader  
Candidate 
Eligibility 
Candidate 
     
Simulation Candidate 0.399*** 0.273*** 0.353*** 0.174*** 
 (0.056) (0.019) (0.054) (0.044) 
Constant  -0.122***   
  (0.027)   
     
Observations 2,563 2,537 2,563 2,563 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Logistic Regressions, coefficients report marginal effect estimates. Village fixed effects included. Complex 
Contagion (=1) indicates individual i was selected as one of the optimal entry points in a complex contagion 
simulation. Standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses 
 
All three of the community-based selection processes and the proportion of nominations received are found 
to be positively correlated with selection as simulation-identified candidates. These results indicate that 
communities are implicitly nominating those individuals who are more likely to be identified as optimal 
entry-points using complex-contagion targeting (as seen in Beaman et al., 2015). However community 
selection and network-based selection is not perfectly correlated. This imperfect correlation is only 
problematic if it results in substantial losses in diffusion rates. Figure 5 presents a graphical comparison of 
the diffusion rates achieved within simulations where the simulation candidates are used as entry points with 
                                                     
56 We adjust our definition of top farmer from top three to top two so that sample sizes of community polling selection 
processes and complex contagion selected individuals are equivalent.  
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those rates achieved by community-nominated Top Candidates.57   
Figure 5 Estimated Diffusion Rates for Complex Contagion Optimal Entry Points (Simulation) 
and Top Community Nominated Candidates (Comm. Poll) 
 
 
 
 
A difference in diffusion rates of less than 10% is observed, although this difference is statistically significant. 
In our sample of communities, this diffusion rate difference would translate into an average of 6 fewer 
households being reached when community Top Candidates are used as entry points instead of simulation 
candidates. Whether this trade-off in reach for cost-savings is worthwhile for a development practitioner 
will depend on factors of financial endowments, network data access costs, innovation being spread, and 
program objectives.  
6 Conclusion 
Adoption of innovations is of central importance for development and is particularly critical for increasing 
agricultural productivity within under-developed regions. Determining optimal entry points into social 
networks has been identified as a key concern in achieving maximum spread of information and innovations. 
Network-theory based selection has been found to improve the width of diffusion of agricultural 
                                                     
57 Only full community-polling is compared as it was the top-performing selection process and will give an indication of how 
a difference in candidate-selection overlap translates to a difference in diffusion rates. 
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innovations, but requires collection of costly network data (Beaman et al., 2015). Justifying these high costs 
requires evidence of sufficient returns in diffusion, and ultimately program impacts. This study speaks to 
the first step of this trade-off. We use detailed network data and low-cost community polling to compare 
community-nominated entry points against simulated optimal entry points. Specifically, we contextualize 
the polling question to agricultural information and set diffusion simulation parameters to reflect that 
adoption of improved agricultural practices more closely approximate complex-diffusion processes 
(Beaman et al., 2015). We explore first who is being nominated by communities combining the community 
poll results with detailed network, social preferences, socio-economic, and agricultural indicators. We then 
explore how closely community selection of candidate entry points correlates with simulation-identified 
optimal entry points.  
At both the aggregate level and within individual nomination decisions similar patterns emerge around 
which community members are being nominated. Selected candidates reflect cultural indicators of ‘success’, 
being male, educated, older, wealthier, and more involved in community leadership. Additionally, candidates 
are more likely to be network central and to be more pro-social. Domain expertise has been found in 
previous studies to be a factor in one’s level of social influence for specific innovations (Chan & Misra, 
2013; Leonard-Barton, 1985). However, we do not see any obvious signs of communities incorporating 
agricultural indicators within their nomination decisions. This indicates that communities may be 
nominating based on perceptions of more general social prominence. However this result could be explained 
by the framing of the candidacy question, as the question states “agricultural information” which offers little 
indication on whether expertise is required for understanding the information. Furthermore framing the 
question using “agricultural technology” may also yield different results. 
In comparing community selected candidates to those identified through complex contagion simulations as 
being optimal, we see that the two sets overlap in 40% of cases. Even reducing the polling sample down 
from full community to only leaders within the community yields similar results. In looking at resulting 
differences in simulated diffusion rates for simulation optimal against community selected candidates, yields 
a drop in diffusion of less than 10 percentage points. These results indicate that community members are, 
at the very least, implicitly aware of diffusion dynamics and could prove a valuable resource in identifying 
network entry points. Where network data is costly to collect, development practitioners aiming to spread 
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new innovations have the alternative of using community polling in selecting their contact points. 
One result that stands out as being critical for program design is that the eligibility-criteria approach to 
selecting community contact-points is potentially detrimental to overall diffusion. Such eligibility-based 
approaches are common within agricultural extension (Anderson & Feder, 2007; Beaman, Udry, Karlan, & 
Thuysbaert, 2013; Simpson et al., 2015). Our results indicate that development practitioners would be better 
to using community-nomination selection over eligibility-selection, an alternative approach with greater 
impacts on diffusion with the added benefit of being lower cost to implement. 
This study only compares diffusion rates using simulation and imposes exogenous parameters on the 
likelihood of a given individual to adopt. Real world diffusion is considerably more complicated than our 
simulation model. While evidence is emerging on the predictive power of simulations for real world 
outcomes in a developing countries,  it remains very limited (Beaman et al., 2015). Quantifying the true 
trade-off between data-demands and diffusion rates requires further testing under field experiment 
conditions until such predictive power is found to be robust. Given the costliness of field-experiments, 
more confidence must first be had in identifying which levers must be tested (e.g. the network parameters 
used for selection; the framing of the candidacy question, etc). Network simulations offer a cost-effective 
means of identifying and prioritizing such levers using less cost-intensive observational data. 
Finally, our study was conducted in small communities of rural eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
where networks are dense and highly connected. As information regarding underlying network structures is 
inferred through observation of social interactions, scaling up to larger communities may have different 
results. Further research into the relationship between community size and member awareness of underlying 
network structures is necessary to determine how well our results translate to large communities. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Variable names, descriptions and constructed minimums and maximums values  
Variable Name Variable Description Min. Max. 
Household (HH) 
Size 
Number of household members  1 20 
Age Age in Years of Household Head 14 103 
Female Household Head is female (=1) 0 1 
Married Household head is married (=1) 0 1 
Migrant Household head was not born in the community (=1) 0 1 
Literate Household head is literate (=1) 0 1 
Wealth Index 
Normalized wealth index constructed using a weighted  mean effects index 
on variables of livestock owned, farm size, and land tenure. Note that 
outlying farm sizes in excess of 100 sq. km. were dropped from the sample. 
-2.2 12.9 
Talks Chief 
Number of days household head talked to the community chief in the last 
month 
0 31 
War Exposure 
War exposure score calculated as Saw Fighting, 0.5 point. Property 
Damage/Loss, 0.5 points. Injured in the war, 1 point. Family member 
injured in the war, 0.5 point. Family member killed in the war, 1 point. 
Migrated because of the war, 1 point. 
0 4.5 
Native Language Household head is a native speaker of the local language (=1) 0 1 
Leadership 
Position 
Household head holds a leadership position within the community 
(community chief excluded). Possible positions include  quarter chiefs, 
religious leaders, educational leaders, health leaders, youth leaders, women 
leaders, and agricultural group leaders. 
0 1 
Primary 
Household head's highest educational attainment was some or all of primary 
school. 
0 1 
Secondary 
Household head's highest educational attainment was some or all of 
secondary school. 
0 1 
Tertiary 
Household head's highest educational attainment was some or all of a 
tertiary school. 
0 1 
Fertilizer 
Knowledge 
Fertilizer knowledge score calculated using correct answers to questions: 
Specifically, the index is based on the following questions: What is the effect of 
fertilizer on yields? What are other effects of fertilizer? When is it effective to apply 
fertilizer? What is the best method to apply fertilizer? What is the price of fertilizer in 
Bukavu? Maximum possible score of 7.5 
0 6.5 
Years Farming Number of years the household head has been farming 0 90 
Primary Farmer Household head's primary occupation is farming (=1) 0 1 
Labor Household head is a member of an agricultural Labor group (=1) 0 1 
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Cooperative Household head is a member of an agricultural cooperative (=1) 0 1 
Committee Household head is a member of an agricultural committee (=1) 0 1 
Centrality Household head's network centrality measure 0 1 
Individual 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
Household head's clustering coefficient 0 1 
In-Degree Household head's total number of incoming network connections. 0 44 
Out-Degree Household head's total number of outgoing network connections 0 77 
Social Preference 
Questions 
Q1 
A : you receive 1000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 1000 Cf 
B : you receive 1000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 2000 Cf 
 
Q2 
A : you receive 2000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 0 Cf 
B : you receive 1000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 1000 Cf 
 
Q3 
A : you receive 1000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 0 Cf 
B : you receive 1000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 1000 Cf 
 
Q4 
A : you receive 2000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 3000 Cf 
B : you receive 1000 Cf and someone else in your community receives 1000 Cf 
Selfish Household head had social preference responses Q1 = A and Q4 = A 0 1 
Generous 
Household head had social preference responses Q1 = B, Q2 = B, Q3 = B, 
Q4 = A 
0 1 
Inequality Averse 
Household head had social preference responses Q1 = A, Q2 = B, Q3 = B, 
Q4 = B 
0 1 
Other 
Household head's responses to social preference questions were not 
consistent with selfish, generous, or inequality averse patterns. 
0 1 
Dictator Game 
Hypothetical amount of rice (Kg) shared with a self-selected member of the 
community out of a maximum of 3 Kg.  
0 3 
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CHAPTER 5 
Social Networks and Social Preferences: 
A Lab-In-Field Experiment in Eastern DRC 
 
  
 
Abstract 
Considerable research points to social ties, and the social networks underlying these ties, as the underlying driver of pro-social 
behaviors upon which large-scale societal organization is based. However, little is known about the empirical relationship 
between social network position and pro-social preferences. Based on original network data and two lab-in-the-field experiments, 
we explore the relationship between social networks and social preferences of trust, trustworthiness and cooperation.  We explore 
whether an individual’s observed social preferences is correlated with an individual’s centrality within the network structure. 
Our results indicate that individuals with high centrality are more trusting and more trustworthy than individuals with lower 
centrality.  Moreover, individuals with low centrality are treated worse in these interactions—people trust them less initially, 
and return less money to them. Within a group context, little evidence is found of more central individuals displaying more 
cooperative behavior. Instead, for group cooperation, when a single monitor can observe contribution decisions, the presence of a 
direct link and more mutual network connections with a monitor correlates to more cooperative behavior by that individual. 
Our results suggest that network centrality and pro-social preferences are related but more localized network ties are more 
strongly correlated with pro-sociality than overall network connectedness. 
 
 
 
 
Publication Status: Ross, M., P. Hofman, J. Larson, P. van der Windt, M. Voors (2017). “Social Networks 
and Social Preferences: A Lab-in-Field Experiment in Eastern DRC”. Working Paper.  
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1 Introduction 
Individuals do not make economic decisions in a vacuum.  Instead, individuals are embedded in rich social 
environments comprised of both formal and informal institutions that shape preferences and drive behavior 
(North, 1997).  The relevance of these social institutions has been well documented: individuals both inside 
and outside the lab contribute to societal investments even at a direct personal cost.  People assess risky 
investments in part based on pre-existing feelings of trust between the investor and investee (Berg, Dickhaut, 
& McCabe, 1995).  Informal markets emerge and persist due to the interpersonal ties connecting their 
participants (Grief, 1993; Landa, 1981).  Individuals in these situations exhibit trust and trustworthiness, the 
same pro-social behaviors that underpin the proper functioning of societies by generating gains from group 
living even absent strong formal governing institutions.  While much research points to social ties, and the 
social networks comprised of these ties, as the underlying driver of these trust-based interactions, little is 
known about the empirical relationship between social network position and pro-social preferences. Based 
on original network data and two lab-in-the-field experiments, we explore the relationship between social 
networks and social preferences of trust, trustworthiness and cooperation.  We explore whether an 
individual’s observed social preferences is correlated with an individual’s centrality within the network 
structure.  
Departing from standard economic theory which holds that preferences are exogenous and stable, 
laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments have shown that preferences may co-evolve with the social 
context (Bowles, 1998; Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Brosig, Riechmann, & Weimann, 2007; Volk, Thöni, 
& Ruigrok, 2012; Voors et al., 2012). Within a social context, social preferences can vary: while there is 
substantial cross-cultural variation, there is also substantial within-culture variation of social preferences 
(Bowles, 1998; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Fehr & Hoff, 2011; Joseph Henrich et al., 2005, 2010). One source 
of variance are salient social cleavages.  When individuals interact with in- and out-group members, 
individuals tend to exhibit more pro-social behavior toward the in-group. This dynamic is shown for 
cleavages defined by gender (Croson & Gneezy, 2009), ethnicity and race (Benjamin, Choi, & Strickland, 
2007; Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001), as well as for exogenously imposed or self-selected groupings (Ben-Ner, 
McCall, Stephane, & Wang, 2009; Chen & Li, 2009; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008).  Studies exploring 
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why this is the case, suggest that favorable social networks interconnecting members of an in-group are part 
of the answer (Habyarimana et al. 2007, Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). 
Social networks may bear on pro-sociality for a number of reasons.  It could be that social networks facilitate 
punishment, so that all who hear about misbehavior punish it.  Relatedly, social networks may spread social 
judgment, so that misbehavior results in a worse reputation.  In either case, a person’s position in a social 
network that can transmit information or facilitate judgment could affect her incentives to behave socially 
or not.  Whether an individual would be punished via social sanctions, or would earn a worse reputation 
which could affect future social capital and support, network positions from which these costs would be 
realized most strongly would offer a greater deterrent to anti-social behavior.   
The standard approach to studying the effect of networks on behavior is to assign participants to an artificial 
“social network” in a lab, vary the connections in that network to vary who could punish and be punished 
by whom, and observe behavior.  This approach is able to cleanly identify a causal effect of a network 
characteristic; however, the network is artificially-imposed and thus cannot illuminate whether participants 
draw on their own social network for these purposes. Our study differs in that we focus on the relationship 
between individuals’ positions within their real social networks and their behavior in interactions with one 
another.   This design sacrifices some precision in our causal effects – we cannot perfectly disentangle the 
mechanisms by which the network affects outcomes – in exchange for greater external validity. Specifically, 
we begin by measuring the social network among individuals in rural villages in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  We then recruit individuals to play two lab-in-the-field experiment (an investment game and a 
public goods game) based on their eigenvector centrality in the village network, including some with low, 
middle, and high values.  Individuals observe the other participants in the games, and so are free to condition 
their behavior on real information, including social network information.  Finally, we relate individuals’ 
eigenvector centrality in their village’s social network to their observed social preferences in these games. 
Eigenvector centrality is a network statistic that captures the extent to which a person is highly-connected 
to others in the network, and the extent to which a person’s connections are themselves highly-connected 
to others (Bonacich, 2007; Borgatti, 2005a)  Eigenvector centrality thus bears on one’s access to information 
flowing through a network, as well as those whom one could access easily to report a bad reputation or 
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coordinate social sanctioning. Consequently, our design admits both post-experimental punishment 
mechanisms and reputation effects.   
Games include a one-on-one investment game that tests trusting and trustworthy behavior, and an eight-
person public goods game that tests pro-sociality in general.  We add a variant to the latter which has a 
player serve as a monitor, observing everyone’s contributions, and vary the network position of the monitor.  
In this way, we have information on a person’s general level of trust and trustworthiness (how she behaves 
overall in the investment game), a person’s selective level of trust and trustworthiness (how she behaves 
when playing certain other people in the investment game), a person’s pro-social behavior in a group (how 
she behaves overall in the pubic goods game), and a person’s responsive pro-social behavior in a group 
(how she behaves in the public goods game when someone in particular is watching).  
Our results indicate that network eigenvector centrality (“centrality” for short) matters in one-on-one 
interactions. Individuals with high centrality are more trusting and more trustworthy than individuals with 
lower centrality.  Moreover, individuals with low centrality are treated worse in these interactions—people 
trust them less initially, and return less money to them.  Our results also indicate that in larger group 
interactions, individuals’ public goods game cooperation is only weakly related to their network centrality—
least central individuals cooperate slightly less.  Strikingly, in these interactions, the presence of a central 
person who can observe all contributions has no greater effect than the presence of one of the least central 
villagers who can observe all contributions.  In other words, central monitors are not generating fear of 
social sanction or reputation effects after-the-fact in these experiments, at least not to a greater extent than 
any other monitor.  On the other hand, monitors who have a personal tie to someone in the group playing 
the public goods game result in that person contributing substantially more, and this effect holds regardless 
of the centrality of the monitor.   
Taken together, these results suggest that network centrality is related to pro-social preferences.  Individuals 
with high centrality scores are more trusting and more trustworthy in one-on-one investment games. At the 
other extreme, isolates contribute less in public goods games.  However, the central are not better at 
improving group cooperative outcomes—their presence as monitor has no effect on the size of the public 
good.  On the other hand, we find that direct ties or shared mutual ties improves cooperation, both for one-
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on-one investments, and public good dilemmas. This suggests that the network mechanism through which 
social preferences are influenced direct network ties, not network position. The more pro-social behavior 
by centrals may be due to central players inherently having more direct ties, so social forces operating 
through direct ties cause them to  behave more pro-socially in more game interactions. The least central 
have fewer direct ties, and so both behave less pro-socially and receive less favorable treatment more 
frequently within game play. In other words, social preferences and networks are more strongly correlated 
locally—with higher cooperation among pairs of peers—rather than globally— i.e. more central individuals 
eliciting more cooperative behavior within groups.  
The existing literature on social preferences and social networks is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 offers a 
detailed overview of the study design. Section describes the sample, and our results are presented in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Social Networks and Social preferences 
Our study focuses specifically on the relationship between the social network in which an individual is 
embedded and their observed social preferences. 
2.1 Social preferences 
While social networks capture the external relationships that define daily social interaction and access to 
information and resources, social preferences are the internal set of preferences determining rank order of 
different allocations of material benefits between oneself and others. This set of preferences includes 
interpersonal values of altruism, fairness, cooperation, trust, and inequality aversion. Social preferences are 
most often measured through laboratory experiments designed to elicit each preference under varying 
conditions and have become a focal point within development economics (Camerer & Fehr, 2002; Cárdenas 
& Carpenter, 2008). Significant research within developing country contexts have been undertaken 
exploring experimental designs that vary the anonymity, group composition, information, and monitoring 
and punishment mechanism effects on observed social preferences through lab-in-field experiments (for 
review see Cardenas and Carpenter, (2008)). Social preferences have been studied across cultural contexts 
(Cardenas, Stranlund, & Willis, 2000; Joe Henrich, 2000; Joseph Henrich et al., 2001; Jakiela, 2011) and 
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linked to economic outcomes of labor markets (Barr & Serneels, 2009; Carpenter & Seki, 2011; Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1993), financial decisions (Karlan, 2005), markets for goods and services (List, 2005), 
tax systems (Alesina & Angeletos, 2003), and environmental resource management (Bouma, Soest, & Bulte, 
2008) amongst others. 
2.2 Social entrepreneurship and trust and trustworthiness 
The theory of “social entrepreneurship” provides a mechanism by which social networks may interact with 
individual trust preferences. Social entrepreneurship is based on the premise that social ties that bridge 
structural holes are risky undertakings with potentially high social returns. Social links that bridge network 
sub-groups or puts an individual in the position of acting as a broker between unconnected pairs offer 
opportunities for economic, political,, or social returns through the ability to influence or control network 
information channels (Burt, 1992, 1997, 2007, Lin, 1999, 2002; Sobel, 2002). These bridging opportunities 
thus create a potentially worthwhile pay-off for the risky and effortful endeavor of coordinating, establishing 
and maintaining social bridges within the network structure. In initiating engagement with a future 
connection and facilitating early transactions absent an interaction history, a minimum propensity to trust 
is required.  Individuals that establish and maintain more structural holes within a network thus repeatedly 
engage in trust-based interactions, with successful interactions reinforcing or strengthening prior levels of 
trust. In smaller networks or networks with sufficient information flows, social-bridge connections may be 
initiated and maintained based on perceived reputations of trustworthiness held by each individual of the 
other. Building a reputation of trustworthiness thus potentially facilitates future bridging links as new 
connections more readily trust that the bridging-individual will act pro-socially (Barr, Ensminger, & 
Johnson, 2009). 
Under the theory of social-entrepreneurship, individuals who more frequently build and maintain socially-
bridging connections have higher levels of trust and trustworthiness. Empirical studies testing these 
theoretical predictions have used varying measures of centrality and connectedness for representing socially-
bridging individuals (Barr et al., 2009) used individual scores of network betweenness within a lab-in-field 
investment game to measure correlations between trust and social-bridges. They found that in the contexts 
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of rural communities in eastern Africa and urban firms in Ghana that individuals with higher network 
betweenness displayed higher levels of trust.  
2.3 Mechanisms: punishment and reputation for PGG 
The extent to which sanctioning can facilitate higher cooperation has been studied extensively within the 
public goods game literature (see Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) for a review) and extended to incorporate 
elements of social network theory. A second additional mechanism for enforcing higher cooperation that 
has ties to social network theory is that of an individual’s reputation as a form of social capital. Both 
institutions of punishment and reputation have provided insight into the complex relationships between 
external networks and internal preferences of cooperation using modified public good game experiments. 
For institutions of punishment, social sanctioning within public goods games is incorporated by allowing 
group members to pay a small fee to levy a larger fine on a group member for behavior that is thought to 
deviate from social norm. As sanctioning is at the discretion of participants, the opportunity arises for anti-
social retaliation to occur which lowers the efficiency of costly punishment in facilitating greater public good 
provision (Boosey & Mark Isaac, 2016).  When monitoring and punishment are limited to network links, 
network structures can be imposed exogenously on experimental groups to explore the relationship between 
punishment, network structures, and cooperation. Overall, more connected networks were found to 
outperform disconnected networks for level of contributions elicited (Carpenter, Kariv, & Schotter, 2012). 
The connectedness of networks was found to even be more important than the relative punishment capacity 
of participants for facilitating higher cooperation (Leibbrandt, Ramalingam, Sääksvuori, & Walker, 2015).  
Using individual level network metrics, a study by Apicelli et al. (2012) found no relationship between 
network in- or out-degree with cooperation. The study did find that co-operators were more likely to be 
connected to other co-operators and vice-versa for defectors. This separate clustering of co-operators and 
defectors is thought to demonstrate social sanctioning of defectors, allowing only co-operators to realize 
gains from public goods and thus facilitating further cooperation  (Apicella et al., 2012). 
An existing theory behind the use of sanctioning for facilitating cooperation is that sanctioning requires 
defectors to be ‘findable’. Higher social connectedness facilitates sanctioning of defectors, increasing the 
probability of punishment in retaliation for anti-social behavior (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). This ‘findability’ 
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effect is found to hold in revealed games even when punishment is not possible within the experiment. 
Since in-group members are likely to be more closely socially connected outside of experiments, participants 
are more cooperative due to the risk of post-experiment sanctioning of defection within the experiment 
(Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005).  
The second mechanism for increasing cooperative behavior within public good experiments is the use of 
reputation as a form of social capital. An individual’s reputation can be conceptualized as a tradeable 
commodity, with positive reputations increasing the probability of receiving social assistance when required, 
even from strangers, as long as the reputation is known (Milinski, 2016). Good reputations are built by 
making pro-social investments in social group members while anti-social behavior results in reputational 
decline. Thus costly investments in social group members can have future returns in the form of social 
assistance, providing an informal insurance system. Experimental evidence testing the effectiveness of 
reputation effects in strengthening cooperation within public good provision found that the presence of an 
artefactual reputation mechanism resulted in sufficiently high contributions for all group members to have 
higher overall returns relative to rounds played without a reputation mechanism (Milinski, Semmann, & 
Krambeck, 2002). 
Similar to punishment mechanisms, the effectiveness of reputational mechanisms is strongly linked to 
underlying social group identities and social network parameters. Any individual’s reputation is constructed 
as the cumulative of pro- or anti-social behaviors observed and spread through informational flows within 
their respective social network.  Therefore, the reputation of an individual is closely tied to social gossip, 
allowing for perceived reputations of others to be known by strangers based on reputation information 
transmitted by gossip through social networks (Sommerfeld, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2008). A theoretical 
study by Larson, set within the context of inter- and intra-ethnic cooperation, explored how information 
flows affect cooperation. The theoretical predictions were that wider and more rapid information flow paths 
facilitated more cooperative behavior (Larson, n.d.). Thus the more reachable individuals are, the more likely 
their social network structure will foster higher overall cooperation by individual network members. While 
the study framed word-of-mouth communication of poor behavior as a form of peer sanctioning, it captures 
the same traits of a negative reputation effect. Evidence suggests that members of social networks can, to 
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an extent, identify individuals that are better situated for gossip channels (Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, 
& Jackson, 2013).  
When reputation mechanisms are contrasted with punishment mechanisms within artefactual experiments, 
reputation mechanisms were found to be both more effective and more efficient relative to punishment 
(Wu, Balliet, & Lange, 2016). This finding was driven by the non-costly reputation effects increasing both 
individual contribution levels and overall earnings at sustained levels throughout all rounds played. 
Comparatively, punishment mechanisms increased individual contribution levels only in later rounds and 
the costliness of punishment resulted in overall lower collective earnings. However when both reputation 
effects and punishment were both available within game play, costly punishment persisted only at low levels 
and was concentrated against free riders, resulting in an interaction effect that boosted overall efficiency of 
player earnings (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). Reputation effects are thus found to be a powerful and low-
cost alternative to punishment. Within our study both reputation and punishment effects may indirectly 
effect player decision making through revealed game play, however neither mechanism is directly 
incorporated within the study design. Providing information on both the identity of the contributor and the 
amount contributed results in substantial increases in giving to the public good (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004), 
however reputation effects cannot be disentangled from ex-post social sanctioning outside the artefactual 
experiment. 
2.4 Contribution to the Literature 
We contribute to this literature in three ways. 
First, we use network data at the community level. By utilizing community social network data we are able 
to explore how an individual’s position within their most relevant social network is related to observed social 
preferences. By using real-world networks we contextualize decisions to capture both within game and ex-
post social forces that potentially relate to social preference behavior. While this compromises the 
identification of causal relationships, it provides an indication of how social preferences and social networks 
interact within real-world networks.  
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Second, use of full network data allows us to calculate the centrality of individuals within their communities 
rather than just within experimental participant groups. Numerous measures of centrality for capturing the 
importance of a network member for the flow of information and resources exist. Each has its own 
functional forms that uniquely captures the varying traits or characteristics inherent within flow patterns of 
different resources or information (Borgatti, 2005a). Eigenvector centrality is often considered a measure 
of an individual’s influence within a network. An individual is considered more influential the better 
connected they are to central individuals within the network, so eigenvector centrality is a recursive measure 
of connectedness (Bonacich, 2007). This recursive function is solved by using degree centrality weightings 
for an iterative estimation approach. While eigenvector centrality is popularly considered a measure of 
influence, it can also be thought of as the probability of an individual participating in any resource flows 
that are able to travel via unrestricted walks. In other words, for resources that can follow any number 
(infinite divisibility) of any links (unrestricted) between network nodes, eigenvector centrality provides an 
approximate likelihood of a given node receiving and passing along the flowing resource. Information is the 
most common resource that flows through networks both divisibly and unrestricted, making eigenvector 
centrality an appropriate measure for capturing the extent to which an individual participates, influences, 
and potentially controls, information flows within their network (Borgatti, 2005b).58 Our study provides 
insights on whether more centrally positioned individuals are, on average, more pro-social in their 
preferences relative to less central individuals. Such relationship would indicate that social preferences and 
social networks are co-evolutionary in their formation, although this study is not designed to explore 
potential causal or directional relationships. 
Third, by combining network data with revealed game play we are able to explore the responsiveness of 
social preferences to localized social forces of network links and shared network connections. This allows 
us to gain a better understanding of whether individuals’ social behavior is more responsive to the threat of 
wider  information flows (e.g. a greater number of more socially-distant individuals) versus localized forces 
(e.g. directly connected individuals) in facilitating pro-sociality.    
                                                     
58 Banerjee et al. (2013) devise an information-diffusion specific measure of centrality that they term diffusion centrality. This 
measure is closely related in mathematical form to eigenvector centrality and so we persist with eigenvector centrality as the 
determining network parameter of interest within our study design. 
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3 Experimental Design 
To test our claims we combine social network data of household heads with two lab-in-field experiments. 
To collect data for this study we visited each village two times. The first visit entailed a household survey 
with all household heads to collect social network information as well as socioeconomic data. The second 
visit occurred approximately one month later, during this visit we implemented our lab-in-the-field 
experiments.  
3.1 Obtaining network information 
Our research assistants first conducted a full village census of all heads of household in the village, during 
which the head of household’s full name, age, and gender were recorded along with the names of any other 
adults in the household. Upon completion of the census, each household head was individually interviewed. 
  
The census consisted out of two parts. The first part collected information about basic socio-economic 
characteristics, such as demography as well as income and related questions. In the second part we collected 
social network data. Specifically, we aimed to obtain data on three types of network. The first is family network. 
Whether the head of the household is biological family with any member within the other household.59 
Second, we ask about field-neighbor network. Whether the head of the household’s fields borders a field owned 
by any member of the other household. Third, we measure the agriculture network. Whether the head of the 
household discusses agricultural related topics with anybody else in the other household. These three 
networks were carefully selected. Pilot studies which included a larger number and greater variety of 
relationship questions indicated that these three relationships captured the most network variation while 
minimizing survey fatigue. We focus on these three networks because they are most closely associated to 
our interest. That is, Kendzior, Zibika, & Voors (2015) found that these three networks are the three 
predominant channels via which agricultural resources were shared. We conducted a number of pilots that 
                                                     
59 Specifically, we use whether the other person is biologically related to a maximum of the third degree (this is a well-
understood term in Congo). This does not include the wife’s family; it has to be through descent. 
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included more networks.60 Pilot results showed that these three dimensions were the most distinct from one 
another and thus captured maximum variation while minimizing the number of network survey questions.  
Specifically, these relationships were elicited by first constructing a complete roster for the entire community 
of all household heads, wives of household heads, and the presence of other adult members (greater than 
16 years of age) within the household. With this roster, each relationship type was its own survey question 
in which the interviewer informed the respondent that each name from the roster would be read aloud. For 
each name read aloud the respondent would indicate ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on whether there existed between them 
the relationship in question.61 Household heads and their wives had their names read off the roster 
individually, however all other household adult members were grouped into a single category and phrased 
“Are you [connection type] with any other adults within this household?” 
Once network data along the three connections was collected for all household heads the data was first 
collapsed to the household level. If any connection exists between a household head and a member of 
another household, the two households are said to be linked. The result was three separate network graphs 
with each node representing a single household and each connection being unweighted and undirected. 
Secondly, we collapsed these three to a single network graph representing all three connection types. These 
three network graphs were reduced to a single composite network graph in which the presence of a link 
between two households along any connection type is treated as an undirected and unweighted link within 
the composite graph. The result is a single network graph for each community in which each node is a 
household and each link represents the presence of any measured connection being declared from one or 
both of the household nodes. The eigenvector centrality score for each household was calculated using the 
respective community’s composite social network graph. To increase comparability of a household’s 
eigenvector centrality score across communities, eigenvector centrality scores are normalized by community 
size measured as the total number of resident households.   
                                                     
60 In total we conducted three pilots. The other networks were friends (the problem was that everyone was everyone’s friend), 
and work on another person’s farm (that overlapped with the other networks). 
61 This approach was considerably more time intensive than alternative strategies in which names were offered up by the 
respondent for each relationship but overcame potential measurement error arising from memory-based recall. This approach 
also offered the benefit of reducing misidentification of individuals in a context with frequently repeated names.  
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The participants in our lab-in-the-field experiments were selected based on the rank order of households’ 
eigenvector centrality scores. We selected the six household heads with the highest centrality score, whom 
we call “Centrals”.  We also selected those with the lowest centrality score, the “Isolates”. Finally, we also 
selected the six heads of households with the median centrality scores, the “Middlings”. 
About one month later after the first visit, we revisited each village to conduct two lab-in-the-field 
experiments with selected participants: the investment game and the public goods game. We discuss these 
now. 
3.2 Measuring trust and trustworthiness 
To measure trust and trustworthiness we make use of the fully-revealed investment game, following Berg 
et al. (1995). In this game, two participants are partnered together as a Player 1 and a Player 2. From an 
initial endowment of 15 tokens Player 1 decides how many, if any, they wish to share with their partner. 
Each token was valued at 100 Congolese Franc. The total endowment (1,500 FC) is equivalent to a day’s 
work. Any token amount that is shared is tripled and given to Player 2. Player 2 is then given the opportunity 
to return any amount of this received money back to Player 1. Both Player 1 and Player 2 are informed of 
the identity of their partner. The number of tokens shared by Player 1 captures the level of trust Player 1 has 
in Player 2. The number of tokens returned by Player 2 is a measure of Player 2’s trustworthiness. We 
implement this experiment following a round-robin game, where each participant is paired one time with 
the other participants. In other words, each participant is 17 times Player 1, and 17 times Player 2.62  
3.3 Measuring cooperation 
After the investment game, participants took part in a public goods game. Specifically, the 18 participants 
were divided into three groups of six members each. Each group consisted of two Centrals, two Middlings, 
and two Isolates. Each participant received 15 tokens and had to decide what number of tokens to 
contribute to a public account. Once all contribution decisions were made, the public account was doubled 
and divided equally amongst all group members regardless of contribution amount. While the group 
composition is fully revealed for all variations of the public goods game played, the privacy of the individual 
                                                     
62 The order of partners was randomized in advance by ID number. As ID numbers were not randomized within the tertiles, 
there are some potential ordering effects present. 
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contribution decisions varied from fully private, public to a single identified group member, to fully public. 
Each participant plays four rounds of the game. This setup is the workhorse to measure an individual’s 
incentivized cooperation subject to perceived group expectations of social norms (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004). 
3.4 Cooperation under monitoring 
To learn about the importance of monitoring and an individuals’ position within the network on 
contribution behavior, each participant played five variations of the above-described game. Variation 1 is 
the basic setup as described above with all information remaining private. Variation 2 is a fully revealed 
public goods game. In contrast to the previous variation, all individuals’ contribution decisions are made 
public. Variation 3 is similar to variation 1 but a monitor is selected. The identity of the monitor is made 
public to the group prior to play commencing. The individuals’ decisions are made known only to the 
monitor. In this variation, the monitor is a central participant. Variation 4 is the same as the previous 
variation, but the monitor is a middling. Variation 5 is the same as the previous variation, but the monitor is 
a randomly selected isolate. Our design is illustrated in Table 1Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
Table 1 Public Goods Game Variations 
Variation Label Monitor Information Public Information 
1 Fully anonymous NA Public account 
2 Fully revealed NA Player contributions & Public account 
3 Central monitor Player contributions Public account 
4 Average monitor Player contributions Public account 
5 Isolate monitor Player contributions Public account 
 
The order in which participant played the five variations was randomized to avoid ordering effects. In 
addition, participants were randomly assigned to each of the three groups. As part of variations 3 to 5, each 
corresponding participant fulfils the role of monitor for two rounds of play. In other words, in variation 3, 
one central participant will be the monitor for two rounds. After two rounds, the other central participant 
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will be monitoring for the remaining two rounds. The order of monitors in each variation was not randomly 
assigned.63  
At the conclusion of both the investment and public goods games, each participant received compensation 
based on their decisions made with one randomly selected partner-pairing from the investment game (paid 
for rounds played with that partner as both Player 1 and Player 2) plus the payouts from one randomly 
selected rounds of public goods game play across all five variations and all retained silence tokens. 
Participants were paid out for both games simultaneously at the end of the day so participants were not 
aware of their realized earnings at any point during game play.64  
3.5 Estimation strategy 
To learn about social network related determinants of trust and trustworthiness, we estimate the following 
equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑧 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑧 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑧 + 𝛽3𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑧 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝛼𝑧 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑧 is the number of tokens contributed by individual i with partner j in community z. Thus for trust, 
i represents Player 1 and j represents Player 2, while for trustworthiness the opposite is true. 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑧 
is an indicator variable for the centrality type of individual i in community z, where 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑧 ⊂
{central, middling, isolate}. 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑧, is the same for their partner. Xiz is a vector of individual 
characteristics for both Player 1 and Player 2. Included in this vector is gender, migrant status, age, literacy, 
and highest education level attained (none, primary, secondary, tertiary. Finally, 𝛾𝑟  are round fixed effects, 
𝛼𝑧 are village fixed effects in order to control for localized social norms that may affect general expectations 
of social behavior, and 𝜀𝑖 is the residual error term clustered at the individual decision-maker level (Player 1 
                                                     
63 Specifically, the order of monitoring determined by ID number from lowest to highest within each group. This opens up 
potential anchoring effects, in that within variation, the more central of the two monitors will play first. We do not expect this 
to be a big problem as the monitors within variation have a nearly indistinguishable centrality. If there are anchoring effects 
and more central individuals are better monitors then the coefficient should provide an upper bound of the effect. 
64 In addition, to minimize sharing of private information between participants, each player was incentivized not to share 
information regarding their decisions throughout the day with ‘silence tokens’. Silence tokens represented additional bonuses 
of 50 Congolese francs to be earned by not discussing private information and were earned for each round of play. If players 
were overheard sharing information that was meant to remain anonymous or private, silence tokens for that round were 
confiscated and noted on record sheets. 
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for outcomes of trust and Player 2 for outcomes of trustworthiness). Note that in the regressions related to 
trustworthiness, we also control for the number of tokens received by Player 2 from Player 1.  
Previous studies (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005) have highlighted the role of ‘findability’ 
for more effective social sanctioning, thus providing an incentive for more closely connected individuals to 
behave pro-socially. As a result, we rerun equation (1) but where we replace the participants’ centrality 
measures (𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑧 and 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑧) with relational network characteristics between the two 
partners. Specifically, we measure the relationship between two partners in three ways. First, the difference 
in eigenvector centrality score between individual i and partner j. Second, an indicator for the fewest number 
of links connecting i and j. Third, the proportion of direct network connections shared by i and j within 
their overall community social network.65  
To learn about the role of social network related factors for contributions in the public goods game, we 
estimate the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑧 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑧 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑧 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑧 + 𝛽4𝑿𝑖𝑧 + 𝛽5𝑴𝑖𝑔𝑧 +   𝛾𝑟 + 𝛼𝑧 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑧 measures the proportion of the initial endowment contributed to the public account by individual 
i of experimental group g in community z. 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑧 is again the centrality type of  individual i. We 
also include 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑧, which captures the proportion of possible direct links between public goods game 
group g members observed within community z as a measure of localized group density. 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑧 indicates the 
variation, which captures the extent to which information is publicized. 𝑿𝑖𝑧 includes the same set of 
individual characteristics as in equations 1 and 2.66 𝑴𝑖𝑧  is an indicator that individual i is the designated 
monitor. Finally, 𝛾𝑟 are round fixed effects, 𝛼𝑧 are village fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖 is the residual error term 
clustered at the individual level.  
                                                     
65 Due to high correlation between direct link and share of network connections, we split these regressions out separately, 
controlling for difference in eigenvector centrality within each. This circumvents concerns of collinearity within our estimation 
results.  
66 While the Investment Game was conducted prior to the Public Goods Game in all communities visited. However, participants 
were not informed of their earnings until after all game play was concluded. Including a measure of average Investment Game 
earnings for individual i in the Public Goods Game analysis does not affect estimated results.  
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Similar to the investment game we also explore the relationship between the participant and the monitor. 
As a result, we rerun equation (2) but add two measures related to the relationship between the participant 
and the monitor. First, we use a measure captures the proportion of shared network connections within the 
larger community z between individual i and monitor m of group g. Second, we use an indicator variable 
taking value 1 if individual i and monitor m are directly connected within the community social network.67  
4 Data and sample 
Before moving to the results in the next section, we first introduce our data and the participants.  
4.1 Data and attrition 
For the census upon which we base our network measures we took every effort was taken to ensure a high 
level of response in our census, which translates into a very high response rate of 97%.68 In total, we aimed 
to collect trust and trustworthiness data from 720 participants (18*40) and 12,240  pairings (18*17*40). In 
total, this study builds on data from 11,774 investment game pairs, played by 706 participants. For the public 
goods game we aimed to collect for 720 participants over 14,400 rounds (4*5*720). In total, we build on 
data from 712 participants, and 14,192 rounds. Lost data was due to some participants game ID’s being 
incorrectly entered during game play, resulting in lab-in-field data not able to be linked to survey data. 
4.2 Manipulation check: Does network position actually mean something? 
We are interested in differences due to different positions of participants in the social network. We now 
check if being a central, a middling or isolate, actually correspond to other characteristics. Table 2 present 
the differences. In exploring the variation in socio-economic variables across centrality types, we conduct a 
difference in means test between each of the three centrality groups. We find several large differences, and 
some similarities. Centrals are more likely to be literate than Middlings, and Middlings are more literate than 
Isolates. This monotonous sloping trend is consistent for all differences we find. Lower centrality is 
associated with being a migrant, and being a female-headed household. We also see that more central 
                                                     
67 If individual i = monitor m than Direct Link = 0. 
68 When a head of household was absent, we returned to the village for a second time (most often that weekend). If the head of 
household was still absent, a replacement within the household was asked to stand-in for the household head.  Representatives 
were asked to respond to all question from the perspective of the household head. 
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individuals have a higher education level, though this only holds significantly for primary and secondary 
education. This is probably because for higher levels we have very little variation (only very rarely had people 
followed more than secondary education). 
Table 1 Description Game Participants 
     Difference in Means Test (p-value) 
VAR Overall Central Middling Isolate 
Central v 
Middling 
Central v 
Isolate 
Middling v 
Isolate 
 Age (years) 47.632 47.867 48.742 46.274 0.540 0.381 0.125 
  (0.961) (1.198) (1.250) (1.532)    
 Literacy (=1) 0.424 0.515 0.424 0.332 0.038 0.000 0.033 
  (0.034) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)    
Migrant (=1) 0.311 0.129 0.305 0.504 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.035)    
Female (=1) 0.324 0.167 0.326 0.483 0.001 0.000 0.008 
  (0.022) (0.025) (0.037) (0.045)    
Highest Edu Attained        
Primary 0.307 0.358 0.275 0.286 0.020 0.099 0.755 
  (0.023) (0.036) (0.025) (0.033)    
Secondary 0.213 0.262 0.220 0.154 0.279 0.006 0.063 
  (0.027) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031)    
Tertiary 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.679 0.688 0.986 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)    
Inequality Aversion 0.615 0.592 0.581 0.675 0.832 0.163 0.064 
  (0.028) (0.047) (0.042) (0.036)    
N 710 240 236 234    
 
5 Results 
In this section we present the results related to trust and trustworthiness. We then present our results related 
to contributions in the public goods game. 
5.1 The social network and trust and trustworthiness 
Trust is measured as the proportion of the initial endowment that is shared by Player 1 to Player 2. We find 
that as Player 1s, Centrals share, on average, 41% of their initial endowments with Player 2 while Middlings 
and Isolates share, on average,  38% of their initial endowments with Player 2. Trustworthiness is measured 
as the percentage of the initial investment returned by Player 2. We find that Centrals returned an average 
of 129%, compared to 119% from Middlings and 121% from Isolates.  
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Each participant played the investment game 34 times: 17 times as Player 1, and 17 times as Player 2.  The 
round in which participants played can have an influence on game play. Figure 1 shows that moving from 
the first round of play to the second round there is a decrease in both trust (3%) and trustworthiness (5%). 
This drop is recovered, however, over the remaining 15 rounds of play for both Player 1 decisions of trust 
and Player 2 decisions of trustworthiness. We randomly assigned the order so as not to be worried about 
ordering effects. 
Figure 1 Trust And Trustworthiness By Order Of Play 
 
Our results are reported in Table 2. Column (1) in Table 2 presents results from equation (1). We find that 
central individuals are on average sending four percentage points more of the initial endowment than 
middling participants within the investment game. In testing the statistical difference in coefficient estimates 
between central and isolate trust behaviors, the difference is found to be statistically significant at the 10%. 
However, there is no significant difference in trust behavior between Isolates and Middling individuals. This 
result indicates that while centrality is correlated to the social preference of trust, the correlation is not linear 
across all centrality types. Instead, the positive correlation occurs only among the most centrally positioned 
individuals within a social network.  
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Table 3 Regressions Results Related To Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Trust Trust Trust Trustworth. Trustworth. Trustworth. 
Player 1       
Central 0.036**   -0.012   
 (0.014)   (0.012)   
Isolate 0.009   -0.025**   
 (0.015)   (0.011)   
Player 2       
Central 0.001   0.067*   
 (0.003)   (0.034)   
Isolate 0.002   -0.016   
 (0.003)   (0.034)   
Difference Centrality   -0.026** -0.026**  0.056** 0.056** 
(P1 – P2)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.024) (0.024) 
Direct Link  0.020***   0.044***  
  (0.006)   (0.015)  
Shared Connections   0.120**   0.200 
   (0.052)   (0.124) 
P2 Endownment    0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.405*** 0.416*** 0.409*** 1.360*** 1.340*** 1.332*** 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.040) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) 
       
Observations 11,614 11,614 11,614 11,517 11,517 11,517 
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.117 0.116 0.116 
Socio-Econ Indicators P1 & P2 P1 & P2 P1 & P2 P1 & P2 P1 & P2 P1 & P2 
Village Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Round Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p-value for F-test 
P1 Central = P1  Isolate 
0.0948 p-value for F-test 
 P2 Central = P2  
Isolate 
0.642   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors clustered by Player 1 for trust regressions and Player 2 for trustworthiness regressions are 
reported in parentheses. Trust and Trustworthiness (Trustworth.) measured as proportion of initial endowment 
and initial investment, respectively 
 
Next we explore outcomes on trust based on relational network parameters between first and Player 2s. 
Column (3) and (4) of Table 3 show that relationship variables are important. As the difference in 
eigenvector centrality scores between Player 1 and Player 2 increases, trust behavior decreases by over two 
percentage points. This translates to a reduction in mean trust behavior of 6%. As this difference in centrality 
measure is directional, a greater difference in centrality indicates that Player 2 is more central than Player 1. 
This result suggests that more isolated individuals are less willing to trust in more central individuals within 
their community. Network relations that increase trust behavior include the first and Player 2 being directly 
connected (Column (3)) and sharing a greater number of connections within the community social network 
(Column (4)). Interestingly, adding a single additional shared link is correlated more strongly with resulting 
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trust behavior (12%) than having a direct network tie (2%) suggesting that the reputation effect is more 
influential than the findability effect69.  
Next, we move to trustworthiness. Results are reported in Columns (4) – (6) of Table 3. Central individuals 
are more likely to return a higher proportion of the initial investment by 6.7 percentage points (5%)  to 
Player 1s compared to Middling individuals, although this difference does not hold statistically between 
Centrals and Isolates. When Player 1 is an Isolate, individuals are less generous in their return on 
investments, returning on average 2.5 percentage points less (-2%), however this decreased trustworthiness 
is not observed for Middlings or Centrals.  
We find that the relationship between Player 1 and Player 2 is again important. Results are presented in 
Column (5) and Column (6). Both a direct connection between Player 1 and Player 2 and a greater difference 
in centrality are found to affect trustworthiness behavior (Column (5)). More central Player 2s are more 
generous in their returns on investment to more isolated Player 1s, as seen in the positive and significant 
coefficient estimate on difference in eigenvector centrality. When a Player 2 is directly connected to their 
Player 1 partner, they will return nearly 4 percentage points (3%) more compared to pairings in which no 
network link is present. No relationship between more mutual connections and trustworthiness is found to 
be statistically significant (Column (6)). This is in contrast to trust, where the shared network connections 
were found important for higher trust levels.   
5.2 Public Goods Game Results 
The average contribution to in the public goods game is 45% with little variation by centrality. Results for 
equation (2) regression analysis are reported in Table 4. Columns (1) shows that there are few difference 
across treatment variations and player centrality scores. Isolates contribute less (4%) on average compared 
to Middlings, significant at the 10% level. We find no difference in average contributions made by Centrals 
compared to Isolate. Furthermore, we observe no effect of monitor centrality on average contributions, 
indicating that connectedness of a monitor is not strong enough facilitate cooperation by triggering potential 
reputation or findability effects .There are no differences in average contribution levels based on differences 
                                                     
69 As our mean village size is 64 households, a single additional shared link corresponds on average to approximately a 1% 
increase in proportion of shared links. 
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in group density, suggesting that greater connection density within the group is also not a strong enough 
mechanism for increasing cooperative behavior.  
Table 4 Regressions Results Related To Trustworthiness 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 
    
Centrality Type    
Central -0.005   
 (0.012)   
Isolate -0.018*   
 (0.011)   
Variation    
2 – Fully Revealed 0.000   
 (0.008)   
3 – Central Monitor -0.002 0.006 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
4 – Middling Monitor -0.007   
 (0.008)   
5 – Isolate Monitor 0.000 0.007 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
Relation to Monitor    
Difference in Centrality   -0.008 -0.004 
(Monitor – Contributor)  (0.016) (0.015) 
Shared Connections  0.087**  
  (0.041)  
Direct Link   0.022*** 
   (0.008) 
Group Density -0.016 -0.005 0.008 
 (0.050) (0.064) (0.064) 
Constant 0.483*** 0.450*** 0.437*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) 
    
Observations 12,802 7,708 7,708 
R-squared 0.270 0.288 0.288 
Variations ALL 3 - 5  
Socio-Econ Indicators Y Y  
Village Fixed Effects Y Y  
Round Fixed Effects Y Y  
p-value of F-test: Central = Isolate 0.291   
p-value of F-test : Variation 4 = Variation 5 0.400 0.340 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Column (2) and (3) only 
include non-monitored variations as no difference in centrality, direct link, or shared connection relationships 
exist.  
Similar to our investment game analysis, we also explore results based on the relationship between 
participants. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 reports results for the relationship between the participant and 
the monitor. Similar to results observed within the investment game, relational network parameters between 
individuals and the monitor have a stronger relationship with cooperative behavior than individual network 
parameters of either the group member or the monitor individually. From column (2) we find that when a 
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group member shares a larger proportion of community network connections, they increase their 
contribution levels by an average of nearly 9 percentage points, the equivalent of a 20% increase in average 
contributions. Additionally, a direct link with the monitor increase average contribution levels by 2.2 
percentage points. This result reinforces the result observed in the investment game that the reputation 
effect may have a stronger effect than the findability effect – indicating that individuals are more responsive 
to potential information spread of their behavior to their localized social connections than they are 
responsive to potential direct sanctioning by a single individual to whom they are directly linked.  
6 Conclusion 
Building on literature exploring origins and drivers of social preferences, we explore relationships between 
social network positioning and social behaviors in two lab-in-field games. We focus on the network 
eigenvector centrality of individuals within investment game and public goods game. We employ a round 
robin styled investment game with fully revealed play to explore how behaviors of trust and trustworthiness 
are tied to first and Player 2 centrality measures. In exploring cooperation, we employ a public goods game 
varying the presence of a monitor, the centrality of the monitor and compare to non-monitored revealed 
and anonymous public goods game designs. These different variations allow us to explore relationships 
between centrality scores and cooperation as well as the potential reputational or ex-post punishment effects 
that may vary in magnitude by the network centrality of monitors. Using household network data collected 
from 40 communities game participants are selected as the most central, least central, and those in the 
middle, based on calculated eigenvector centrality score.  
Our investment game results indicate that centrality is positively but not uniformly correlated with social 
preferences of trust, trustworthiness and cooperation. While Central individuals displayed higher levels of 
trust and trustworthiness behaviors in the investment game, Isolate individuals displayed less cooperative 
behavior in the public goods game relative to the other two centrality types. These results indicate that there 
are shaping forces tying an individual’s social preferences and positioning within their community social 
networks although our results are unable to isolate the direction of that relationship. Determining whether 
more pro-social individuals become more central or whether more central individuals develop more pro-
social preferences is beyond the scope of this paper. However it is clear that the two are inextricably linked, 
150 
 
providing evidence supporting existing theoretical literature on relationships between pro-social behaviors 
and centrality within social networks.  
Expanding beyond traits of an individual to exploring mutual network traits between paired individuals in 
social transactions highlights the more substantial role of relational network indicators. In the bilateral 
investment game experiment, partnered individuals exhibited higher trust and trustworthiness levels when 
they shared a greater proportion of mutual connections within their social network and had a direct 
relationship tie. Similarly, in the multilateral public goods game environment, when a single monitor was 
informed of the other group member contribution levels, the group members responded to the monitor’s 
presence with greater cooperation when they were directly connected via a network link with the monitor 
and had a greater proportion of mutual connections with the monitor within the larger community network.  
These latter two findings suggest that pro-social enforcement mechanism of ex-post experimental findability 
and reputation effects are strong enough to elicit greater pro-social behaviors but only at a very localized 
level. An individual being more central within a social network is not sufficiently strong enough of a 
mechanism to facilitate pro-social behavior. Instead these reputation effects and findability effects are 
occurring only when the informed party (either the partner in the investment game or the monitor in the 
public goods game) has a more direct influence over the local connections an individual holds within their 
community network. This direct influence may be either through mutual links or a direct link with the 
individual themselves. Our study is unable to determine whether this localization of reputation and 
findability effects is due to individuals being unaware of the relative centrality levels of individuals to whom 
they are only distantly connected, or share few mutual connections with, or whether it is due to the 
findability and reputation mechanisms by more distant individuals being of less concern when making social 
versus individualistic allocation decisions. Research by Banerjee et al. (2013) on the capabilities of 
community members to approximate centrality levels of peers within their social networks, even when 
distantly connected. Furthermore, our study is conducted in small communities of under 100 households, 
making it improbable that knowledge constraints are a major factor in play within our study context. With 
these two considerations in mind, we hypothesize that the reduced pro-social behavior is not attributed to 
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insufficient network knowledge but instead weaker social linkages resulting in reduced effectiveness of 
findability and reputation effects in eliciting more pro-social behavior. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
“Economic action (like all action) is socially situated, and cannot be explained by individual motives 
alone; it is embedded in ongoing networks of personal relations rather than carried out by 
atomized actors”  
~ Granovetter, (1992; p.4) 
1 Overview 
Global development tackles practical, but complex, challenges that reduce the quality of life of populations 
within developing countries. Global development practitioners attempt to implement solutions that bring 
about self-sustaining change and improve the well-being of those within underdeveloped regions. Such 
change ultimately remains rooted in individual actions. Whether it be targeting health with deworming pills 
or financial security through saving and lending opportunities – the impact of the solution is only catalysed 
by the action of individuals adopting them. The question of whether the solution “works” depends first on 
whether it is adopted and second on whether it generates the professed change in outcomes. As a result, 
program design must account for the forces that ultimately drive the actions and decisions of people in 
order to increase adoption of the innovations that can lead to improved wellbeing. 
Throughout this dissertation, the term innovations has been broadly used, referring to both new information 
and new technologies. Adoption of an innovation is the decision to change one’s behaviour by putting into 
practice the new information or utilizing the new technology. Such decisions hinge on the belief that the 
change in behaviour will result in greater or equal well-being – termed ‘returns to adoption’. Only if an 
individual’s information set indicates that such returns are realizable is adoption likely to occur. This 
dissertation has focused on the ways in which social forces shape these information sets on innovations on 
which adoption decisions are based. Specifically it explores the relationship between the channels by which 
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individuals learn and agricultural productivity, diffusion of information through social networks, and the 
relationship between an individual’s social preference and their network position.  
 Within many development initiatives there exists an implicit recognition of some of the social forces 
working behind individual decision-making. Particularly, the use of social learning to facilitate behavioural 
change is a popular strategy within development programs. The use of  peer trainers is a popular tool within 
many development programs as a means of targeting knowledge gaps that may obstruct innovation 
adoptions. This is a particularly popular method within the fields of health (Kelly et al., 1991; Kim et al., 
2015; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Oster & Thornton, 2012) and agriculture (Anderson & Feder, 2007; Conley 
& Udry, 2010; Kondylis, Mueller, & Zhu, 2014). Peer trainers act as the contact points into social networks 
from which information spreads from development practitioners to community members. Such designs rest 
on assumptions of social learning in which information on innovations is transmitted via channels of 
interpersonal relationships.  
Agriculture has been a sector in which the use of peer trainers has become widespread and is most visible 
in the practice of agricultural extension programs (Anderson & Feder, 2004; Rivera, Quamar, & Crowder, 
2001). Practitioners make use of farmer-trainers within communities in efforts to maximize program reach 
while minimizing direct costs to program implementers. With this approach, practitioners reduce the 
number of trainings to only farmer-trainers and then rely on social learning to spread extension information 
onward. Attention has been given to testing the overall effectiveness of agricultural extension on farmer 
productivity, income, and wellbeing (Anderson & Feder, 2004; Cunguara & Moder, 2011; Kondylis et al., 
2014). However studies on the underlying mechanisms that shape social learning are only just beginning to 
emerge within the development economics literature (Banerjee et al. , 2014; Beaman et al., 2013; Breza, 
2016; Kim et al., 2015).  
While development practitioners are eager to incorporate more effective methods into their program designs 
when possible, many lack the capacity or expertise to conduct rigorous empirical testing of mechanisms. 
Academics have the expertise necessary for formulating and empirically testing theories of how social forces 
shape and drive decisions. Through cooperation, a feedback loop is formed in which practitioners offer 
space for academic research to occur within their programs and in return receive insights on more effective 
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program design. Such partnerships have become very popular in testing the overall effectiveness of 
extension programs on metrics of technology adoption, productivity, and economic wellbeing (see 
Anderson & Feder, 2004 for a review of extension evaluations).  However as data becomes richer and more 
accessible, opportunities are presented to test intermediary mechanisms that lay at the core of behavioural 
change and the adoption of new innovations. Studies have begun exploring the role of learning, social 
networks, and the diffusion of information through networks in attempts to better understand  how social 
learning shapes adoption decisions (Beaman et al., 2015; Benyishay & Mobarak, 2015; Benyishay & South, 
2013; Conley & Udry, 2010; Emerick, Janvry, Sadoulet, & Dar, 2016; Vasilaky & Leonard, forthcoming).  
This thesis seeks to contribute to this growing empirical literature. First it explores tools of social learning 
and individual learning. Specifically it tests if reducing-costs to learning-by-doing complements social 
learning for greater impacts on farmer crop harvests (Chapter 2). Second, it dives into the social learning 
process by exploring diffusion of innovations through social networks. Two key questions are asked: (i) who 
participates in diffusion flows, (ii) how far do innovations diffuse, and (iii) how does (i) and (ii) vary by 
network entry-point (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).  Some development programs prioritize who benefits while 
others prioritise the reach of benefits. Different design elements (e.g. network entry point) may be better 
suited for one objective over another. Finally, the thesis culminates with a deeper dive into the relationship 
between an individual’s social preferences and their social network position. As preferences lie at the heart 
of human decision-making, understanding the relationship between social networks and individual 
preferences can provide insight on the heterogeneous behaviour observed within communities. 
This thesis is set within an agricultural context. Economic decisions are highly contextualized and the results 
of this thesis speak directly to decisions within agricultural production. However as more literature emerges 
on similar mechanisms in other sectors, patterns will emerge and mechanisms that are cross-cutting will 
become highlighted. Therefore this thesis is positioned as contributing to the overall literature of social 
learning and technology adoption, with a specific focus on agricultural innovations and rural communities. 
I review the major themes of the dissertation in the sections below. Within each section I discuss position 
insights from my research within a broader context and make recommendations for future research.  
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2 Channels of Learning 
Individuals base their technology adoption decisions on the expected returns to adoption (Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 2010). These expectations are dynamic in that they are updated as relevant new information is 
received and incorporated. New information can be received through discussion with and observation of 
prior adopters (Chuang & Schechter, 2000; Nourani, 2016). However, some technologies have more 
heterogeneous returns or their proper application and structure of returns are less visible through social 
learning (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). Under such conditions, learning-by-doing can be a more effective 
channel of learning as data quality biases are reduced (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010; Sunding et al., 2001). 
Learning-by-doing provides potential-adopters the opportunity to assess the marginal benefits to adoption 
given their personal situation. Within agricultural production, this means that farmers can experiment with 
new innovations in order to determine their respective marginal benefits given their production functions, 
market transaction costs, and optimization priorities (e.g. utility vs. profit). However experimentation comes 
at an investment cost, which can deter potential adopters.  
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, an intervention that reduced the cost of learning-by-doing, coupled with a social 
learning program, is compared to a purely-social learning intervention. Results indicated that the combined 
intervention of social learning in conjunction with lower-cost experimentation had a greater impact on 
average farm output levels. This chapter speaks to how development programs can tailor designs for 
strengthened impact on wellbeing. Farmers are more strongly influenced by prior adopters that are 
comparable to themselves, but uncertainty still remains in regards to the quality and applicability of this 
information (Benyishay & Mobarak, 2015). Many agricultural technologies have a vital knowledge-
component on proper use and application as well as heterogeneous returns depending on farmer application, 
soil quality, crop portfolio, and productive endowments. Targeting experiential learning channels in addition 
to social learning channels can strengthen overall outcomes on farmer output levels by providing farmers 
first-hand knowledge on their returns to adoption. However experimentation must be accompanied by 
sufficient information on the proper use of innovations. Without such information, negative effects could 
arise in which improper use yields negative returns, dampening adoption further.   
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Intuitively, one could anticipate that the synergies of the two learning channels increase over time. Farmers 
that adopt after experimentation will provide further observation points for farmers still deciding if adoption 
is the right choice for them (Nourani, 2016). These dynamic synergies could strengthen the cumulative 
impacts of programs in the longer run. The impact evaluation in Chapter 2 was conducted over a relatively 
short time-horizon for agricultural decisions, lasting only one year, so measuring such dynamic synergies is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However future research is required to better understand potential dynamic 
synergies. Determining how such synergies play out within the timeline of innovation spread and what the 
optimal time is for introducing low-cost experimentation will be a key question for stronger program design.  
Provision of subsidized samples of new innovations in facilitating learning-by-doing  is costly. Alternative 
strategies for reducing the information quality bias may offer a lower cost Research by BenYishay & 
Mobarak (2014) indicates that individuals weight information more heavily from those more comparable to 
themselves. Furthermore,  Hanna et al. (2014) find that what information is noticed by potential-adopters 
when observing prior-adopters influences ultimate adoption decisions. Further research on program design 
elements that can ensure potential-adopters are receiving information from comparable, and trusted, sources 
as well as that the critical elements of information are being noticed could provide cost-effective strategies 
for increasing adoption rates.  
3 Diffusion Targeting and Reach  
Development programs vary in the extent to which they prioritize the targeting of their intervention towards 
specific beneficiaries compared to the ultimate reach of their intervention (Peyre Dutrey, 2007; Van 
Domelen, 2007). Program targeting decisions vary but some examples include goals of poverty alleviation 
(e.g. targeting most “in need”), by demographics (e.g. women or youth), or concerns of ‘elite capture’ (Alatas 
et al., 2013; Buvinic & Gupta, 997; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003). Programs that prioritize reach are more 
focused on achieving widespread impacts. Neither program objective is inherently better or worse, but 
instead depends on the innovation in question and the capacity and mission of the organization. However 
targeting and reach are extremely pertinent to the study of social network diffusion. Program designs must 
take into account network diffusion dynamics and their relationship with outcomes of who is benefiting from 
the information flows as well as how many are benefiting.  
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Theoretical studies and empirical studies utilizing detailed online social network data have illustrated the 
importance of network structures and entry points on resulting diffusion patterns (Sinan Aral, Muchnik, & 
Sundararajan, 2013; Centola & Macy, 2007; Choi, Kim, & Lee, 2010). This thesis has extended this same 
question to the context of a developing country within the agricultural sector. Results from chapter 3 
corroborate previous findings that in selecting network entry points, not all network measures create the 
same diffusion patterns. Studies show selecting network entry points that are more clustered together can 
have positive effects on diffusion reach (Beaman et al., 2015; Centola & Macy, 2007). However no consensus 
has been reached on the effectiveness of selecting individuals with the most connections as network entry 
points ((S. Aral & Walker, 2012; Gulyás & Imre, 2014; Hinz, Skiera, Barrot, & Becker, 2011; Kim et al., 
2015) This thesis finds evidence that  selection of network entry points by eigenvector centrality score yields 
little impact on the width of diffusion. However important results were found on who participated in 
diffusion processes as both central entry-points and isolate entry-points were found to transmit to  network-
central individuals (Chapter 3). This means that regardless of the centrality of the network entry-point, 
resources pool in the center of networks. This is an important finding especially as periphery households 
were found more likely to be female-headed, less wealthy, and less active in community leadership positions 
– all oft-used classifications of ‘marginal households’ that poverty alleviation programs may specifically 
target. Therefore, reaching marginal households may be better accomplished through strategies of direct 
targeting rather than through social diffusion. Additionally, in situations where innovations are more 
susceptible to elite capture, diffusion through social networks may compound potential adverse 
distributional effects.   
While the results of Chapter 3 show no clear differentiation in reach of diffusion by centrality-selected entry 
points, this does not mean that other network parameters will have no effect. Each measure of network 
connectedness capture different relationships between information flows and the network structure. Further 
research on how these relationships vary by entry-point selection processes using different network metrics 
will allow these relationships to be leveraged within program designs. Results from Chapter 3 indicate that 
eigenvector centrality is not an ideal entry-point selection parameter for the agricultural innovation of in-
organic fertilizer. The knowledge-intensity of in-organic fertilizer may require greater consideration be given 
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to the proximity of the entry-points to one another in order for potential adopters to be sufficiently exposed 
so as to be swayed into adopting (as seen in Beaman et al., 2015).  
Chapter 4 uses a complex contagion simulation to network structures, which accounts for proximity of 
network-entry points in predicting which pair of entry-points maximizes diffusion reach. Diffusion reach is 
defined as the proportion of the community who ‘adopted’ the innovation within the simulation. Use of the 
optimal entry-points results in diffusion rates of over 50% within the simulation. The high costs of collecting 
network data and the strict cost constraints that development practitioners race may make network 
simulation-based selection processes impractical. An alternative, lower-cost strategy of community-wide 
polling is therefore compared within the simulation. While community-wide polling is not found to be 
perfectly correlated with simulation-identified optimal entry points, there is substantial overlap. Our results 
are in line to previous findings on community-based selection by Valente & Davis (1999). Community-
polling may offer an opportunity to leverage network diffusion dynamics without the high costs of network-
data. Field testing of this approach is required before community-wide polling can definitively be put 
forward as an effective alternative to network-based selection. A study by Emerick et al. (2016) finds that 
selection of network contact-points using a community-wide meeting yields insignificant results on 
diffusion. However, community meetings are potentially susceptible to hierarchical social pressures that do 
not give equal voice to all attendees’ individual knowledge of network structures. Unequal representation 
may result in less complete network information behind entry-point selection. As a result, field testing a 
private community-polling result would be beneficial in highlighting both the effectiveness of community-
wide selection on diffusion as well as shedding light on dynamics of public versus private nomination 
processes.    
4 Networks and Individuals 
A third dimension of social networks that cross-cut the chapters of this thesis is how social networks and 
individual characteristics are related. Chapters 3 and 4 both find evidence of an individual’s centrality level 
being correlated with socioeconomic indicators of wealth, education, community leadership, and gender. 
These results suggest that network centrality is predictive of social prominence. Furthermore, Chapter 4 
finds evidence of correlations between peer-perceptions of influence with network centrality. This strong 
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relationship may offer a policy opportunity. Selection using socio-economic indicators offers a strong 
correlation to both network connectedness and perceived social influence. This predictive relationship 
offers development practitioners a lower-cost method of identifying entry-points that leverage diffusion 
dynamics and social influence.  
Social influence, as measured by community nomination, is not perfectly correlated with either network  
centrality nor socio-economic prominence. This indicates that there are missing explanatory factors of 
influence within the model. One explanation may lie in individual preferences. Socially influential individuals 
were found to be more pro-social in terms of trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation relative to their non-
nominated peers (Chapter 5). Social preferences are important for understanding which individuals are more 
likely to participate in community-beneficial interventions, even at individual costs, and how such individuals 
can be incentivized. For development programs, this information can be leveraged within program design 
for selecting more pro-social individuals and designing more effective incentives.  
More research is necessary on what incentive structures will best facilitate greater diffusion. Evidence 
suggests that social learning can be strengthened when communicators are provided with small incentives 
(Benyishay & Mobarak, 2015). Exploring how response to different incentive structures varies by social 
preference sets and network position will help identify how incentives can be better used for generating 
diffusion based on network entry-point.  
This thesis explores only preferences as they relate to sociality. Exploring relationships between network 
position with a broader set of preferences (e.g. risk, time-discounting) could offer greater insights behind 
network position and innovation adoption decisions. Preference under-gird economic decision-making. 
Understanding links between an individual’s likelihood to adopt an innovation, preference set, and network 
position will offer opportunities for identifying pro-social first-adopters that are well positioned for 
catalysing diffusion.  
5 Final Thoughts 
Social networks, and the interpersonal relationships that define them, can provide valuable information on 
how global development initiatives can strengthen the spread of innovations. However the complex 
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relationships between technology adoption, social influence, and networks within developing countries is 
still in the early stages of research. It is on the shoulders of academics to more thoroughly explore the 
mechanisms that underlie these relationships so they can be translated into policy designs that increase 
intervention impacts.  
Opportunities for such research continue to grow as data costs decrease with the continued expansion of 
ICT infrastructure within developing countries. This data will provide opportunities for researchers to 
explore more complex and contextualized questions on the relationships between social networks and 
human behaviour. This zooming in on the foundations of human behaviour is imperative in understanding 
how social forces drive the individual decisions that ultimately shape development program outcomes.  
This thesis was directed by zooming in on mechanisms, but the digitalization of social interactions will create 
opportunities to explore networks at a regional, national, and international level. Network data within this 
thesis was collected through in-person surveys which necessitated that only small networks, defined at the 
community level, be analysed. Future research is required on larger community networks as its unlikely that 
network dynamics scale up in a linear fashion. Furthermore, future research should not ignore networks of 
communities and the interlinkages between each community. By moving up a level and exploring networks 
of communities, a better understanding of geo-spatial diffusion within regions becomes possible. Such 
insights could guide decisions on which communities should be targeted by development programs as 
opposed to just which individuals within those communities. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This thesis contributes to a growing literature that explores relationships between social networks and 
innovation diffusion within a developing country context. Given this context, the networks of interest 
within this thesis are the offline interpersonal relationships between community members. Diffusion 
channels for new innovation are therefore limited to word-of-mouth communication, observation, and 
personal experience. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis analyses two policy tools in targeting these information gaps. The first is through 
social learning as part of a farmer extension program. The second combines social learning with experiential 
learning, reducing the cost to personal experimentation with subsidized improved input packages. Our 
results indicate that farmers who are exposed to both social learning and learning-by-doing more 
significantly impacts farmer productivity relative to those receiving no intervention and those exposed only 
to social learning. I interpret this result as an indication of learning-by-doing combined with social learning 
being a more effective strategy for facilitating adoption of technologies that have more heterogeneous 
returns to adoption.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis tests the difference in diffusion patterns that result by varying the network contact-
point. Specifically, network contact-points are selected as being either the most central or least central 
individuals within the network. I find evidence that centrality affects the speed of distribution but does not 
affect the width of diffusion nor which individuals are participating within the diffusion process. 
Furthermore, large attenuation is observed throughout the diffusion process, which suggests the importance 
of selecting a sufficiently large set of lead community members for the spread of new technology. 
Chapter 4 combines a community-wide polling of network entry-points combined with detailed community 
network and socio-economic data. First we explore what attributes are prioritized by community members 
in nominating a resident farmer as an extension contact-point. Second, we use simulations to compare the 
diffusion spread of top-nominated individuals as network entry-points compared to entry-points that 
achieve maximal spread within diffusion simulations. We find that community members prioritize network 
connectedness, pro-social preferences,  and socioeconomic indicators of gender, age, formal leadership, and 
education levels within their nomination decisions. Furthermore, receiving the top three most amount of 
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nominations is found to be significantly correlated with selection as an optimal entry-point within the 
diffusion simulation. These results suggest that community-wide polling offers a less data-intensive 
opportunity to realize gains in diffusion warranted through network-based seeding.   
Chapter 5 explore whether an individual’s observed social preferences is correlated with an individual’s 
centrality within the network structure. Our results indicate that individuals with high centrality are more 
trusting and more trustworthy than individuals with lower centrality.  Moreover, individuals with low 
centrality are treated worse in these interactions—people trust them less initially, and return less money to 
them. Within a group context, little evidence is found of more central individuals displaying more 
cooperative behavior. Instead, for group cooperation, when a single monitor can observe contribution 
decisions, the presence of a direct link and more mutual network connections with a monitor correlates to 
more cooperative behavior by that individual. Our results suggest that network centrality and pro-social 
preferences are related but more localized network ties are more strongly correlated with pro-sociality than 
overall network connectedness. 
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